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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study emphasizes the role of soft power in China’s relations with Africa. It attempts to 
explore and interpret China’s role in Africa from Joseph Nye’s perspective of soft power and 
Realism in general.     
 
China’s foreign policy is ideologically underpinned by nationalism. In the past two decades, it is 
based on the need to protect its national interest, by expanding trade and diplomatic relations. 
For this reason, China has expanded economic interest in Africa by means of mutual 
development and investment, economic cooperation and trade. This has led to the growth of 
‘soft’ ties between China and Africa, through the provision of aid and diplomatic cooperation. 
By using ‘soft power’ as a vehicle to promote the perception of a peaceful rise to power, it also 
makes a valuable contribution to the Chinese goal of constructing a harmonious world. 
 
Based on the research, the conclusion is that China has achieved impressive gains in its overall 
level of soft power in Africa, especially in economic and political aspects of its relationship with 
Africa and less in its cultural penetrations.  
 
 
 
Key words:  China and Africa, soft power, Joseph Nye, Realism, economic soft power, 
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CHAPTER ONE:   
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The importance of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the world has been steadily growing 
during the past few decades. China, with a soaring economy as well as an increasingly affluent 
population, is now the second largest trading nation in the world in GDP terms, only trailing 
behind the United States of America (USA). China’s economy is entering a new phase, looking 
outwards and investing in different nations around the world1. In order to acquire resources and 
assets for its growing population, Chinese companies have been searching the global stage for 
new markets and technologies2. 
 
The point of departure of this study is that China is using soft power to promote its national 
interest on the global level. This study is therefore not intended to provide evidence to prove that 
China is using soft power in Africa, but instead it is used as a premise for this study. In this 
regard three articles written by Joseph Nye can be cited which illustrate that China is indeed 
using soft power. They are: The Rise of China’s Soft Power3; Why China Is Weak on Soft Power4 
and China’s Soft Power Deficit5. Many other quotations and references appear in the chapters 
that follow which elaborate on this premise. The main purpose of this study is to investigate how 
soft power is used by China in Africa (see especially chapter 5 and 6). In chapter four we 
examine in detail China’s concept of soft power in general. 
 
In China the concept of soft power has become very fashionable among Chinese political 
leaders, academics and policy makers. Since Joseph Nye first coined the term in 1990 in his book 
                                                          
1 Kuhn, A,Series overview: China’s growing influence, retrieved from http://www.npr.org/templates/ story/story. 
php?storyId=89196830 2008, accessed on 31 March 2008 
2 Kuhn, A, Series overview: China’s growing influence, retrieved from http://www.npr.org/templates/ story/story. 
php?storyId=89196830 2008, accessed on 31 March 2008 
3 Wall Street Journal Asia, Op-Ed,The Rise of China’s Soft Power, Nye, Joseph, 29 December 2005 
4 International Herald Tribune, Op--Ed,Why China Is Weak on Soft Power, Nye, Joseph, 17 January 2012 
5 Wall Street Journal, Op-Ed , China’s Soft Power Deficit, Nye, Joseph,  9 May 2012 
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Bound to Lead6, Chinese leaders have been quick to adopt this concept into their political 
strategy. Mingjiang Li argues that “the discussion of China’s soft power has been particularly 
notable. The concept of soft power provides a unique perspective not only on China’s current 
foreign and security policy but, more significantly on the trajectory of China’s rise in the long 
term”7. National President and the Secretary-General of the Communist Party, Hu Jintao, noted 
at the Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Group meeting on 4 January 2006 “that the increase of 
China’s international status and influence depends both on hard power, such the economy, 
science and technology, and defense, as well as on soft power, such as culture”8 He reiterated 
again in the 17th Party Congress in October 2007 the need to build China’s cultural soft power to 
meet its international and domestic challenges.9 Various government organizations, such as the 
ministries, the State Council Information Office and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conferences (CPPC), are regularly discussing ways for China to exercise its soft power by 
means of public diplomacy. 
Chinese academic works were initially focused on introducing and evaluating the concepts of 
soft power but later took the discussion one step ahead to develop Nye’s ideas by adapting his 
concept to suit China’s needs.  
As China’s status rises on the global stage, its soft power has become a subject of scholarly 
scrutiny in recent years. China has moved quickly and made self-conscious efforts to mobilize its 
soft power resources to promote its interest and cultivate its influence as a rising power. In order 
to ease growing tensions and anxieties about China’s rise, it has embraced the notion of soft 
power, as it is compatible with Chinese cultural and political imperatives. 
China has come to see soft power as a fundamental component of its comprehensive national 
power, which includes economic, military and political power. In the words of Tsinghua 
University’s Professor Yan Xuaetong,“during a period of globalization, the sphere of 
competition is no longer about land, resources or markets but rule–making, setting regulations, 
                                                          
6Nye, Joseph, Bound to lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, Basic Books, Inc., 1990 
7 Li, Mingjiang, ed., Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics, Lexington Books, 2009, page 
6 
8Hu Jintao, Report to the 17th Party Congress, October 15, 2007 
9 Hu Jintao, Report to the 17th Party Congress, October 15, 2007 
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norms. Building soft power is a way to advance China’s domestic and international agenda, to 
guard Beijing against criticism, and to boost the country’s international standing10”. 
China’s economic growth and rising prosperity at home has given rise to a greater demand for 
the world’s resources, as well as the need to develop stronger bilateral relations with different 
nations. Among the strongest and clearest of these examples are China’s relationships with 
African states. It will be argued in this study that China’s expansion and penetration into the 
African continent is mainly through the use of “soft power”. If will become clear later in the 
study that soft power implies the use of persuasion and attraction rather than coercion11. Given 
this, some of the key questions underlying the research in this study will be: is China’s use of 
soft power succeeding in Africa? If so, how and what are the instruments of soft power that 
China uses in its bilateral relations? How is soft power used in its political and economic 
relations with Africa? This research therefore hopes to determine the nature of China’s use of 
soft power in Africa.  
 
1.2 Motivation for the study 
 
China has been the most successful developing country in the modern era of globalization12. 
China was regarded as one of the poorest countries at the beginning of its economic reforms after 
1978. Since then its economy has expanded at a steady annual average rate of eight per cent of 
GDP, which dramatically improved the living standards of ordinary Chinese people13. According 
to David Dollar, this “growth rate has fueled historically unprecedented poverty reduction; the 
share of the population living beneath the World Bank’s cost of basic needs poverty line declined 
from 60% at the beginning of economic reform in 1978 to 7% in 2007”14. For Africa's part, 
Chinese involvement is arguably the most momentous development on the continent since the 
end of the Cold War. China’s approach to Africa has dramatically changed since the end of the 
                                                          
10Hooghe Ingrid, The limits of China’s soft power in Europe, Beijing’s public diplomacy puzzle, Netherland Institute 
of International Relations, page 4, January 2010 
11 Nye, J.S., Soft power: The means to success in world politics, New York City, Public Affairs, 2004 
12Dollar, David, Lesson from China for Africa, Policy Research Working Paper 4531, The World Bank, February 
2008, page 2 
13Dollar, David, Lesson from China for Africa; Policy Research Working Paper 4531, The World Bank, February 
2008, page 1 
14Dollar, David, Lesson from China for Africa; Policy Research Working Paper 4531, The World Bank, February 
2008, page 1 
~ 15 ~ 
 
Cold War. Authors like Alden argue that after the end of the Cold War and since the mid-1990s, 
the emergence of “China as a significant political force in Africa has instigated a transformation 
in the continent's traditional international relations orientation”15. For much of the past “thirty 
years Africa has been considered as a developmental failure plagued by bad governance, 
economic decline (macroeconomic instabilities, resource curse), acquired immunodeficiency 
syndrome (AIDS), environmental degradation and conflict. Since lately, China's engagement 
with Africa has turned the attention of the scholar community (among others), and watchers are 
debating the nature and scope about the Chinese motives in the region”16. 
 
Stephen Marks writes that “China’s relationship with Africa has shifted from Cold War ideology 
to a more classical pursuit of economic self-interest. But it’s not all negative - as the global 
economic giant bulges, opportunities also arise for Africa”17. 
On the other hand, other writers argue that China’s pursuit of economic self-interest – through its 
access to raw materials, markets and spheres of influence through investments, trade and military 
assistance – can be viewed as pursuing the goals of any classical imperialist power. 
China’s engagement with Africa commenced as early as 1949 after the victory of Mao’s 
Communist Party over the Chinese nationalists. During the period from the late-1950s to 
Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, China played a significant role in Africa’s liberation 
movements.  The 1980s heralded an end to the Sino-African engagement based primarily on 
ideological or Third World solidarity as Chinese development efforts were diverted inwards in 
tandem with policies enunciated by Deng Xiaoping. Through the 1990s China increased its aid to 
African governments on the premise of mutual respect and non-interference in their domestic 
affairs. Trade between China and Africa expanded rapidly from approximately US$12 million in 
1950 to more than US$10 billion during 2000-200318. By 2013, the Economist indicated that 
                                                          
15Alden, C., Large, D. and Soares De Oliveira, R,. China Returns to Africa: A rising power and a continent 
embrace, London, HURST Publishers Ltd, 2008, page. 353-4 
16Carmody, P., Globalisation in Africa: Recolonization or Renaissance?, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010, 
page 1 
17Guo, Sujian, and Shiping Hua, ed. New Dimensions of Chinese Foreign Policy, Lanham, MD, Rowman & 
Littlefield-Lexington, 2007, page 20 
18Moyiga, Nduru, China and Africa in an Ever-Closer Embrace?, Sometimes thornier embrace? Johannesburg, IPS, 
8 December 2004 
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China has become Africa’s top business partner and trade between the two countries has 
increased to US$166 billion19. 
There is however a depth and complexity to China-African relations that require a much more 
sophisticated study and analysis. The main motivation for this study is to determine how China is 
using power – and specifically ‘soft power’ (as conceptualized by Joseph Nye and others) – in its 
relations with African states to maximize its own self-interest and in the process to enhance its 
international status as an emerging or rising world power.  
 
Since the 1980s China has displayed a significant rise to power as a result of the opening up 
process and accelerated economic growth20. Subsequently, China’s interest in Africa has seen a 
renewed impetus, as is evident in growing relations with the continent in recent developments. 
This growing Chinese interest in the African continent has led to critical assessments of the 
nature of China-Africa relations and whether these are mutually beneficial and are based on 
harmonious principles aimed to forge a new multilateral world order, or, conversely, whether 
they are based on economic exploitation aimed at fuelling China’s rising power status. Many of 
the studies on this issue assess mostly ‘hard’ power aspects of China’s expanding influence and 
therefore neglect a critical element of Chinese foreign policy that may be at the crux of a 
potential multilateral world order based on South-South cooperation and a greater role for China 
in international leadership. 
 
1.3 Literature review 
 
In this section an overview is presented of the state of academic research or literature on China’s 
use of soft power in its relations with African states. It is not presented here as an exhaustive list 
of all the publications on this topic. The purpose is rather to present an overarching perspective 
on the existing literature and therefore the literature discussed represents specific themes or 
                                                          
19The Economist, Chinese trade with Africa keeping growing: fears of  neo colonialism are overdone, 23 March 
2013, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21574012-chinese-trade-africa-keeps-growing-fears-
neocolonialism-are-overdone-more 
20Contessi, N., Experiments in Soft Balancing: China-led Multilateralism in Africa and the Arab World, Caucasian 
Review of International Affairs, vol 3, issue 4, 2009, page 404-434. 
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tendencies on our research topic. In the case of theoretical literature on soft power, it is expanded 
further in Chapter Three. 
  
In the last decade, the literature on China’s soft power in Africa has dominated many scholars in 
Africa and abroad.  The literature review will provide a general overview of the state of literature 
on China and its use of power as well as its perceptions about soft power and its status as a rising 
power. The literature review will focus on academic scholars who have already written on soft 
power in China-African relations. It will provide the reader an indication of the nature of the 
existing the literature, some of the main tendencies in the literature and therefore also some of 
the main shortcomings in it. It will also provide an indication of the prominence Africa has 
already received in this research. It is not the only opportunity to address this topic and in 
Chapter Three scholarly aspects of soft power are discussed again.   
 
In 1968 George Yu, a leading contributor to China–African research, wrote that “‘studying 
China in Africa is much like pursuing a dragon in the bush. The dragon is imposing but the bush 
is dense”21. This analogy of the dragon operating in the unfamiliar African bush describes China-
Africa relations very well. 
 
In July 1961, The Institute of Asian-African Studies was set up following Chairman Mao’s 
observation that “we don’t have a clear understanding of African history, geography and the 
present situation”22.  There was a marked shift in the quality of the research produced within 
China, which was affected by political developments within and outside China, as Li Anshan has 
noted: “African studies in China have been more or less a mystery to Africanists in other parts of 
the world”23. The earliest and the most comprehensive historical background regarding relations 
between China and Africa was Philip Snow’s book The Star Raft: China’s Encounter with 
Africa24.  It provided a comprehensive account of historical contacts between the two continents. 
 
                                                          
21 Yu, George T., Dragon in the bush: Peking’s presence in Africa, Asian Survey, vol. 8, issue 12, 1968, page 1026. 
22 Li Anshan, African studies in China in the twentieth century: a historiographical survey, African Studies Review 
48, 1, 2005, page 62. 
23 Li Anshan, African studies in China in the twentieth century: a historiographical survey, African Studies Review 
48, 1, 2005, page 62 
24 Snow, Philip, The Star Raft: China’s encounter with Africa, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1988. 
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There appeared a limited number of publications on China–Africa relations during the 1990s; Ian 
Taylor provided probably the earliest study on Taiwanese diplomacy in Africa25. Chris Alden’s 
China in Africa is arguably the foremost publication providing serious analysis on the topic26. 
Another significant publication which utilizes the Chinese concept of “soft power is the Forum 
on China-Africa Cooperation: The politics of human research development edited by Li Anshan 
and Funeka Yazini April27.  
 
Taylor’s China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise and China in Africa: Mercantilist 
predator or partner in development? edited by Garth le Pere28 as well as Barry Sautman and Yan 
Hairong’s analysis provide critical interventions of China’s links with Africa29. A special edition 
of the South African Journal for International Affairs30 and African Perspectives on China in 
Africa, provides a diverse range of views31.  
 
Trade and resource publications have increased32 and have focus primarily on resource 
extraction which is the driving force behind China’s current engagement in Africa33. However 
                                                          
25His works include China’s foreign policy towards Africa in the 1990s, Journal of Modern African Studies 36, 3, 
1998, page 443–460; The “Captive States” of Southern Africa and China: the PRC and Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 35, 2 (1997), page 75–95; and, with Scarlett 
Cornelissen, The political economy of Chinese and Japanese linkages with Africa: a comparative perspective, 
Pacific Review 13, 4, 2000, page 615–633.  
26Alden, Chris, China in Africa, Zed Books, London, 2007. See also his China-Africa  relations: the end of the 
beginning in Peter Draper and Garth le Pere (eds), Enter the Dragon: Towards a free trade agreement between 
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the contentious subject of governance issues regarding China and Africa has not yet received 
much academic attention34. 
 
Literature on the relationship between South Africa and China is more extensive than in the case 
of other African countries. This is expected, given China’s importance and interest in South 
Africa. Garth le Pere and Garth Shelton (see for example, China, Africa and South Africa) are 
regarded as notable South African scholars on China and South African relations35.  
 
With regard to the long and short-term impact of China’s engagement in Africa, two contrasting 
views are presented. Authors like Alden argue that “Africa without Europeans” broaches the 
possibility of transformative impact whereas authors like Clapham argue that China’s 
intervention is unlikely to change Africa fundamentally36. 
 
The literature on soft power has gained much interest and momentum in China and among 
scholars. Mingjiang Li’s survey of Chinese articles published in Chinese journals and periodicals 
is kept in a vast database called the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI). It was 
found that the annual number of articles with references to "soft power” averaged about eight 
during 1994-200037. This number increased to 53 during 2000-2004, and continued to increase to 
314 during 2005-200738. During this period, the senior Chinese leadership, including President 
Hu Jintao and Chairman of the Chinese Political Consultative Conference, Jia Qinglin, stressed 
in several meetings that China should strive for its soft power39. In The Dragon’s Hidden Wings, 
Ding argues that the popularity of soft power as a concept could be traced to China’s need to 
fend off the ”China threat” argument (discussed in Chapter 6) and to assure the world about the 
peaceful nature of a rising China. Chinese scholars also believe that soft power is embedded in 
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Chinese traditional ideology40. The popularity of soft power in China, and China’s efforts to 
aggressively cultivate soft power has dominated scholarly debate. One of the best known authors 
on China’s soft power is Joshua Kurlantzick who has written several books and articles on it. He 
emphasizes that China uses soft power by attracting African elites and it is gaining popularity in 
Africa. Similarly, Kurlantzick, Zhu and Wibowo have also written extensively on China’s soft 
power manifestations in Africa. 
The mainstream literature on China’s soft power focuses on its popularity in China and the major 
tools China uses to cultivate soft power and strengthen its image abroad. This literature largely 
follows what Mingjiang Li called the “behavioral approach” of soft power, which focuses on the 
soft use of power. 
The notion of soft power is very popular in China but because it is meant to support its rise as a 
major power in the future, the question is whether it will not constitute a contradiction: that it 
uses power to be attractive but ultimately its international power can become a threat for others. 
These arguments from different perspectives are presented by scholars. In addition to reviewing 
the literature on soft power, it will therefore also be useful to look at some of the literature on 
China’s rise as a major power.   
Since the early 1990s scholars, policy makers, governments and key business leaders began 
questioning China’s new role as a rising power in the international domain. Andrew J Nathan 
and Robert Ross explained in their book China’s New Foreign Policy Strategy: The Great Wall 
and the Empty Fortress that the rising China will not necessary become a threat41. At the time of 
writing their book in 1997 their view was that China has not yet sufficiently demonstrated its real 
intentions and that its economy needs time to be integrated into the world system. On the other 
hand, more critical authors like Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, in their book The Coming 
Conflict with China, published also in 1997, predicted an inevitable conflict with Asia and even 
more so with the United States42. They foresaw an “inevitable conflict between an expansionist 
China that views itself as the rightful arbiter of power in Asia and a naïve and unprepared United 
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States that has already entered three wars in the last half century to prevent any single country’s 
domination”43. 
Some commentators argued for the past decade that China will become a superpower of 
unprecedented proportions44, while others suggest that “an economically strong China would 
become bolder, more demanding and less likely to cooperate with other major powers in the 
region”45. Some also claim that China will become a hegemonic power in East Asia. Engaging 
China: the Management of an Emerging Power by Alastair Iain Johnson and Robert S. Ross 
provides a comprehensive and provocative analysis of China’s rise within the region. Michael 
Swaine and Ashley Tellis have authored a thoughtful study of China’s grand strategy that looks 
at the security implications of China’s rise. They argued that “an assertive China is likely to 
appear over the long haul”46. Avery Goldstein adopted a more theoretical approach by looking at 
the applicability of various international relations theories to different aspects of China’s rise and 
integration into the international order47. Numerous articles published on China’s rise focus on 
China’s elite perception and military capabilities. Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang focus on the 
internal variables that shape China’s behavior in the international arena48. 
In examining China’s rise, authors like Alastair Johnson and Robert Ross have posed the 
question - what implications do the growth of Chinese power have for peace and stability in the 
international system? They addressed this question by providing an in-depth analysis of China’s 
foreign policy. 
 In a book published in 2006 titled New Dimensions in the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy49 
they explored rising China’s foreign policy from multiple dimensions, including different 
research agendas, diverse methodologies and research materials. They argued that the rising 
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China may not be a stabilizing force in East Asia. Conversely, other authors like David C. 
Kang’s China Rising: Peace, Power and Order in East Asia argued that China’s rise from its 
neighboring countries can be a stabilize factor in the region both politically and economically50.  
David Lampton’s Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money and Minds looks at the military, 
economic and intellectual aspects of China’s rising power51. Other examples of authors who 
have addressed the issues of Chinese foreign policy include: Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang’s 
China Rising: Power and Motivation in the Chinese Foreign Policy52; Sujian Guo’s China’s 
Peaceful Rise in the 21st Century: Domestic and International Conditions53; and Sujian Guo and 
Shiping Hua’s New Dimensions of Foreign Policy54.  
Most of these authors are of the view that China possesses significant power resources that can 
be mobilized to pursue the country’s national interest. A key question raised by many of them is 
however whether China will become a responsible power in the twenty-first century? 
Despite increased research on China’s soft power and rising power status, as presented above, 
the existing literature on it is still limited and under-researched, and from the discussion it should 
be apparent that it is the case particularly in regard to China’s use of soft power in Africa. This 
conclusion serves as an additional justification for this research project.  
 
1.4 Research question 
 
The main focus of this study is to analyze the concepts of “power” and “soft power” in the context of 
China and Africa. It is based on two assumptions: The first is that China aspires to become a ‘world 
power’ and it raises the issue of the nature of that power. Secondly, as a rising world power, its 
relationship with African states is based on a diverse use of that power to achieve its objectives. The 
research question therefore arising is: 
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• In its relationship with African states, how does China use soft power to promote its 
national interest? What is the nature of that soft power and does it also affect our 
theoretical understanding of soft power?  
 
1.5 The study’s objectives  
 
Following from the research question the purpose of this study is to achieve the following two 
objectives: 
1. To determine the salient features of ‘soft power’ and their application in Chinese 
relations with African states. Moreover, to determine China’s perception of what "soft 
power” is and how it can be used in Africa.  
 
2. To test the theories of ‘soft power’ in the process of their application to Chinese 
relations in Africa. Based on the preparatory research for this study it is assumed that 
the Chinese application of soft power can be divided into two main areas: the political 
and economic aspects of soft power.  
 
1.6 The theoretical framework 
 
The theoretical approach at this study is grounded in the traditions of International Relations (IR) 
and Global Political Economy (GPE). China’s involvement in Africa will therefore be explained  
a from Realist perspective an International Relations, since it emphasises the different 
dimensions of power and therefore can explain China’s stance towards Africa in terms of soft 
power. In discussing Political Economy, the theory of Economic Nationalism is most apt for 
analysing China’s economic involvement in Africa.  Chapter Three is dedicated to develop this 
theoretical framework in more detail. In this section only a few introductory remarks are made, 
mainly about Realism and Economic Nationalism. In Chapter Three ‘soft power’ as a theoretical 
concept for this study is explained. 
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According to Hans Morgenthau as one of the pioneers of Realism, the main aim of states within 
the global system is to pursue their national interests “defined in terms of power”55.  In order to 
build power and gain an advantage in the balance of power equation, states are inherently self-
centered entities. Morgenthau believed that the national interest is defined within the ‘political 
and cultural context’ of foreign policy formulation56. Therefore, power and its use will depend 
on the current political and cultural context. 
 
China’s foreign policy can therefore be viewed “as responsive to the changing dynamics of the 
international environment”57. For example, ‘energy security’ is seen as a strategic national 
objective for powerful states and therefore is an economic articulation of Realism which can be 
aligned with Economic Nationalism in theoretical terms. 
 
1.7 The limitations of this study 
 
Studies of Chinese politics and economics are numerous and vast in their focus areas. This study 
forms part of that corpus of literature but must be demarcated so that the reader does not have 
unrealistic expectations. The first limitation of this study is that the analysis uses mainly 
qualitative methods. Due to the nature of the topic, namely the role of soft power, it is difficult to 
measure it in qualitative terms. The concepts of soft power are not easily quantifiable and even 
its main protagonist, Joseph Nye, have not made any attempt to quantify it. The qualitative 
nature of this research excludes any additional value that could be gained from quantitative data, 
and opens the analysis to subjective interpretations and normative deductions on the part of the 
researcher. 
  
The second limitation is related to the focus of the study and, more specifically, to the necessity 
to contain the topic within a practical framework. Firstly, the scope of the study is bound by the 
specific theories underpinning the analysis and the selection of cases is made in accordance with 
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expected outcomes. The case selection is done in an attempt to derive general trends based on 
comparisons. It provides an overview of what the researcher understands as China-Africa 
relations and might therefore inherently lack empirical depth and precision. The timeframe of the 
study is also limited to the period from 1990 to 2012.  
 
A major challenge in conducting this research from an empirical point of view is the lack of 
reliable data on both traditional and non-traditional types of Chinese investment in Africa. The 
Chinese central government departments’ trade statistics may be biased or inaccurate and 
therefore some of the data maybe unreliable. Every effort has been made to cross-check it for 
accuracy and consistency during interviews and when obtaining data, but they are still limited in 
their accuracy, especially those that depend on statistics from African states.   
 
This is often true for private Chinese companies and Chinese SOEs, which receive funding from 
a number of Chinese investment banks with close connections to the Chinese government. Data 
on these subjects is usually drawn from third-party sources engaged in monitoring activities, 
which may not capture the full scale of Chinese activity, or may suffer from reporting bias. This 
is equally true when obtaining any information from African countries.  In many cases any data 
maintained by African governments is generally unreliable and not up to date. However, every 
effort was made by combining and comparing information from several sources to ensure 
accuracy. 
 
Another limitation to this research was the magnitude of the task of covering 53 African 
countries. African countries are not homogenous and in fact are very different in their political, 
economic, social and historical background and therefore this made the task difficult. This study 
is therefore not about with each of the African states but is a continental perspective with some 
comparative elements. It does not pretend to represent an analysis of each of the African states. It 
should also be made clear that the study is approached from the Chinese perspective and not the 
perspective of the African states. In that sense it is limited to only one side of the power 
relationship. 
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1.8 Research methodology  
 
In this study the concept of China’s soft/hard power will be analyzed in order to develop a 
deeper understanding how China uses soft power in its foreign policy towards African states. 
The method used in this study is primarily analytical and explanatory, and provides a detailed 
account of China’s political and economic involvement in Africa. The methodology consists of 
the following components:  
 
1.8.1  Qualitative approach 
 
This study uses a qualitative approach and not an empirical, quantitative one which means that 
the sources of information are mainly in published form or derived from interviews. It does not 
include statistical analyses or manipulation of empirical data, survey analysis or mathematical 
modeling.  It is based on sources like scholarly research work published in academic journals, 
books, and publications from Chinese and Western think tanks and research institutes. In 
addition, the research relies also on official documents and reports of Chinese origin and by other 
official bodies (including Chinese documents like the White Paper on China's African Policy). 
The Chinese and Western media were also consulted, including web-based publications. The 
method applied in this respect was a literature analysis of the published information and a 
qualitative content analysis of the interviews. The literature and official documentation included 
several types of information, ranging from empirical statistics to theoretical analyses in 
international relations and history. 
 
The qualitative approach in this study is primarily comparative in nature. The comparisons are a 
combination of longitudinal (i.e. comparisons over time) and cross-sectional (i.e. amongst states 
at the same point in time) approaches. The comparisons are sometimes amongst focused case 
studies and in other instances a comparison of the statistical data of a number of states. 
 
One possible method for this study was to concentrate on one or more case studies based on the 
premise that they will be representative of African states in general. It is, however, almost 
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impossible to identify a small number of cases that will be representative of the entire Africa. In 
the absence of representative cases any of the conclusions of a case study will only apply to that 
case and cannot be generalized about. Therefore the comparative approach instead of case 
studies was chosen. 
 
The qualitative method of content analysis is used in the study. It is primarily in the form of 
logical interpretation of texts (including interview texts) and does not include codifying core 
concepts or phrases in texts for the purpose of empirical analysis. 
 
1.8.2 Interview methodology 
 
The methodology regarding interviews involved the following: 
1. Selection of interviewees: 
All the interviewees were experts in one or more aspects of the research topic. An important 
contribution to this research is the wide range of personal expert-based (or key informant) 
interviews designed for qualitative information analysis and conducted over a period of seven 
years (from 2007 to 2013).  
During this study’s proposal stage 23 interviewees were initially identified based on their direct 
relevance for the research topic. The selection was based on persons identified as relevant during 
the literature review or the researcher’s work experience on China at the Institute of Security 
Studies and in other capacities. Interviewees were selected from various disciplines and sectors 
such as academics, think tanks, senior government officials, the diplomatic corps, and private 
sector. Snow-balling methods were also used in the sense that some of the interviewees referred 
the researcher to other experts.   
The interviews were conducted in the USA, China and South Africa. During my seven visits to 
China I had the privilege to interview several senior government officials, senior academics, 
policy makers, researchers from think tanks, leaders from the business community and diplomats 
posted in Beijing and in Africa.  
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The selection of interviewees was never intended to constitute a representative sample of a larger 
population. It was also never intended to constitute a survey with generalized conclusions. It was 
confined to the notion of “elite interviewing”58 which could produce unique, qualitative 
information.  
2. Format of the interviews: 
Interviews can be based on either a well-prepared structured format, or a semi-structured format 
or even an unstructured format. The structured format means that the same questions are put to 
all the interviewees or respondents. Such a format is very useful for comparative purposes. If the 
questions are a closed set of options and not open-ended questions, then they are also useful as 
surveys which can be presented in the form of statistical data. Semi-structured interviews are a 
combination of the structured format and questions designed specifically for each respondent. 
The structured parts are useful for quantitative analysis while the unstructured parts are more 
appropriate for qualitative analysis, except if codified content analysis is done. 
An unstructured format is used if each respondent or interviewee has unique information 
available which constitutes a source in itself and is not regarded as merely one opinion amongst 
many. The interview is then designed to discover the unique information with specifically-
targeted questions. According to Manheim & Rich, such a format suits elite interviewing59: 
In this context, people are referred to as elite if they have knowledge which, for the 
purposes of a given research project, requires that they be given individualized treatment 
in an interview. Their elite status depends not on their role in society but on their access 
to information that can help answer a given research question, though people who get 
elite treatment in research are often persons of political, social, or economic importance. 
Most of the interviews for this study were conducted in an unstructured manner in order for the 
questions to be flexible and responsive to the course taken by the interview while the interviewee 
was able to speak freely and respond to open-ended questions. The unstructured interviews were 
designed for their specific expertise and access to information.  The questions were therefore not 
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meant to be an empirical source of information to be used for comparative purposes or 
representing any specific categories of persons or the views of specific types of organizations or 
institutions. These interviews were recorded and transcribed; furthermore, notes were taken 
during the interview process. These formed the textual source of the interview. 
For ethical reasons all the interviews were conducted with the clear understanding that they were 
not confidential (or ‘off-the-record’) and that the interviewed person understood that it would be 
used for this research. 
3. Interpretation and use of interview information: 
The interviews were transcribed and therefore became a “text” for the researcher. The 
interviewee provided the context of the text, in particular the person’s institutional or political 
position justified his/her authority to make observations or statements about a particular matter. 
Therefore they cannot be treated as equal in value and some information weighs more than 
others. Manheim & Rich made the following observation about it60: 
… never treat what interviewees say as factual data, but rather treat the fact that they said 
it as data. In understanding political behavior it is often as important to know what 
people believe or claim to be true as it is to know what is true. 
The ideal is that information gained through an interview should be verified by information from 
other types of sources and vice versa. It is however not always possible, because some 
information can be unique and is not available in any other form. Interview information is not 
necessarily less reliable or “objective” than other forms of published information. A limitation on 
interview information, however, can be if an interviewee’s memory is not any more reliable. 
Most of the information gained from interviews for this study is however relatively current in 
nature; some of it is also about interpretation or opinions and therefore does not rely exclusively 
on correct historical “facts”.  
In this study the interviews were treated as important sources of information similar to the other 
sources. Their texts were analyzed by means of content analysis and were, where possible, 
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integrated with the literature analyses of the other published sources. In some instances the 
interviews were independent and could not be complemented by other sources. In other instances 
a form of cross-referencing was possible.  
  
1.8.3 Research conducted at Harvard  
 
In 2008/2009 the researcher was awarded a Harvard-South African fellowship and thereby was 
given the opportunity to pursue pre-doctoral studies at Harvard University.  The researcher was 
able to utilize the facilities of the well-known Harvard China Centre which provided assess to a 
unique source of unpublished reports and archival material which contributed to a deeper 
understanding of the subject matter. Access to other well renowned resource centers like the 
Harvard–Yenching Library, Harvard University’s Asia Center, the Fairbank Center for Chinese 
Studies and its H.C. Fung library, provided me with primary and secondary sources that are often 
not available in Africa or South Africa.  Several interviews were also conducted with leading 
academics and China experts in Washington, DC and at Harvard University.   
The research at Harvard utilized both the qualitative and interviews methods. The rich collection 
of resources there included the latest statistics on China provided by the IMF and World Bank, 
UNDP, and the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade). These 
relatively new statistics and information on Sino-Africa economic affairs provided a clear track 
on the extent of imports, exports, investment figures and aid contributions between China and 
Africa.  
 
1.9  Structure of the study  
 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. The study focuses on China’s influence in Africa and for 
that purpose it is divided into the following chapters:  
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Chapter One introduced the rationale for this study, its research objectives, the problem 
statement, the research methodology and an introduction to the theoretical framework that will 
be used in this study.  
Chapter Two provides a historical background to the relationship between China and Africa. 
Most of the focus is on the period from 1949 to 2000. This background is not presented as a 
history of China but instead identifies some of the most salient historical aspects for 
understanding China’s current use of soft power in Africa. 
Chapter Three provides the theoretical perspective of this study, by observing China’s rise from 
different perspectives, including the Realist perspective and comparing it with other international 
relations perspectives like classical power analyses focusing on soft/hard power (coercive use of 
national power in international relations) and its related power resources. Finally, we present 
Joseph Nye’s theoretical view of soft power.   
Chapter Four traces China’s application of soft power in general and not only in Africa. 
Although it is Nye who first coined the term ”soft power”, the idea of soft power has always 
been embedded not only in recent Chinese foreign strategies, but also in ancient Chinese 
ideology and culture. This chapter reexamines it in more detail and describes soft power from the 
Chinese perspective.  
Chapter Five analyzes how China has used economic soft power in its relations with African 
countries, in various sectors like trade and foreign aid. A number of case studies are used to 
support the findings.  
Chapter Six examines China’s political soft power in Africa. This chapter focuses on China’s 
political diplomatic skills in persuading African countries to become strategic partners by signing 
several treaties and agreements that may have led to increased cooperation or stronger ties 
between Beijing and African countries. Additionally, this chapter includes an analysis of how the 
issue of Taiwan plays a role in the relationship between China and Africa through Beijing’s 
pursuit of the One-China Policy. This chapter also analyzes the frequency of meetings between 
high-level cabinet Ministers and Head of States and how this has cemented stronger relations 
between countries; and finally  
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Chapter Seven the conclusion, presents the findings of this research. The chapter provides an 
overall answer to the questions posed in this research, namely: In its relationship with African 
states, how does China use soft power to promote its national interest? What is the nature of that 
soft power and does it also affect our theoretical understanding of soft power? It concludes with 
an analysis of and several final thoughts on the direction of Sino-Africa relations and where they 
may be possibly heading in the near future.  
 
1.10 Concluding Remarks 
 
As mentioned earlier Realism is the theoretical point of departure of this study and Realist 
theorists argue that a rising power has a high potential to disturb the balance of power in a 
particular context, which can possibly lead to conflict. According to Realist scholars, emerging 
great powers often resort to ‘force’ (war, military actions) to change the status quo in accordance 
with its own national interests. On the other hand, existing powers feel threatened by such action 
and therefore are normally determined to preserve their status within the international arena. 
Some theorists differ by stating that economically developed world is the area for “complex 
interdependence” among states. These complex interdependencies can sometimes promote 
cooperation. From this point of view it can be argued that China is becoming increasingly 
integrated into the larger capitalist system and globally more interdependent on other states.  
They argue that therefore China cannot be defined as a revisionist power that wants to radically 
change the current international balance of power. They further argue that China’s reforms have 
increasingly changed its foreign policy from communist Maoism to a reformist policy. 
This literature review has presented different perspectives on China’s power perceptions and 
their possible implications. Though it presented a rich tradition of publications on China’s use of 
soft power, Africa as a region is not particularly well represented in it. Earlier it was already 
mentioned how prominent China is becoming on the African continent but it is not yet reflected 
in the scope and magnitude of research studies done on its use of different forms of power to 
achieve it. Even in more specific terms this literature review concludes that soft power in its 
existing theoretical form and in the way China utilizes it in relation to African states has not yet 
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received sufficient research attention. It therefore provides a justification in its own right for such 
a study to be conducted.  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1. Introduction  
 
The rise of China has become the focus of attention because of its rapid economic growth and 
active diplomacy in world affairs. This chapter seeks to establish a theoretical and conceptual 
framework for an analysis of China’s rise to such prominence based on its relationship with 
African states. For that reason it will use a theoretical and empirical connection between Nye’s 
soft power concept and China’s rise in relation to Africa. 
 
Based on the above research question of this study in Chapter 1, which includes assumptions 
about China’s power, an investigation into the driving forces for China’s involvement in Africa 
will require theoretical tools that deal with a range of dimensions about power, the use of 
different forms of power to promote its interests, and the prominence of national interest as a 
concept in China’s foreign policies and relations. It is unrealistic to expect that one set of 
theoretical propositions will suffice for this study and therefore a combination of them is 
presented here. The first of them is Realism which is historically the theoretical tradition in 
International Relations most associated with the concept of power. Economic nationalism is 
another theoretical tool of analysis to understand China’s rise. Finally, I shall draw from Joseph 
Nye’s theory of soft power in order to understand China’s use of soft power in Africa. 
2.2 Realism: National interest as a key component 
 
Realism provides the most appropriate analysis to understanding power and hence the notions of 
on ‘soft power’61. 
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From the early 1930s to the twenty first century leading political scientists, international relations 
theorists and policy makers have given prominence to the Realist view of understanding the 
world. According to the historian E.H Carr, the starting point to understanding international 
relations was to believe that inherently human beings and countries will be in a constant state of 
conflict. However, there are imbalances where certain people and some countries are better off 
than others62. But countries and human beings will always, as a first priority, defend and 
preserve their privileged position. The less privileged or the “have-nots’ will constantly want to 
better their situation.  
 
In describing ‘essential Realism’, Dunne and Schmidt put forward three elements common to all 
Realist works: ‘statism, survival, self-help’63. This makes the state the key unit of focus and 
analysis. Although the state, which has monopoly on legitimate violence, provides for the 
security of its  inhabitants, internationally the absence of an over-arching body leads to a void 
that forces  states to compete with each other. Ultimately, this is a competition between states for 
their survival which is necessary before they can carry out their other responsibilities.64 Through 
self-help, state at a global level can achieve security, but uncertainty about states intentions can 
turn security capabilities into perceived threats. For many Realists, a balance of power is 
necessary for stability. 
 
Jackson and Sorensen described the key elements of Realism as ‘a pessimistic view of human 
nature’; a view that international relations are fraught with conflict, ‘ultimately resolved by war’; 
with priority going to ‘national security and state survival’; and scepticism of the possibility of 
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progress.65 Levy noted that Realist leaders focus on the short term and ‘adopt worst case 
thinking’66. 
 
Realism can be classified in from classical realism, through modern Realism to neo- or structural 
realism, which includes a number of branches, among them defensive and offensive realism67. A 
sketch of the development of Realism should help anchor it in the broad streams of IR thinking 
overall and help us in our later reconsideration of ‘soft power’. 
 
International relations viewed through the prism of Realist theory are essentially about how 
inter-state relationships are used to maximize states’ national interests and desires. Another 
element of Realism is that the state is regarded as the key actor in international relations and its 
only priority is to ensure the survival of the state by maximizing its power. Self-help is also 
another important tenet of Realism. 
 
One of the most significant Realist theorists was Hans Morgenthau, who brought the theory to 
the United States.  His book Politics Among Nations: The struggle for power and peace, first 
published in 1948, dominated the studies of international politics for two generations. 
 
Morgenthau’s point of departure was that human nature is the base of international relations and 
humans are self-interested and power seeking, resulting in ultimate aggression.  Therefore the 
international system causes states to become self-interested entities, with the aim of building 
power and gaining and maintaining an advantage in terms of the balance of power. It was 
Morgenthau’s belief that national interest must be situated within the ‘political and cultural 
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context’ of foreign policy68. It therefore means that power and how it is utilized is dependent on 
the current political milieu. Consequently, China’s foreign relations policy and conduct “are seen 
as responsive to the changing dynamics of the international environment”69. 
 
The rise of fascism in the 1930s in Europe is highly debated and challenged and influenced the 
theoretical assumptions of Realism about human nature in very important ways. The same 
applies to Hannah Arendt’s notion of totalitarianism. Einstein believed that the “human lust for 
hatred and destruction is intrinsically in all humans”70. Freud corroborated with this view that 
such an “aggressive impulse did indeed exist, and he remained deeply skeptical about the 
possibilities for taming it”71. 
 
A second departure point for Realism is its focus on the struggle for power - “the ultimate aim of 
international politics, power, is always the immediate aim”72. According to Morgenthau, 
international relations are essentially a struggle for power and for survival, justified by 
promotion of a state’s national interest. The quest for power certainly characterized the foreign 
policies of Germany, Italy and Japan in the 1930s; it also characterized much of the Cold War 
and it still today characterizes many states’ international behavior. 
 
2.2.1 Neo-realism 
 
Kenneth Waltz broke new ground in his book Theory of International Politics which illustrated a 
different Realist theory inspired by the scientific ambitions of behaviorism. His theory is often 
referred to as ‘Neo-realist’. Waltz departs from classical Realism in showing no interest in the 
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ethics of statecraft or the moral dilemmas of foreign policy - which are emphasized in the Realist 
writings of Morgenthau73. 
 
Waltz points out that the balance of power and security concerns are the main Realist analytical 
tools. There is special focus on great powers as they have the most influence on the international 
stage. Waltz specifically refers to the period after the Second World War which was dominated 
by two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. This bi-polar system, he predicted 
then, would tend to balance each other. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
United States naturally became the dominating power. However his ‘balance of power theory’ 
implies that other countries will attempt to neutralize the more powerful country by trying to 
establish a balance with it - in this case the USA. Furthermore, the smaller and weaker states will 
tend to align themselves with great powers in order to preserve their maximum autonomy. In 
arguing this, Waltz departs from the classical Realist argument that human nature is only about 
self-interest and is manifested by recurring conflicts, rivalries and wars. According to Waltz 
“states are power-seeking security-conscious not because of human nature but rather because the 
structure of the international system compels them to be that way”74. 
 
The main differences between classical Realism and Neo-realism is that classical Realists situate 
the basis of international conflicts (war) in the inhumanity of man while Neo-realists believe that 
its roots are to be found in an anarchic international system.  
 
2.2.2 National Interests 
 
Realism and its variations share the notion that states are primarily concerned with promoting 
their national interests in their relations with other states. One of the most important means of 
promoting national interest is to maximise their power on the international level. 
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The national interest can be defined as things that satisfy the material and spiritual needs of a 
nation. It includes economic, military, and cultural interests. The primary national interest is the 
state's survival and security. The pursuit of wealth and economic development and prosperity are 
also important national interests. Many states (especially in modern times) regard the 
preservation of the nation's culture as of great importance. 
 
National interest can be divided into core national interest, important national interest and 
ordinary national interest. Core national interest is the interest that concerns the existence of a 
nation and is usually not compromised. Important national interest refers to the interest that is 
important for national survival. For example, the Chinese government regards Taiwan as a core 
national interest. 
 
National interest can also be categorized into short-term, mid-term and long-term national 
interest. National interest is usually viewed as the basis of the foreign policy and international 
activities of a nation. 
 
Realists define national interest in terms of power and tend to view national interest from the 
domestic aspect. Morgenthau believes that national interest should include three aspects: 
territorial integrity, sovereignty and cultural integrity75. Within it, the most essential national 
interest is the problem of national existence.76 Liberals define national interest more as economic 
interest and believe that the different nations can have common interests. Keohane put forward 
three kinds of national interest: existence, independence and economic wealth77. Both Realists 
and Liberals’ national interest concept absolutely reflects a materialist ontology. However, 
constructivists believe that national interest is decided by national identity, with the implication 
that a change of national identity, results in national interest also changing.78  According to 
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Wendt, different people within one nation will have different perceptions on national interest, for 
example national existence, independence and economic wealth79. 
 
 2.2.3 Defining power (Realism and Neo-realism) 
 
The most basic question asked in every work on power analysis and therefore also in Realism is: 
What is power? Power has been traditionally defined as the ability to realize wishes and to 
produce the effects one wants to produce. For example in Bertrand Russell’s theory of social 
power, power was simply defined as “the production of intended effects”80. Max Weber offered 
this definition: ”Power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a 
position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this 
probability rests”81 . The discussion here is not intended to be an exhaustive treatise on power, 
because ultimately for the purpose of this study only very specific notions of power (mainly ‘soft 
power’) will be concentrated on, but a general and brief introduction is required. 
 
According to John Mearsheimer the first orthodox view of power is defined within a Realist 
paradigm: “realists believe that state behavior is largely shaped by the material structure of the 
international system”82. However this definition of Mearsheimer misrepresents Morgenthau’s 
view of power - because he believes that “power may comprise anything that establishes and 
maintains the power of man over man…..from physical violence to the most subtle psychological 
ties by which one minds controls another”83. It is evident from the literature that classical 
Realism and Neo-realism view power in very opposing ways. Classical Realism emphasizes 
human nature as the basis of international relations while Neo-realism concentrates on the 
anarchic international system84.  
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Morgenthau’s classical Realism is based on a fixed and universalistic account of human nature 
(as articulated by Thomas Hobbes or Machiavelli). Realism makes the point that “politics, like 
society in general is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature”85.  
According to Morgenthau, “the struggle for power at the international level is largely the result 
of animus dominant; the political man’s urge to dominate others, a concept influenced by 
Nietzsche’s metaphysics on the will to power”86. However, Morgenthau moves beyond just 
looking at human nature when he regards the “state as a collective reflection of political man’s 
lust for power and the unit which carries out its impulses at the international stage”87. In 
Morgenthau`s theory the state is the central object and the agent pursuing power in international 
affairs. The Maslow hierarchic order is used in support of it, because it accepts that the pursuit of 
power (as a survival need) is important; hence the desire to dominate others. It is also the 
motivating factor in states behavior which occurs as long as the international system remains 
anarchic.  
 
 For Morgenthau, an important aspect of power resides in the armed forces, but even more 
important is a nation’s character, morale and quality of governance88. This is further elaborated 
when he states that “power….tends to be equated with material strength, especially of military 
nature, I have stressed more than before its immaterial aspects”89. Waltz provides a narrower 
definition of power or capabilities than Morgenthau, which includes the “size of population and 
territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and 
competence”90. Waltz’s emphasis on materialism is due to his commitment to ‘scientific’ 
realism. Consequently, he limits his definition to mainly tangible variables which are easier to 
qualify. 
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‘Rising powers’ or new emerging powers like China have always been regarded as a threat by 
status quo powers. Power is conceptually relational in nature and therefore a ‘rising power’ is 
emerging in relation to other powerful states.  In order to understand the relational dimension of 
the concept of ‘rising power’ one needs to look beyond the Realism family for answers to the 
question: “what is power?” Beyond the realm of International Relations power has been 
traditionally defined in Political Science “as the ability to realize wishes and produce the effects 
one wants to produce”91. Robert A. Dahl views power as “A has power over B to the extent that 
A can get B to do what he would not otherwise do”92. According to Dahl, power is exercised in 
order to cause those who are subject to it to follow the private preference of those who possess 
power. Other political theorists like Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz believe that a “power 
relationship should include a second face – A has power to prevent B from doing what he wants 
to do”93. 
 
 In Steven Luke’s book, Power: A Radical View he argues that power needs to be looked at from 
a multidimensional basis. He argues that “the exercise of power is one in which A affects B in a 
significant manner contrary to B’s interest and this is applicable to both individuals and 
collectives”94. The first dimension is the ability of A to change the behavior of B; the second is 
when A is able to define the agenda and thereby preventing B from expressing her/his interest in 
the decision–making process; and lastly when A determines what a grievance is and creates the 
perception that B acknowledges that he/she does not have any significant grievances95. Luke 
believes that the most effective type of power is the ability to influence and manage people’s 
thoughts and desires so as to preempt future conflict. This aspect of power can be viewed in the 
processes of socialization and control of information and the control of mass media.  
 
                                                          
91 Baylis John and Smith Steven, The Globalization of World Politics, An introduction to International Relations, 
Oxford University Press, 1997, page 112 
92 Dahl, Robert A. The Concept of Power. Behavioral Science, vol. 2, issue .3, 1957, page 201-215 
93 achrach Peter and Morton Baratz, Two Faces of Power.  American Political Science Review, vol 57, no 4, 1962, 
page 947-52 
94Luke, Steven, Power: A Radical View, second edition, New York, Palgrave Macmillian, 2005, page 15 
95Luke, Steven, Power: A Radical View, second edition, New York, Palgrave Macmillian, 2005, page 20 
95Luke, Steven, Power: A Radical View, second edition, New York, Palgrave Macmillian, 2005, page 21 
 
 
~ 43 ~ 
 
There are two basic distinctions that can be drawn between behavioral power - the ability to 
obtain the outcomes one desires - and resource power - the possession of certain resources   
associated with the ability to reach the outcomes one wants. During the past decades, several 
interpretations have been conceived about power. It is seen as either the attributes of the state, 
the attributes of relations among states or the structure of the international system. Each of these 
is represented in a conceptual school of thought on power in the field of international relations. 
These schools are complementary to the different approaches already discussed but emphasize 
different aspects of power.  
 
We will discuss three traditional approaches (attribute power, relational power and structural 
power) in the conceptualization of power. These approaches can be useful to determine the 
nature and extent of China’s power. 
 
2.2.4 Attribute Power Approach 
 
The first conceptual approach to understanding power is commonly held to be determined by the 
properties attributed to the state and this is called the attribute ‘power approach’. This is central 
to the idea of the balance of power between states and alliances. Based on this approach, power 
resides “in the aggregate capabilities of the state relative to others and can be measured by some 
inventory of state attributes. It is a basic power conversion model that presumes the ability to 
translate underlying capabilities into effective influence or compliance through the imposition of 
costs or conferring of benefits on the opponent or the threat or promise to do so”96. This view 
was further developed and expanded by Hans Morgenthau who believed that power was not only 
an immediate aim but also a means to the nation’s end. Morgenthau vehemently argued that 
international relations are the struggle for continuous power and all nations strive to realize their 
goals by means of attaining the ultimate power. He defined power as “man’s control over the 
minds and action of other men, and political power as the mutual relations of control among the 
holders of public authority and between the latter and people at large”97. He also distinguished 
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two elements of power:  relatively stable elements and those subject to constant change in 
determining the power of nations.  The first concept of relatively stable factors includes 
geography and natural resources (food and raw material). The second idea of constant change 
includes industrial capacity, military preparedness (technology, leadership, and quality of armed 
forces), population, national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy and the quality 
of government98. 
 
2.2.5 Relational Power Approach 
 
The second approach argues that power is embedded in the relations between actors; this is 
called the relational power approach. The concepts of ‘global power’, ‘superpower’, ‘regional 
power’ or ‘rising powers’ all assume an element of comparison with other states, and therefore 
power is determined in relation to other states. This approach adopts the view that power is not 
limited to the properties that inhere in the state actors but include resources that emerge from all 
kinds of exchanges between actors.  Robert Kahl suggests “that power terms in modern social 
science refer to subsets of relations among social units such that the behaviors of one or more 
units … depend in some circumstances on the behavior of others”99. These factors include force, 
sanctions, trade, aids, technology transfer, and direct investments. The analysis of relational 
power can also be extended to non-state actors like international organizations, multinational 
corporations and individual persons.  
 
According to this approach state power is relative, not absolute. The relational power approach 
focuses on attraction and co-option rather than coercion by physical force in international 
politics. Advocates of these theories employ an analytic framework of interdependence and 
dependency to explain how power operates in international politics. 100 
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2.2.6  Structural Power Approach 
 
The third approach, the structural power approach, believes that power emanates from the 
structures of the international system. This approach views power as residing in the unequal 
distribution of various resources in the international system. Today it is seen in concepts like the 
North/South or formations like the G8 or the G77+China, in the governance structures of the 
IMF and World Bank or the P5 in the UN Security Council.  
 
Calls for the reform of the UN, for example, are essentially a call for a change in the structural 
power relations. At the national level, citizens who have limited assets and resources and who 
therefore feel structurally powerless, more often engage in conflicts. Susan Strange, who 
specializes in international political economy, elaborates on this concept as structural power 
within international relations. Structural power decides how things are determined and the ability 
to shape frameworks whereby states relate to each other or relate to corporate enterprises. 
Strange argues that what matters is “the share of world output – of primary products, minerals 
and food and manufactured goods and services”. She elaborates that a country’s power can also 
be determined by other intangible forms - like information technology. The US has dominated 
the market in information technology which makes the US a major economic power101. 
 
2.2.7 Multidimensional Power Approach  
 
After discussing the three traditional approaches of the concept of power within the ambit of 
international relations, the following observation can be made:  one of the fundamental 
weaknesses is the absence of a multidimensional approach to understanding power.  It would be 
true to say that the three traditional approaches rely only on a single dimension of power: the 
attributes of the state, or the relations among states, or the structure of the international system. 
Many international relations theorists have attributed the lack of analytic leverage of the Realist 
conceptualization of power to its uni-dimensional view of power resources and not much 
synthesizing of the different approaches. 
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Critics and theorists argue that there is no comprehensive theory in a multidimensional approach 
and hence one has to draw theories from other disciplines like sociology, psychology and natural 
sciences to obtain a better understanding of the subject of power. 
 
There are at least two reputable perspectives on the multidimensional view of power. In the first 
perspective three analytically distinct types of resources (utilitarian resources, coercive resources 
and normative resources) coexist and each lends itself to a distinctive mode of domination102. 
The second perspective distinguishes between allocative resources (control over material 
objectives) and authoritative resources (control over human beings)103. The multidimensional use 
of allocative and authoritative resources prevents power analysts from equating power with 
violence104.  
 
This study will use a multidimensional framework (based on a combination of the approaches 
discussed above) to understand power from different perspectives within an international 
relations framework as a means to understanding China’s relationship with African states as an 
aspect of its ascension to a world power position.  
 
2.3  Joseph Nye’s Soft Power105 
 
The term “soft power” was conceived and coined by Joseph Nye. Although the concept can be 
traced to earlier political and social scientists, Morgenthau recognized the importance of the 
‘quality of diplomacy’ as an important factor. Although Nye attempted to redefine soft power, he 
still referred to traditional Realists like Hans Morgenthau, Klaus Knorr and Ray S. Cline, who 
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believed that the definition of power as the possession of resources might be more practical than 
a behavioral definition of power106. 
 
Soft power should not at all be understood as the “soft” strength of a state.  Since soft power 
leads to compliance and agreement, it can be more strategic and provide longer-term benefits 
than hard power107. 
 
Nye believed that soft power can achieve the desired goals through persuasion or attraction (or 
co-option), without the necessity of using force108. It also includes political and cultural ideals, 
institutional and organizational imperatives, and the extent to which these factors shape or attract 
others who have similar desires.109. Nye contends that a country could obtain the outcomes it 
desires when other nations, who admire that country’s values, copy it, and strive for its level of 
prosperity and openness110. Nye, however, stresses that soft power is not the same as 
influence111. According to him, influence may also be the outcome of the use of hard power 
through threats or payments112. He argues that soft power is more that persuasion, admitting that 
it is still a key part of soft power and that, in fact, it is attraction that usually leads to 
acquiescence. In behavioral terms, soft power is attractive power113, and soft power resources 
produce this attractive power114. Three resources, according to Nye, constitute the soft power of 
a country, namely political values, culture, and foreign policies115. Political values consist of a 
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government’s domestic and international policies that can be leveraged as soft power so long as 
these policies appeal to others. Culture includes a country’s pop-culture, education, and 
commerce.  
 
Foreign policies contribute to a country’s source of soft power in that it can provide legitimacy 
and moral authority to that country116. With regard to hard power, military power relies on using 
threats of force through coercive diplomacy, war, and alliances with the aim of coercion, 
deterrence, and protection. Additionally, economic power, which consists of using aid, bribes, 
and economic sanctions in order to induce and coerce, also forms part of hard power. Hard 
power differs from soft power in that the former is used to force, while the latter is used to co-
opt. They sometimes however strengthen and meddle with one other117. As Nye indicates, hard 
power can create a sense of invincibility that may lead other nations to emulate the country that 
utilizes hard power.118. At times, when a large nation’s military power is accompanied by soft 
power, weaker nations maybe attracted to it and follow the lead of the larger nation119. When it 
comes to hard power and soft power, both are complicatedly intertwined in today’s world120 - as 
illustrated in the figure below.  
 
Figure 1: Forms of Behavior between Hard Power and Soft Power121 
 
 
Hard power/ 
command                           Coercion            Inducement        Agenda sitting        Attraction                Soft power/ co-optive 
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For the institutionalism theorist, ‘interdependence’ also denotes certain characteristics of 
contemporary international relations, such as the greater complexity of, and the decreasing state 
independence in international relations. Against this backdrop, the concept of soft power 
provides a new approach to analyzing rising powers and the current “interdependent” world in 
which power not only has been distributed in a multidimensional pattern, but also has been 
owned by many more non-status quo powers and new international actors. 
 
In contrast with Waltz, Gilpin and Rosecrance, Nye elaborates on other important issues in 
defining power - which are less concerned with military power.   Kenneth N. Waltz describes 
power politics in a bi-polar world as “competition (that) becomes more comprehensive as well as 
more widely extended. Not only just military preparation but also economic growth and 
technological development become matters of intense and constant concern”122. Robert Gilpin 
notes that besides military, economic and technical know-how, factors like public morale and the 
quality of political leadership have the ability to influence political events123. Richard 
Rosecrance stresses that since 1945 the world is moving toward a system composed of states that 
view power as a trading system that has the potential to change the traditional views of self-
sufficiency124. 
 
In comparison to the above authors, Nye’s analysis of power transition in the new international 
environment includes factors like global information, culture, ideology, institutions, technology 
and education. He believes these aspects have become more important than factors like 
geography, population and raw materials. 
 
It is clear that Nye does not reject the Realist definition of power. On the contrary, there is a 
clear link between his definition and those of the Realists. In fact Nye provides a neoliberal 
paradigm in which to explore Morgenthau’s power analysis. Nye admits that while world politics 
have become much more complex and new approaches need to be adopted, traditional views of 
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military balance of power should not be abandoned, but rather its limitations should be accepted 
and supplemented with insights about interdependence125. 
 
Nye criticizes the traditional attempts to define power in a narrow sense in terms of traditional 
military power and strategic power based also mainly on traditional military and strategic 
aspects.  Those narrow definitions preclude a country from obtaining desired political outcomes 
without threats or manipulation. Nye argues that in the age of rapid globalization, culture, 
political values and foreign policies, as elements of soft power, are increasingly important in 
achieving great power status126. 
 
Thus important manifestations of power are inclined to become less tangible and less coercive 
among developed countries. It is evident that as developing countries embark on a modernization 
process and enter the globalization process, soft power becomes more important in international 
relations. Nye explains that since the Cold War, the United States has become an economic and 
military superpower. 
 
Based on the institutionalist alternative to Realism, Nye’s concept of soft power has been 
developed in his three books. In Bound to Lead, The Changing Nature of American Power, Nye 
regards the ability to get other states to change the directive or commanding method of 
exercising power, which is the same as inducements, carrots or threats approach. This is 
occasionally referred to as the “second face of power” - an indirect way to exercise power. He 
describes the second face of power as follows: 
 
A country may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics because other countries 
want to follow it or have agreed to a system that produces such effects. In this case, it is 
just as important to set the agenda and structure the situation in world politics, as it is to 
get others to change in particular situations. This aspect of power - getting others to want 
to what you want - might be called indirect or co-optive power. It is in contrast to the 
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active command power behavior of getting others to do what you want. Co-optive power 
can rest on the attraction of one’s idea or on the ability to set the political agenda in a way 
that shapes the preferences that others express…. The ability to establish preferences 
tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and 
institutions. This dimension can be thought of as soft power, in contrast to the hard 
command power usually associated with tangible resources like military and economic 
strength127.   
 
 
Furthermore, he claimed that the United States had abundance of soft power resources as well as 
traditional military and economic hard power resources, which could ‘meet the challenges of 
transnational interdependence’. The question was whether America could rally the ‘political 
leadership and strategic vision’ to convert them into ‘real influence’ in a changing world128. Nye 
viewed complacency and an unwillingness to make the effort to bring others along as danger.129 
 
In a follow-up second book written in 2002, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s 
only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone, Nye provides insightful analysis when he discusses the 
implications of the information revolution and globalization for American foreign policy. He 
emphasizes that information technology elevated knowledge to the level of an important power 
resource. Knowledge and information access (for example, on the internet) has become an 
important weapon in the power hierarchy. The sovereign state has become intrinsically 
interdependent on the global information system. Hence military force is not the only source of 
power. Economic interdependence and information flows also play a pivotal role. 
 
On reviewing Nye works one is inclined to believe that his soft power theory has been premised 
on an institutionalist understanding of the current world’s “interdependence”. According to 
Keohane and Nye, there are three main characteristics in the world of “complex 
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interdependence”: these are multiple channels, the absence of hierarchy among issues, and a 
minor role for military force: 
 
Multiple channels connect societies, including informal ties between governmental elites 
as well as formal foreign office arrangements; informal ties among nongovernmental 
elites…. and transnational organizations ... The agenda of interstate relationships consist 
of multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy…. Military 
security does not consistently dominate the agenda…. The distinction between domestic 
and foreign issues became blurred….. Military force is not used by government towards 
other governments within the region, or on the issues, when complex interdependence 
prevails… force is often not an appropriate way of achieving other goals (such as 
economic and ecological welfare) that are becoming more important130.  
  
In this milieu, Nye believes power is distributed among states in a pattern that resembles a 
complex three-dimensional chess game131. 
 
In Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics (2004), Nye analyses the sources and 
limits of US soft power. He included other countries and non-state actors, not threatening US 
power as before, but leveraging soft power themselves. Nye addressed the issue of soft power 
usage, mainly through public diplomacy, as he attempted to reinforce the view that the foreign 
policy of the United States might improve following the invasion of Iraq132.  Consequently, Nye 
argued for the necessity of getting soft and hard power working together, as well as getting the 
United States to work with countries by incorporating some of their interests. 
 
Nye began to increasingly use anecdotes to illustrate his arguments and his advocacy became 
more urgent. “Soft power is attractive power”, Nye said133. To gain cooperation it used “an 
attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those 
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values”.134 Currently, soft power resources stem from an organization’s culture and values, 
through its internal practices and policies, and in the manner it handles its relations with 
others135. Countries are in a position to enhance their power by embracing and acknowledging 
causes that are attractive to others136, and institutions could help to build soft power by 
increasing others’ perceptions of legitimacy137.  
 
The main sources of a country’s soft power, Nye stressed is:  
 
[Its] culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it 
lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen 
as legitimate and having moral authority)138.  
 
Nye indicated that for power to be effective, the context has to be appropriate. He acknowledged 
drawbacks to American culture in some places, but conversely, America’s outlook to modernity 
and innovation was viewed as a positive in most contexts. Culture was not only transmitted 
through the consumption of cultural products, Nye explained, but also through personal contacts, 
like, studying abroad, as well as through business exchanges. Some of these interactions had 
greater impact than others at reaching ‘elites with power’.  
 
The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 damaged its soft power in most regions of the world. Nye 
stressed that soft power did not belong to government ‘in the same degree’ that hard power 
was139. 
 
Nye stated that soft power depended ‘more than hard power on the existence of willing 
interpreters and receivers’. Nye believed that the concentration of power amongst a few could 
lead to soft power having less traction.  Soft power worked best in certain circumstances but it 
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could not do some of the hard tasks that are necessary140. Therefore soft power of governments 
could not surpass the soft power of private business, organisations and individuals. 
 
Nye believed that power resources were limited and did not always produce the ‘desired 
outcomes’ for countries and that the ‘objective measure’ of potential soft power had to be 
‘attractive in the eyes of specific audiences’. More importantly, was that this attraction had to 
‘influence policy outcomes’141.  Identifying the link between policy context and concrete policy 
decisions was not an easy task, and Nye pointed to the role of the United States as an example of 
such a link popular and high culture in Europe after World War II, and in the ‘victory’ in the 
Cold War142. 
 
Nye expanded his earlier argument that politics had become ‘a competition for attractiveness, 
legitimacy and credibility’. He elaborated “that advantages would go to countries with multiple 
channels of communication; whose dominant culture and ideas are closer to prevailing global 
norms (which now emphasize liberalism, pluralism and autonomy); and whose credibility is 
enhanced by their domestic and international values and policies. The United States was not 
alone in this competition; nor was the game confined to large and important players”143. 
 
2.3.1 Political values  
 
Political values are one of the three main sources of soft power identified by Nye. More specific 
attention can therefore be paid to it. 
 
Within the realm of political science, it has been difficult to define the concept ‘value’ but 
according to Kluckhohm, “a value implies a code or standard that has some persistence through 
time, or more broadly put, which organizes a system of action. A value, conveniently and in 
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accordance with the received usage, places things, acts, ways of behaving, and goals of action on 
the approval-disapproval continuum”144.  
 
In 1948 Hans Morgenthau was one of the earliest writers to link political values with national 
power. Within his framework for analyzing national power he refers to political values which 
relate to national morale. National morale also implies “national will, which encompasses 
national cohesiveness, leadership and government efficacy, as well as concerns over national 
strategy and interests”145.  Morgenthau also further explained that “public opinion, national will 
or national morale provides an intangible factor without whose support any government, 
democratic or autocratic, is able to pursue its policies with effectiveness, if it is able to pursue 
them at all”146. 
 
In Morgenthau’s view the quality of government is another important element of national power 
and political values. He believed that a democratic system that successfully addresses popular 
aspirations is the best foundation for strong national morale. In this manner, national morale 
could be undermined by undemocratic rule, ethnic or national dissension, and class divisions. 
Since Morgenthau emphasized the strong connection between political values (human rights and 
democracy) and national power, political theorists see this as an important component in 
developing a country’s foreign policy. However, Samuel Huntington argues that the promotion 
of democracy is not the main objective of foreign policy. According to Huntington “the belief 
that non-western people should adopt Western values, institutions, and culture, is if taken 
seriously, immoral in its implications…. The interests of the West are not served by promiscuous 
interventions into the disputes of other peoples”147. However Francis Fukuyama concluded that 
“the progression of human history as a struggle between ideologies is largely at an end with the 
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world settling on democratic ideals, free market capitalism, and related neoliberal economic 
policies after the end of the Cold War”148. 
 
 In comparison to the above debates on political values, Joseph Nye contributes a new approach 
in investigating how values are applied in global politics. According to Nye, “the state’s values 
depend on its own domestic governance performance, because how a country implements its 
political values can enhance its image and perceived legitimacy, which has important 
implications for the advancement of foreign policy”149. Nye also stated: 
 
The United States, like other countries, expresses its values in what it does as well as 
what it says. Political values like democracy and human rights can be powerful sources of 
attraction, but it is not enough just to proclaim them … Others watch how Americans 
implement our values at home as well as abroad…. How America behaves at home can 
enhance its image and perceived legitimacy, and that in turn can help advance its foreign 
policy objectives. It does not mean that others need or want to become American 
clones150. 
 
While Nye does not try to repudiate Huntington and Fukuyama’s views on political values in 
international relations, he defines political values as an important component of soft power 
resources, which he believes are important to a state’s foreign policy, but which cannot be 
imposed on other countries. Nye adds that it is more important to increase the attractiveness of 
political values at home before they are propagated abroad. He warned that political values can 
either repel or attract others. For example, American feminism can be regarded in some Middle 
East countries as offensive151.  
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2.3.2 Criticism of Joseph Nye’s Soft Power  
 
There are criticisms of Nye’s theoretical framework of soft power, particularly in Mingjiang Li’s Soft 
Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics. Li and others do not criticize Nye’s core 
propositions; however they focus on his conceptualization of soft power152. They argue that “soft 
power does not exist in the nature of certain resources of power but rather it has to be nurtured 
through a soft use of power”153 adding that “it has to be intentionally cultivated through prudent use 
of all sources of power available in certain social relationships”154. They also criticize his 
distinction between hard and soft power155 by noting that Nye did not provide a clear line 
between the two, which leaves the definitions blurred156. By way example they indicate that “if 
country A provides economic aid to country B without explicitly or implicitly asking for any 
favor in return, is that soft power or hard power for country A?”157   
 
They also criticize Nye’s resource-based approach to soft power, indicating that his sources of 
power – culture, ideology, values – are not always attractive, persuasive or appealing158. It is 
their contention that soft power can be counter-effective in certain situations, leading to 
resentment, repulsion or hostilities instead of attraction, persuasion and appeal159. An example is 
the United States’ use of cultural power in Hollywood. Although this has strengthened its soft 
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power, the portrayal of certain cultures, characters, and the use of actions such as graphic sexual 
violence has led to opposition to certain American values in some regions of the world. Li et al. 
also explain that hard power can have attraction and appeal, for instance, in the use of military 
power in humanitarian or international peacekeeping activities, as seen in Haiti in 2010160. They 
believe that it is the behavioral approach that defines the essences of soft power161. Instead of 
soft power they call for the soft use of power by stating:  
 
If culture, ideology, and values can be used for coercion, and military and economic 
strength can be used for attraction and appeal, a better approach to soft power is how the 
resources of power are used rather than associating sources of power as soft or hard. In 
essence, soft power lies in the soft use of power to increase a state’s attraction, 
persuasiveness, and appeal… If a state uses its resources of power in a prudent, cautious, 
accommodating, and considerate approach in its relations with other states and plays a 
leading role in providing public goods to international society, it will surely win respect, 
amity, and positive reciprocity from other states162.   
 
They believe that focusing on how a state uses its capability instead of focusing on the resources of 
power, there will be a greater understanding of how culture, values, and institutions can be brought 
into the discussion.163. However, while agreeing that an ideal state could use all its resources to gain 
soft power, the difficulty with this proposition is that states have their own self-interests that diverge 
from one another164.  
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As explained earlier, this research will analyses China’s soft power in relation to its diplomatic 
initiatives and policies – foreign and formal diplomacy, political and economic policies. China’s 
using of soft power in bilateral relations differs from country to country in Africa leading to different 
levels of success.  
 
The issue of China’s rise and its use of power are increasingly being discussed amongst 
scholars165. A possible reason is that when it comes to discussing China’s use of power, there 
seems to be differences among scholars who criticize Nye’s original conceptualization of soft 
power and who believe that China’s use of power is a combination of soft and hard power or 
simply, a broadened form of soft power166. 
 
When it comes to scholars who see China’s use of power as being a broadened form of soft 
power, Kurlantzick explains that when Nye initially developed the term soft power, he “used a 
more limited definition, excluding investment and aid and formal diplomacy” 167 - these 
Kurlantzick admits are traditionally “harder forms of influence”168. However, Kurlantzick   
explains that in examining China today the term applies a broader interpretation of soft power,  
including investment and aid, and one which he, as well as other scholars, and this research, uses 
to examine soft power169. Li et al go even further in criticizing Nye’s conceptualization of soft 
power170. They believe that instead of going forth with Nye’s resource-based approach to soft 
power, scholars should focus on a “soft use of power approach”171. In this study both the use by 
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Nye and those who criticize him (like the “soft use of power”) will be considered for application. 
In the end one of the conclusions of this study might be about how appropriate Nye’s framework 
for China is.  
 
2.4 Economic Nationalism 
 
Economic nationalists advocate the primacy of the state in the global system172 and maintain that 
its role has not diminished because of globalization. Furthermore national economies are the 
most important actors in international economic processes.  Another similarity is that Realism 
and Economic Nationalism are both preoccupied with power. The key concern of Economic 
Nationalism is the bolstering of national power by economic means. This assumes that national 
power implies a combination of political and economic power.  When economic power is 
maximized it has an impact on political power and vice versa. Therefore Economic Nationalists 
agree that there is a connection between wealth and power. 
 
For Economic Nationalists, the well-being of the state is of central importance to increasing 
power. In order for the economy to develop and modernize, the state needs to mobilize the nation 
through its monetary, trade, legal, and education policies, thereby creating a national market. 
This ultimately leads towards the formation of a national identity, because “economic 
development forms and enforces the idea and sentiment of the nation, which increases the 
political power of the state. Thus, the relationship between the economy and the nation is an 
important issue for Economic Nationalism”173.  While it is argued that Economic Nationalism 
has often been associated with mercantilism and protectionism, however, it is distinctly different 
from those approaches. Where the mercantilist’s goal is autarky, the Economic Nationalist’s 
goals are centered on national unity, autonomy and maximization of national power.  
 
Mercantilists advocate protectionism, while Economic Nationalists advocate free trade if it 
bolsters national power. The proponents of Economic Nationalism, like Alexander Hamilton and 
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Friedrich List, were in favor of tree trade174. The approach is pragmatic and calls for 
implementation of the policy that best supports national power.  Therefore, Economic 
Nationalists advocated protectionism and state intervention in the economy in particular 
circumstances, such as “if a nation capable of industrializing had not yet done so”175.  
 
Economic Nationalists believe that liberal economic policies in the global economy differ from 
the practice of liberal policies in the national economy. They argue that state intervention is a 
prerequisite for successful participation in the global economy; hence economic policies are 
usually designed to strengthen national unity. These policies typically include industrialization, 
Keynesian policies and currency manipulation.  Therefore, this theory is appropriate to analyze 
China’s foreign relations, because it has a long history of nationalism and its foreign policy 
orientation remains distinctly nationalist. 
 
Chinese nationalism was inflamed by western hostility towards the country as well as colonial 
rule over parts of China especially during the Opium Wars in the 19th century. It is within this 
context that China encouraged nationalism as a means to confront external hostilities and re- 
asserts its independence176.  It was this nationalism that was the key driving factor behind 
Chinese foreign policy for most of the 20th century. Since 1949 the Chinese government had 
aggressively promoted ‘state nationalism’, building a Chinese nation as opposed to ethnic 
nationalism, and adjustments in Chinese foreign policy were adopted to achieve this goal. 
According to Zhu this was “to see and preserve China’s national independence”177. The key 
drivers of Chinese nationalism are economic development, national unity and independence, and 
international prestige, of which economic development is seen as the most important priority; the 
one that encompasses all other national aims178. 
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2.5 ‘Rising Power’ as a manifestation of power relations 
 
Many view China as a potential rising power or the new rise in status quo power in the twenty-
first century. We shall examine China’s rise to power from a Realist perspective. According to 
Brzezinski: “only the United States unambiguously earned the ranking as the most powerful state 
in every twenty year intervals since 1880, and the gap in the 1990s between the top-ranked 
United States and the rest had become even wider than ever before”179. 
 
Approaching the twenty first century, more scholars have concluded that China will become a 
superpower of unprecedented proportions180. Certain analysts suggest “an economically strong 
China would become bolder, more demanding and less likely to cooperate with other major 
powers in the region”181. 
 
Most of these authors state that China possesses significant power resources which can be 
utilized to pursue its national interest. A key question posed by some of these authors is: will 
China transform into a responsible power in the twenty-first century? 
 
As discussed in the earlier chapter, Realist theorists argue that rising power will inevitably lead 
to war. According to the Realist approach, great powers often resort to ‘force’ (war, military) to 
change the status quo in accordance with their own national interest. Alternatively, existing 
powers feel threatened and therefore are determined to preserve their status within the 
international area. However, many theorists have a contrary position arguing that the 
economically developed world is the terrain of ‘complex interdependence’ among states and 
societies. These complex interdependences can sometimes promote cooperation. From this point 
of view analysts argue that China is becoming increasingly part of the larger capitalist system 
and globally more integrated. They argue that China cannot be defined as a revisionist power 
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based on the traditional power transitional theory. They further state that China’s reforms have 
increasingly changed its foreign policy from communist Maoism to a reformist policy182. 
 
Classical international relations theorists in the Realist tradition argue that a state’s interests are 
shaped firstly by its power, which is measured by its material resources and political influence.  
 
Martin Wight argues that it is the “nature of powers to expand … They have always wanted to 
spread their cultural, economic and political influences to the other countries with the final goal 
of expanding their territory”183.  Robert Gilpin argues that the state will attempt to transform the 
international system only if it is advantageous to itself, in other words, if the balance of power in 
the system is to its advantage184.  
 
John Mearsheimer argues that great powers have tried to move the burden of preserving the 
balance of power onto both allies and rivals, and thereby using wars between states to preserve 
their status quo in international politics185.  In contrast, inequality of power has often led to peace 
and stability as there is no benefit for weak states to declare war with a powerful state. Therefore, 
no “matter how a state’s natural power is measured, an equal power distribution among major 
states has been relatively rare in world history”186. 
 
China is often presented as a rising world power and in the context of this study, its implications 
for international power relations (including with Africa) are therefore important to analyze. 
According to Hans J. Morgenthau, if rising powers are challenged by another power they will in 
turn develop their own capabilities or form alliances to confront the dominant power. In this 
milieu, the rising power will always be perceived as a threat by the dominant powers. 
Morgenthau states “a nation whose foreign policy aims at acquiring more power than it actually 
has, through a reversal of existing power relations - whose foreign policy, in other words, seeks a 
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favorable change in power status - pursues a policy of imperialism”187. According to Randall 
Schweller, the expansion of a rising power is as a result, not only of internal pressure, but also of 
threats and opportunities in the external environment Schweller believes that the weakness of 
surrounding states promotes opportunities for rising power states. The dangers for a rising power 
of not expanding into a power void left by weak states are twofold: “(1) other powerful states 
may not be equally restrained from doing so, and (2) weakness implies political instability that 
may spill across national borders”188. 
 
Therefore, a rising power is bound to expand its influence or even territory.  An example is Japan 
in the first half of the twentieth century. During this rising process, dominant powers unleash 
large scale wars to overthrow the established order or occupy more territory. 
 
According to Realist thinking, an emerging  power is often perceived as a threat to the balance of 
power and international security, leading to war either because it uses force to change the 
international order to suit its national interest or because the existing leading power launches a 
preemptive war to preserve its status quo status.  
 
Against this backdrop, China, as a rising power in the twenty-first century, is likely to be 
regarded as a threat to some states in the existing international order. Many scholars believe that 
China, being an authoritarian state on the rise, will prioritize its foreign policy strategy to focus 
on expanding its national interest or exercise its power outside its territory.189 
 
Rising power is also related to revisionist power. Morgenthau stresses the possible 
misconceptions in defining revisionist power - “not every foreign policy aimed at an increase in 
the power of a nation is necessarily a manifestation of revisionism”190. Schweller has described 
revisionist power as follows: “revisionist states value what they covet more than what they 
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currently possess…. they will employ military force to change the status quo and to extend their 
values”191. Based on this description, China cannot be regarded as a revisionist power, because 
in its three decades as a rising power Beijing has rarely been involved in military conflicts with 
other countries or in a full-scale war. Instead Beijing has employed non-military power resources 
to increase its political, economic and cultural power and status, especially in dealing with 
external issues like Taiwan. It will become clear in the discussions that follow that China defines 
itself as an emerging power that wants to change and therefore revise the existing international 
balance of power. 
 
Alastair Iain Johnson argues that it is acceptable to determine whether a state pursues a status 
quo or revisionist foreign policy. Therefore Johnston believes that China’s foreign policy 
behavior in recent years needs to be examined. Beijing has become more compliant with existing 
international rules and norms and has supported various global or regional security institutions 
and economic multi-lateral organizations192. Beijing has embraced more predictable and 
pragmatic approaches in its foreign policy since the end of the Mao era. However, it would be 
true to say that Beijing did not adopt a revisionist approach. As David Kang asserts: “China’s 
expected emergence as the most powerful state in East Asia has been compared with more 
stability than pessimists believed …… it has provided credible information about its capabilities 
and intentions to its neighbors: east Asian states believe China’s claims, and hence do not fear - 
and instead seek to benefit from – its rise”193.  
 
Thus, according to Johnson, China’s foreign policies are constructed on the Realist theoretical 
framework leaving one to conclude that China is not a revisionist power and will become a threat 
to international security194. For example, he states: “with more rigorous criteria for determining 
whether a state’s foreign policy is status quo or revisionist orientated than have been used in 
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international relations theorizing, it is hard to conclude that China is clearly a revisionist state 
operating outside or barely inside, the boundaries of a so called international community”195. 
  
Realists argue that a rising power is by nature a threat, pursuing its natural interests and argues 
for an expansion policy. However, in the past few decades China has not pursued a revisionist 
approach in accordance with it being the most dominant and powerful state in the Far East and 
its Asian neighbors. In fact its Asian neighbors seem to bandwagon China’s rise rather than 
counterbalance it.  
 
Certain elements of Realism theory are aligned with China‘s rise. Realists would argue that 
rising powers are inevitably interested in challenging existing institutions, norms and power 
distribution. Within the Realist framework, China’s rapid military buildup and economic 
expansion are indicators of a rising power. Many scholars and political analysts accept the 
Realist notion of a rising power as an inherent threat to status quo powers and its neighboring 
countries, although some other international relations theorists refute this argument. However 
others argue that international institutions, international regimes and international law weaken 
state behavior, and that states have more to gain from cooperation than competition196.  
 
Many theorists discard the traditional approach of wielding power as a foreign policy imperative 
that includes coercion and bullying, and they have started to look at new approaches to power 
and power politics. The works of Keohane and Nye have analyzed alternative approaches 
including “neoliberal institutionalism”. Keohane and others have argued that due to the 
involvement of multi-lateral institutions and a new age in technology cooperation is possible 
even during times of anarchy.  By seeking to link neoliberal concepts like “interdependence” 
onto Realist’s view of power, these scholars argue that under certain circumstances governments 
participate in cooperative international arrangements even to their dislike. 
 
Based on this theoretical framework, it is possible to conclude that a rising power is not a threat, 
and is more likely to cooperate with other countries, because it is in their interest to do so. Rising 
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powers can use international norms and institutions to their advantage in multilateral 
organizations to assert their policy objectives. Therefore they do not have to change the status 
quo through revolution or rapid change but rather by evolutionary processes in an incremental 
way. By working together, international security can be strengthened by arms control agreements 
and peacekeeping missions and international trade expanded to achieve mutual benefits. The 
differences between the Realist and the institutional theoretical framework in interpreting the 
rising power’s intention reflects their understanding of nationality as a state  seeking to maximize  
its short term self-interest and the rationality to pursuing long term collective benefits. In the 
latter, acquiring wealth is more important for rising powers than gaining power relative to other 
states.   
 
2.6 Chapter Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the main concepts that will be used in this study and to 
link them to a theoretical framework. It is seldom that a study can depend on only one theoretical 
premise to provide an analytical or explanatory framework. This study is no exception. 
 
Given the fact that China’s relationship with African states is located in the domain of its 
emergence as a major world power, power as a concept is central in this study. Traditionally 
power is associated with the schools of Realism and Neo-realism, which still remain relevant for 
this study also. Different dimensions of power – attribute, relational, structural and 
multidimensional – are also incorporated in this study’s framework. 
 
It is given that China views itself as a ‘rising power’. Though this study is not concerned with 
China’s domestic development processes but only with how its relationship with African states 
contributes towards it, the notion of a “rising power” forms the backdrop of this study.  
 
For the purpose of analyzing its current relationships with African states this study will use a 
combination of the theories of soft power and economic nationalism. Soft power has theoretical 
links to the Realism/Neo-realism schools but there is doubt whether its form articulated by 
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Joseph Nye is most appropriate for China. An alternative in the form of the soft use of power is 
therefore also included for use in this study. 
 
Finally, though this is not a study in theory, the application of the combination of theories 
discussed in this chapter provides an opportunity to make some observations about their 
appropriateness for studies like this one. It applies in particular to Nye’s soft power. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
HISTORICAL VIEW OF CHINA AND AFRICA 
 
3.1 A Short history of China 
 
According to well renowned scholars Garth le Pere and Garth Shelton, “China is an ancient 
civilization, and a country that has historically always had a strong sense of its identity and place 
in the world. Chinese Civilization, with a history of 4000 years, has proved itself to be the most 
enduring and resilient in the world, and hence China is one of the world’s most extraordinary and 
unique countries. Calling itself the ‘Middle Kingdom’, Chinese tradition and mythology held that 
their emperors were preordained to rule ‘all under heaven’, in a universe composed of concentric 
circles, with China forming the core of the natural order.”197  
Prior to the 20th century, China’s history is divided into several periods of dynastic rule. These 
dynasties witnessed different patterns of rule, during which time China rose and fell and 
experienced periods of growth and decay. “When a dynasty fell, it had lost the ‘Mandate from 
Heaven’, giving the people the right to rebel: and when another rose, its ability to establish itself 
was proof that it enjoyed the approval of the gods to inherit the mandate”.198 Imperial China was 
characterized by misrule, corruption, nomadic invasions, natural disasters and social discontent. 
The fall of one dynasty was replaced with another vigorous and seemingly self-assured dynasty. 
Among the main successes of the Qin Dynasty, (which ended in 221 B.C) was its ability to unify 
China, standardize a system of writing and the standardization of weights and measurements. 
Significantly, it was during this period that the Great Wall was completed. 
In the Han Dynasty (206 BC and AD 220), Confucianism became the official state doctrine and 
an examination system for selecting elite government officials was established. The Han period 
also allowed ethnic Chinese to expand beyond the Yellow River cradle area into the rich Yangzi 
valley to the south. The collapse of the Han dynasty was followed by four centuries of division 
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and disruption until the country was politically reunited under the Sui Dynasty in 590. The Sui 
Dynasty was distinguished by a period of great engineering and construction of the ancient world 
- the 2000 kilometer long Grand Canal linking north China with the Yangzi valley to the 
south.199  
The next 500 years were known as Tang (618-906) and Northern Song (960-1126), commonly 
referred to as China’s ‘medieval flowering’ period.200 During this period China experienced 
great advances in agricultural production, water management, improved seed variation, better 
fertilization and establishment of public administration and institutions of government. However, 
this period came to end in 1279 with the first invasion of the Mongol conquerors, Genghis Khan 
and his grandson Kublai Khan. Although the Mongol’s were great conquerors, they proved to be 
poor rulers. Their dynasty only lasted a century (1279-1367)201. 
 
3.2  The Opium Wars 
 
The Opium Wars (1839-1860), caused by British merchants illegal trade in opium, are regarded 
by the Chinese as a period of ‘great humiliation’. After losing both wars, The Qing Dynasty was 
forced to tolerate opium trading and to sign the treaties of Nanjing and Tianjin that opened 
Chinese ports to international trade. Hong Kong was occupied and further territorial concessions 
were made to the British. Similar treaties were signed between other powers and China, 
including Japan, which occupied Taiwan in 1895 following a short Sino-Japanese war.  
China’s humiliation by the ‘unequal treaties’ with European powers created domestic unrest 
against the powerless Qing Dynasty leading to the Taiping (1850-64) and Boxer (1899-1901) 
rebellions. This led in 1911 to the overthrow of the monarchy and the official proclamation of 
the Republic of China on 1 January 1912 by Chinese nationalist Sun Yat Sen. The control of the 
Kuomintang (SunYat Sen’s National Party) over Chinese territory, was tenuous leading to civil 
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strife organized by provincially based Chinese war lords. General Chiang Kai-shek attempted in 
the late 1920s to reunite China under Kuomintang rule but was repelled by opposition forces 
including Mao’s Communist Party of China (CPC). The Kuomintang and the Communists joined 
forces in 1931 to fight Japan after it invaded Manchuria. With the withdrawal of the Japanese 
after the Second World War in 1945, civil war broke out once again.  The Chinese Communist 
Party   controlled most of China and drove the Kuomintang into retreat to Taiwan (which the 
Japanese had been forced to hand back to China at the end of the Second World War).  
Thereafter Mao Zedong established the People’s Republic of China, under the rule of the CPC on 
1 October 1949. 
 
3.3 Mao and Revolutionary China 
 
Mao Zedong’s dominated China’s political landscape from 1949 until his death in 1976. 
Although Mao succeeded in unifying the country and establishing the CPC, he failed in 
delivering its main goal, economic development. Mao adapted his economic model from its key 
ally the Soviet Union, which turned out to be disastrous, especially in rural China. Mao’s ideas 
evolved through different phases but it was limited by the ideological imperatives of the 
permanent social revolution.  
The first phase saw the launch of the first five year plan which emphasized both the 
reconstruction of the heavy industrial complex and a socialist rural reform programme. This led 
to the nationalization of all private property, similar to the Soviet model. All links with capitalist 
countries were either summarily ended or severed, resulting in China becoming increasingly 
dependent on Moscow. However, in the 1950s, the ideological tension between Beijing and 
Moscow led to China competing with the Soviet Union for leadership of the communist 
movement, particularly the newly independent countries in Asia and Africa.  
Because of the command economy’s increasing inefficiency and its unsustainable production 
levels for a growing urban population, Mao adopted a more radical approach from 1959 to 1961 
which he called a ‘Great Leap Forward’. The Great Leap Forward was designed to engender self-
sufficiency by transferring all labor to the national development project in rural communities. 
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However this failed and in fact it further impoverished the country, leading in the latter years to 
famine202. Opposition grew among intellectuals and purges followed, leading to a dark period in 
Chinese history known as the ‘Cultural Revolution”, which lasted from 1966 to 1976. During 
this period China’s economic situation deteriorated. Its population experienced massive 
starvation pushing the country on brink of disaster. 
The end of the Cultural Revolution was declared in 1969, but it was only after Mao’s death that 
the conflicts and tensions began to diminish. During this period, China’s domestic situation was 
fraught by turmoil, while its foreign relations were beginning to stabilize. The PRC’s admission 
to the United Nations in 1971, with the support of many African states, led to a period of normal 
relations with the West that had important implications for China’s development.203 
 
3.4 Deng Xiaoping and the ‘Opening’ and Reforms in China 
 
With the death of Mao and the dismissal of the Gang of Four, a moderate faction under Deng 
Xiaoping took gradual control of the CPC. Deng Xiaoping pursued a reformist path to 
development. The ‘Four Modernization’ reform initiatives initiated by Chinese Foreign Minister 
Zhou Enlai in the 1960s, included industry, national defense, science and technology.  
These ‘modernizations’ were written into the Chinese constitution and became the bedrock from 
which China developed into a modern and powerful socialist state.  
The third plenary session of the Central Committee of the CPC in December 1978 approved 
these reforms within the context of the gradual opening up to the outside world. The agricultural 
sector began the reformation with the ending of the People’s Communes and the establishment of 
the rural household responsibility system based on a 15 year land lease. This allowed households 
to sell a significant part of their production in the market, creating a new-found demand for 
production. With improvements in technology and increased production, there was an expansion 
in the labor market, fuelling migration to urban centers. This resulted in the expansion of the 
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light labour industry204. The second phase of reforms focused on the coastal urban centers which 
addressed the preferential fiscal investments policies and international trading rights.205 
Three decades of economic backwardness under Maoism was compared to the economic 
successes of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau. Deng Xiaoping included these territories into his 
reform strategy under the ‘one China, two systems’ project. Deng Xiaoping aimed to preserve 
the liberal economic structures that engendered their success. Furthermore, the first Chinese 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) - Shenzhen, Xiamen, Shantou – were created in 1980 and were 
established around Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.  
The intention was to benefit from their access to the world market and to reduce the income gap 
between those and the new SEZs so as to allow for a smooth reintegration. These SEZs opened 
up China’s markets gradually, avoiding disruptions in the system, as had happened in the Soviet 
Union206. In aiming to quickly establish a vibrant export-led light industry through foreign 
investment, technology, China wanted an outlet for its production to the outside world.  
During these changes, Chinese socialism underwent transformation in order to bypass the 
contradictions and to instill a new ideological framework that would accommodate the Marxist 
ideological tendency. Deng introduced the ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ policy 
during the 12th National Party Congress in September 1982. Deng’s reformist tendencies are best 
captured in his celebrated statement: “it does not matter whether the cat is black or white as long 
as it catches mice”.207 According to Deng the “goal is to have the best of both worlds: the 
freedom of private initiative and the administration and regulatory power of the state.”208  
During the 3rd plenary session of the 12th CPC Central Committee convened in 1984, the CPC 
approved a resolution that expanded economic reform by launching the foundation of a planned 
economy based on public ownership. The focus was to restructure production forces in the urban 
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areas. The first state owned enterprises (SOE) were given autonomy during this period, and 
gradually public entities began listing on the world stock exchanges. The private sector grew 
rapidly and foreign entities began investing in China through joint ventures. Private and foreign 
capital was encouraged to invest in most sectors except for electricity, oil, telecommunications 
and defense, where the Communist party had absolute control.  
The Tiananmen protest in June 1989, led by students and other groups, resulted in a widespread 
government crackdown. US and European countries reacted by imposing sanctions. However, 
Deng continued on his reformist path and argued that a market economy was compatible with 
both capitalism and socialism and urged the Chinese to increase the pace of the economic 
reforms. During the 14th National Congress of the CPC in 1992, Deng emphasized that the main 
aim of his policies was the creation of a socialist market economy with a central and macro 
regulatory role for the state.209 
Part of the modernization policy saw the reorganization of the education system which led to 
thousands of Chinese students and researchers being sent to America and European universities 
to acquire knowledge and technological expertise that were critical for China.210 
With the death of Deng Xiaoping in September 1997, Jiang Zemin came to power and at the 15th 
National Congress he committed to deepening the economic reforms process. By this time China 
had emerged as the largest global production platform and the largest emerging market.  
In 2002, Hu Jintao championed a policy for greater integration into the global economy by 
urging China to surpass the export-led model. This would mean that China’s new economic 
strategy would expand globally on two major fronts - trade and investments.  
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3.5 Period of Isolation between China and Africa 1949-1955 
 
From October 1949 until the end of the Korean War (1950-1953), the newly founded PRC under 
Mao Zedong, was preoccupied with a number of domestic and external problems which 
precluded China from actively pursuing its foreign policy211. This also excluded engagement 
with the African continent. In the first PRC’s plenary session of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference, it stated that “the principle of the foreign policy of the People’s 
Republic of China is protection of the independence, freedom, integrity of territory and 
sovereignty of the country”212. During this period its foreign policy was mainly dominated by 
stabilizing China’s borders with her surrounding neighbors, for example Manchuria and Tibet213. 
On the domestic front, China was preoccupied with unifying the Chinese people under the 
Communist Party and “began a process of the reorganization of Chinese society”.214 Chinese 
scholars have characterized this period as an attempt to ‘bury thoroughly old humiliations in the 
country’s foreign affairs’215. 
As stated earlier there was very little contact with African peoples except with South Africa. In 
fact South Africa is one of the only documented countries during this period that provided an 
African visitor to Beijing. Walter Sisulu, the Secretary General of the African National Congress 
(ANC) was apparently impressed by the Chinese government and was a great admirer of Mao.216 
It is important to note that not one of the four independent African countries at the time, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa recognized the Beijing government217. Any official contact 
between these countries in the post-revolution, pre-Bandung period was negligible. However in 
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1951, a Chinese delegation did visit Cairo to attend a joint meeting of the Universal Postal Union 
and the International Air Transport Association.218 
 
 
3.6 Bandung Conference – revival period for China and Africa 
 
The Asian-African Conference, convened in Bandung, Indonesia between 18-24 April 1955, was 
a milestone in China–Africa relations. Twenty nine countries attended the conference, of which 
six were African - Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya and Sudan219. The only independent 
ruler attending the Conference at the time was President Nasser of Egypt. There were a number 
of discussions between Beijing and Cairo and Zhou Enlai, the foreign Minister at the time, 
extended an open invitation to the Egyptian delegates to visit Beijing220. This led to the 
establishment of a trade agreement between Egypt and China on 22 August 1955 and Egypt 
became the first African country to establish relations with Communist China in 1956221. Sudan 
was the second country to recognize Communist China on 4 February 1959. 
Some scholars argue that the Asia-Africa Conference was significant in that it marked the start of 
a definite interest by the PRC in Africa and in the developing world in general. Others argue that 
“Africa was relatively unimportant to China at Bandung”222. This period, dubbed ‘the Bandung 
Era’, saw the beginning of China’s involvement in Africa and the anti-colonial struggles 
developing on the continent became definite. During this conference, the Afro-Asian solidarity 
adopted the five principles of peaceful coexistence223 as their foundation224. These principles 
were:225  
1. Mutual respect for sovereign and territorial integrity  
2. Mutual non-aggression  
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3. Non-interference in each other’s internal affairs  
4. Equality and mutual benefit  
5. Peaceful coexistence  
 
These five principles were later extended to eight principles and as Brautigam observes, these 
principles still reflect how China operates in Africa today226. These eight principles will be 
discussed later in Chapter Six. 
In 1956, the Department of West Asian and African Affairs was established by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. According to Ian Taylor, “the change in nomenclature reflects the perceived 
growing in strength of anti-colonialism and the importance that China attached to this 
development”227. 
A few years after the Bandung conference, a wave of independence movements began to spread 
across the African continent and many colonial states in Africa gained independence. The PRC 
provided funds and supplies, as well as advisors, to several independence movements and also to 
some of the nations that were facing great opposition from their colonial masters e.g. 
Zimbabwe’s African National Union (ZANU)228. China’s engagements in Africa were still 
limited to diplomatic engagements and were rather superficial in nature. However this changed 
in 1955 when a trade delegation from Egypt led by the Minister of Commerce and Industry, 
Mohammed Abu Nosseir, visited China and signed a three year Trade Agreement.229 Shortly 
after that, the PRC extended an aid project to Guinea.230 Diplomatic ties with Guinea were 
established in 1959 and in 1960 China advanced an interest free loan to the country for the 
construction of a cigarette and match factory in the country231.  
During this period, China concentrated on North Africa countries, in particularly Algeria and 
Egypt. In Algeria, the Chinese issued propaganda on behalf of anti-French rebels and supplied 
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the FLN with weapons and training in their fight against the French colonial power.232 At the 
same time, China began developing strong trade relations with Nasser’s Egypt by purchasing 
large amounts of cotton from the country. The following countries established diplomatic ties 
with China: Morocco on 1 November 1958, Algeria on 20 December 1958 and Sudan on 4 
February 1959 respectively233. By 1957, Chinese attendance at international conferences was the 
main avenues by which Beijing developed linkages with Africa: the first Afro-Asian People’s 
Solidarity Conference held in Egypt, followed in April 1958 by the First Conference of 
Independent African States in Ghana234. By 1959, Chinese interest in the continent had rapidly 
increased, with ten Chinese delegations visiting Africa, while in 1960 the number had doubled to 
25 and by 1962 this number was 52235. 
Between 1960 and 1965 the PRC entered into relations with 14 newly independent African 
states: Ghana, Mali, Somalia (1960); Zaire (1961); Uganda (1962); Burundi, Kenya (1963); 
Benin, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Tanzania, Tunisia, Zambia (1964); and 
Mauritania (1965). On the international front, the Soviet Union stopped its aid to China due to 
differences in communist ideologies.236 Furthermore, Taiwan still occupied its seat at the United 
Nations (UN). With the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and the support for Taiwan from the 
USA, as well as the economic embargo on the PRC237, China worked hard to gain influence on 
the international stage by establishing diplomatic ties with the newly independent African 
countries. In 1971, the PRC gained its UN seat with the support of its allies, most of which were 
the newly independent African countries.238  
 According to Ian Taylor, secret army documents obtained in 1961 indicate that China viewed 
“the revolution situation in Africa in the long-term and Chinese activities in the 1960s can be 
seen to be aimed at this.  Africa was evidently regarded as a key point of world interest”239. In 
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1960, Sekou Toure of Guinea became the first African head of state to visit China.240 His visit 
was a turning point in Chinese policy towards Africa as Beijing for the first time committed itself 
to economic and technical aid to a newly independent African state.241 
By the end of 1963, Zhou Enlai, China’s foreign minister embarked on a ten-nation tour of 
Africa. The main purpose of his tour was firstly to strengthen China’s policies in Africa, 
secondly to promote the Bandung conference, and finally to promote the PRC’s anti-Soviet 
policies and persuade African countries to marginalize Moscow from attending the conference.  
In 1964, the Eight Principles of foreign aid were established. These eight principles were drawn 
from the five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that the Afro-Asian solidarity adopted in 1955 
in Indonesia. Not only did these new principles begin a new era in China-Africa relations then, 
but they also provide guidance for China’s foreign aid today.  The Eight Principles of foreign aid 
are:  
1.  Emphasize equality and mutual benefit  
2.  Respect sovereignty and never attach conditions  
3. Provide interest-free or low-interest loan. Help recipient countries develop                           
independence and self-reliance  
5. Build projects that require little investment and can be accomplished quickly  
6. Provide quality equipment and material at market prices  
 
7. Ensure effective technical assistance  
 
8. Pay experts according to local standards242. 
 
After the establishment of the Eight Principles of foreign aid, China’s aid programme expanded 
rapidly to many other African countries: Tunisia, Congo, Zambia, Tanzania and Ghana in 1964; 
Mauritania, Uganda in 1965; Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia in 1970; Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Cameroon, Sierra Leone and Burundi in 1971; Mauritius, Togo, Madagascar, and Benin in 1973; 
Gabon in 1974; Botswana, Mozambique, Comoros in 1975; Cape Verde, and Seychelles in 1976. 
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By the late 1970s, China provided aid to forty-three African countries.243 These aid programmes 
were established in the form of interest free loans, grants combined with loans, and also the 
construction of a number of infrastructure projects. The interest free loan offered to Zambia and 
Tanzania in 1967 for the construction of the Tan-Zam Railway (1967-1976) is a good example of 
such a loan244. The Chinese also provided these African countries with technical support both in 
terms of know-how as well as skilled technicians, to work with and train Africans to build bridges, 
hospitals, schools and roads245.  
Furthermore, China provided diplomatic support as well as military support as well as material 
provisions for training of the liberation movements. Rising anti-colonialism, and growing 
tensions with the Soviet Union, saw China involved in the politics of the Cold War in Africa. 
Twenty eight African countries supported Beijing’s bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security 
Council in 1971, which it was able to secure. This accounts for 34 per cent of the General 
Assembly votes.  By 1976, only thirty nine states recognized the government in Beijing and only 
eight had diplomatic ties with Taipei.246 Beijing commenced the normalization of diplomatic 
relations with African countries and the extension of economic assistance to selected 
governments, irrespective of their ideological orientation as long as they accepted the one-China 
policy.  
 
3.7  Deng Xiaoping’s “open door” policy towards Africa 
 
After Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping advocated for a more socialist market economy and 
an “open-door” policy. The aim of his reform was to increase the role the market by reducing 
state planning and central control.247 Subsequently China joined the IMF and the World Bank 
and became an increasingly attractive country to invest in. Several Western countries provided 
bilateral aid and investments to China.  
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During the early 1980s modernization and economic development became priorities and during 
this period, China’s aid to Africa started “being less political altruism to being more 
commercially oriented".248 In the latter part of the 1980s, China’s leaders announced that they 
would undertake new aid projects on the scale of the Tan-Zam Railway through the promotion of 
joint prosperity. In addition, China announced in 1987 that 69% of China’s aid funds must be 
spent on Chinese equipment,249 thereby tying the aid down and securing economic benefits for 
China. The post-Mao reforms indeed accelerated changes during the 1980s and 1990s and a 
variety of new forms of aid were incorporated with joint ventures, assisted sustainability and aid-
to-profit.250  
By this time, China was clearly on the rise and its relations with the West had improved. 
Between 1979 and 1982, China’s aid programme slowed down temporarily as Chinese leaders 
were getting use to the more market-oriented “open-door” international economic policy251. 
China’s commitment fell from $254 million in 1980 to just $25 million in 1981, before rising  
up to $289 million in 1984 out of which $258.9 million went to Africa, making China the sixth 
largest donor in Africa that year.252  
  
In 1982, Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang visited eleven African countries to promote South-South 
cooperation with an emphasis on the principals of equality and mutual benefit, practical results, 
diversity, and common progress. The event was regarded as an important move in China-Africa 
relations. After this time, China’s engagements in African were more economic in nature.253 This 
corresponded well with China’s plan to switch from aid towards other forms of engagements that 
would benefit both partners. In other words, China had learned from opening-up its market to 
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economic cooperation, which meant a decreasing of direct aid and an increase of combined aid 
with trade and investment.254  
 
3.8 China’s ‘Going out Strategy’ 
 
In 1995, China changed its focus towards trade and access to mineral resources in its engagement 
with Africa. However resources were not the only reason for Chinese engagement, as Brautigam 
observes: “the Chinese are interested in everything.”255 Since the foreign policy reform in 1995, 
Chinese leaders began to emphasize the significance of China’s ties to Africa.  From 1991 
onwards, it became a tradition for China’s Foreign Minister to visit a group of African countries 
in January of each year256. 
 
According to Brautigam, China’s engagement with Africa during the late 90s till the present has 
been a “well-thought-out and long-term strategy”.257 This strategy developed in three important 
stages: Firstly, in 1995 the major aid reforms linked aid, trade and investments. In 2000, Chinese 
leaders took their role as promoters of “common prosperity” very importantly and created 
several regional organizations that supported programs that combined aid and economic 
cooperation. Thirdly, China joined the WTO in 2001, and in addition to that, China introduced 
the “going out strategy” as a tool to help its domestic restructuring by pushing its mature 
industries overseas to invest258. This was perceived as complementing the “open door” 
strategy259.  
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3.9 Chapter   Conclusion 
 
As we observe in the this section, it is obvious that the way China deals with the outside world, 
including Africa, is very reflective of what is happening in China’s internal affairs. From the 
beginning when China was isolated and it had prioritized securing diplomatic ties, it dealt with 
the outside world in this manner. However, we see that throughout the history of China’s 
relations with Africa, there is a shift in China’s foreign policy as China began to put economic 
development in the center of its affairs. In writing this section, the knowledge acquired has been 
that, to properly understand the history of China-African relations, one has to investigate the 
history of development in China itself which undoubtedly mirrors changes in the policies and 
objectives of the Chinese and the way China interacts with the rest of the world. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN CHINA’S STATUS AS A RISING POWER AND 
ITS USE OF SOFT POWER  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The period between the first Opium War (1840) and the end of the Second World War (1945) are 
referred to by the Chinese historians as “one hundred years of humiliation”.  It was also during 
this period that China was defeated by Japan in a humiliating way in 1895, which China has 
never forgotten. Many Chinese believe that China will regain its rightful place as a respectable 
global power. During the last one and half centuries, Chinese leaders and scholars, from Sun 
Yat-Sen and Mao Zedong to the current CPC leaders regularly label their dreams of China’s rise 
as the Zhenxing Zhonghua260 (i.e. the rejuvenation of China). As Yan Xuetong points out 
Zhenxing (rejuvenation) referred to the psychological power inherent in China’s rise to its former 
world status. In his article, ‘The Rise of China in the Chinese eyes’ Yan Xuetong quoted the 
following:  
First, the Chinese regard their rise as regaining China’s lost international status rather 
than as obtaining something new. This psychological feeling results in the Chinese being 
continuously dissatisfied with their economic achievements until China resumes its 
superpower status. Second, the Chinese consider the rise of China as a restoration of 
fairness rather than as gaining advantage over others. With this concept, the Chinese 
people take the rise of their nation for granted. They never concern themselves with the 
question of why China should be more advanced than other nations, but rather frequently 
ask themselves the question of why China is not the number one nation in the world261. 
The above quotation indicates that China’s rise is closely related to a strong nationalist sentiment 
among Chinese people. Others will argue that China’s rise is less pragmatic and less 
nationalistic. This is observed by authors like Fei-ling Wang, who argues that; 
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Increasingly confident and self-assured, China is now rightfully feeling safe as a nation. 
Many of its people believe that rejuvenation of Chinese civilization is approaching. 
Despite the noticeable nationalist sentiment, aspirations and even ambitions common to a 
rising power, China appears to have accepted two basic facts of today’s international 
relations: first, the world is organized in a nation-state political system and in 
international market economy rather than anything like the Chinese world order of the     
Middle Kingdom: second, China is still clearly a backward or developing nation that 
lacks the economic clout, capital, and technology necessary to realize its potential as a 
great power262. 
Other Chinese scholars argue that in the last century, Chinese rulers have paid more attention to 
defending its borders and strengthening domestic control rather than focusing on foreign 
conquest. They argue that China has been introverted in its foreign policy and does not have a 
history of colonization but of one exploration. This has been equally true of the nineteenth 
century, where it has focus on defending its boarders rather than expanding its borders263.  
However, political scientist will argue that territory expansion is not the only condition for 
evaluating the rise of China. It is true, that in the history, power states have been judged by 
territory expansion or military power. In the case of China, it was based on economic power. For 
example in 2005, China has become the third largest foreign trade country with the largest 
foreign exchange reserves. Many economists predict that China’s economic size measured in 
terms of purchasing power parities264 will overtake the United States by the next decade.  
Still China’s rise to power should not be determined primarily by traditional criteria like military 
hegemony, political supremacy and territorial gain but rather by other definitions of power such 
as ‘soft power’. 
 
 
 
                                                          
262Wang, Fei-ling, Self-Image and Strategic Intentions: National Confidence and Political Insecurity, in The Eyes of 
the Dragon: China Views the World, edited by Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang. Lanham MD; Rowman & Littlefield, 
1999, page 21-22 
263 Lai Hongyi and Yiyi Lu, China’s Soft Power and International Relations, Routledge, 2012, page 22-25 
264 Lai Hongyi and Yiyi Lu, China’s Soft Power and International Relations, Routledge, 2012, page 15 
~ 86 ~ 
 
4.2 Discussions of Soft Power in China 
 
Since the 1990s, the concept of soft power has taken major prominence among Chinese scholars, 
academics, policy makers/ think tanks, political leaders, journalist and government. It has been 
argued that it has become one of the most important aspects of Chinese foreign policy strategy 
and least researched and understood by the Western world265.  It is for this reason that the 
concept of soft power will be examined from a Chinese perspective in this chapter. 
A good starting point is to examine the overall understanding of soft power among Chinese 
intellectuals and the implications of this understanding for China’s International strategy. We 
will examine how China understands and interprets the meaning of soft power? Why is there a 
strong and growing interest in soft power in China? What role do the Chinese elite assign to soft 
power in China’s international strategy in the new century, especially in the context of China’s 
rise? A conscious effort has been made to look at official documents endorsed by the top Chinese 
leadership and articles in prominent Chinese journals. 
China’s research and interest on the topic has surpassed any other country, even including the 
U.S266.  The concept “soft power” which is translated as ruan shili (or ruan liliang) in Mandarin 
Chinese is a familiar concept among academics and policy makers. However, ruan shili or soft 
power has different interpretations and understandings among scholars and academics267. For the 
Chinese scholars the clear definition between soft (ruan) and hard (ying) is difficult to 
understand because according to the ancient and still popular Chinese philosophy, the hard could 
become soft and vice versa268.  
In 1993, President Jiang Zemin’s chief advisor and former Professor of Fudan University, Wang 
Huning published an article, stressing the importance of soft power in China’s foreign policy.269 
Another prominent academic, Pang Zhongying, published an article emphasizing Nye’s soft 
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power theory in detail270. Various think tanks in China have held conferences and seminars to 
debate Nye’s theory. Some scholars have criticized his theory, asserting that Nye’s soft power 
pertains to American circumstances and might not be relevant from China’s perspective271. 
Soft power was first mentioned in the political report to the 16th Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) Congress in 2002, stating that “in today’s world, culture intertwines with economics and 
politics, demonstrating a more prominent position and role in the competition for comprehensive 
national power”272. On 28 May 2004, the Central Committee focused on how to develop China’s 
philosophy and social science. Two months later the CCP publicized a document titled 
“Suggestions of the CCP Center on further Developing and Boosting Philosophy and Social 
Science”. Political analyst commented that the study session suggested and signified the 
leadership’s will to accelerate the growth of China’s soft power to a strategic level273. 
Another article published in the official weekly of the Chinese government, Outlook (liaowang) 
revealed that the CCP had a study session on soft power and debated the official thinking behind 
soft power274. The CCP during this study session also discussed the Chinese model and the 
Beijing Consensus. In this article, soft power was defined as “international appeal and attraction 
of one’s nation’s culture, values, political system and development model”275.  It was reported 
that the Chinese leadership could align themselves with soft power theory. 
Another article published by one of the Chinese government official think tanks stated “China 
needs soft power” and that “soft power comprised of culture and ideology and is a necessary 
element in the competition among nations. The aim of China’s soft power was to gain 
international recognition and respect”276. 
In October 2007, at the Seventeenth Congress of the CCP, President Hu in his speech 
emphasized that culture is an important part of national cohesion and overall national power. The 
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Party should “enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country to better guarantee the 
people’s basic cultural rights and interests”277. 
In July 2010 the CPC Politburo held the twenty-second study session, at which President Hu 
Jintao stressed the importance of comprehensive national power. Furthermore, the Party decided 
to enhance Chinese culture and its soft power278.  
In October 2010, the Central Committee of the CPC issued a Five-Year Plan, from 2011 to 2015. 
In this document, article 9 discussed the need to develop national soft power through 
incorporating traditional Chinese culture, domestic innovation, export of cultural products and 
external media initiatives279. 
 With these developments and interest, Chinese policy makers and intellectuals have tied 
together some aspects of soft power into its national strategy that aids China into becoming a 
global power. The concept of comprehensive national power (Zonghe Guoli) or grand strategy 
also emerged in the 1990s: “as soft power gained wider recognition as an important component 
of comprehensive national power”280. Among scholars, academics and government officials, the 
concept of soft power became a key national objective. A published article, The Theory on 
Comprehensive National Power describes comprehensive national power as comprising hard 
power (i.e. economics power, science and technology power, national defense power, and 
national resource power)”.  While soft power consists of political power, diplomatic power, and 
cultural and educational power. 
Professor Ye Zicheng from the Peking University argues “that China should strengthen its soft 
power in the areas of politics, economy, and foreign policy in order to avoid following in the 
footsteps of the Soviet Union”281. In his opinion, the Soviet Union collapsed because it lacked 
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soft power, which in turn diminished its international influence, even though the Soviet Union 
was one of the strongest military powers. Ye proposed that China uses ‘institutional innovation’ 
in all areas (especially political, economic, and cultural institutions) as a method of increasing 
China’s soft power”282.  Zhang Youwen and Huang Renwei shared a similar view in their article 
in China’s International Status Report 2005, that strengthening of soft power is one of the key 
criteria to increase China’s national power.  They argued that China’s soft power increased in 
2004 chiefly because of its attempt at institutional building283. 
During the Hu Jintao era, policy makers in the CCP understood that China must strengthen its 
soft power on a strategic level as well as hard power to develop into a global rising power.284 As 
a result, the Chinese government realized it needed to strengthen its education in socialist 
ideology and institute policies to protect China’s traditional culture285. 
With the CCP emphasizing the need to increase China’s soft power, various Chinese 
organizations and research institutes have organized conferences on the topic. The China Foreign 
Language Bureau hosted a forum on “trans-cultural communications and soft power building” in 
Beijing in August 2006. In 2007, the International Public Relations Research Center at Fudan 
University sponsored a forum among government officials and leading scholars on national soft 
power construction and the development of China’s public relations. The China Institute on 
Contemporary International Relations did a special study on soft power286. The Institute of 
Strategic Studies of the Central Party School also conducted a comprehensive study on soft 
power287 
The literature on soft power was dramatically increased among officials and scholars. Mingjiang 
Li conducted a survey, and noted the number of articles (in Chinese) that mentioned soft 
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power288. The outcome was that in the period 1994-2000 it was mentioned in eight articles but 
increased in the period 2000-2004 to 53 articles and during the period 2005-2007 to 314 
articles289.  
 
4.3 China as a Rising Power  
 
The preceding discussion demonstrated why and how China understands the concept of soft 
power. However, some analysts will argue that there are other reasons why China is enthusiastic 
about soft power. One of the most frequent arguments is that soft power is part of the 
comprehensive power that any major power is expected to possess. It is believed in Chinese 
strategic circles that soft power is an important indicator of a state’s international status and 
influence290. “A great power has to have material or hard power as well as soft power in order to 
enjoy flexibility in international politics and maintain advantageous position in international 
competition”291. In light of this, many Chinese analysts have argued that soft power is 
inseparable from China’s rise.  
According to various scholars, building soft power is commensurate with China’s major power 
status and influence has become part of China’s development strategy292. The first of its 
development task was China’s hard power (i.e. economic, technological and military build- up) 
and the second is to develop a harmonious society, where its focus must be on culture, national 
cohesion and to maintain political stability to create favorable condition for China’s peaceful 
rise. 
China’s emergence as a new global power is perceived in different ways. Many states in the 
global South or developing world regard China as a rising power which will dramatically change 
the global balance of power in Realist terms more towards the global South. It makes China 
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attractive for them and therefore provides a basis for its soft power. The status quo powers on the 
other hand, are cautious about China’s rise and regard it as a potential challenge for their status.  
In the discussion below a general discussion of China’s rising power is followed by an 
exposition of the development the concept has undergone. Initially the Chinese described it as 
“rising power” but because of the negative suspicion it elicited, they changed it to “peaceful rise 
and development”, which was later adjusted to “peaceful development” and finally captured in 
the notion of working towards a “harmonious world”. Each of them is discussed later in the 
chapter.  
Many perceive China as a potential rising power or the “new rise” in the twenty-first century. In 
2004 the American strategist, Zbigniew Brzezinski claimed that “only the United States 
unambiguously earned the ranking as the most powerful state in every twenty year intervals since 
1880, and the gap in the 1990s between the top-ranked United States and the rest had become 
even wider than ever before”293. 
Similar to the United States, China’s vast territory, ever growing population, rapid economic 
growth, deep cultural roots, geo-strategic position, ever expanding domestic market and rising 
international prestige, will enable it to be a potential superpower. During the Cold War China 
was unable to attain great power status under Mao’s rule as he retarded economic growth and 
adopted an inward foreign policy approach. It was only when Deng Xiaoping succeeded Mao 
that China began to attain potential great power status and adopted an ambitious national strategy 
of ”reform and opening up” in the late 1980s. It was during this period that China began 
transforming its economic, political and economic strategy. Unexpectedly, China emerged as an 
important player in the international arena, especially during the 1980s in US-USSR-China 
relations.  
Since the early 1990s scholars, policy makers, government and key business leaders began 
questioning China’s new role in the international domain. In 1997 Andrew J. Nathan and Robert 
Ross explained in their book, China’s New Foreign Policy Strategy: The Great Wall and the 
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Empty Fortress that rising China will not necessary become a threat294, arguing that China had 
not sufficiently demonstrated its real intentions and that China’s economy needs time to integrate 
into the world economy. More critical authors like Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro who 
wrote The Coming Conflict with China, predicted an evitable conflict with Asia and more so with 
the United States295. They predicted an “inevitable conflict between an expansionist China that 
views itself as the rightful arbiter of power in Asia and a naïve and unprepared United States that 
has already entered three wars in the last half century to prevent any single country’s 
domination”296. 
Approaching the twenty first century, more scholars have concluded that China will become a 
superpower of unprecedented proportions297. Certain analysts suggest “an economical strong 
China would become bolder, more demanding and less likely to cooperate with other major 
powers in the region”298. 
Most of these authors point to the fact that China possesses significant power resources which 
can be used to pursue its national interest. A pointed question raised by some of these authors is: 
will China become a responsible power in the twenty-first century? 
As discussed in an earlier chapter, Realist theorists argue that rising power will inevitably lead to 
war. According to the Realist approach, great powers often resort to ‘force’ (war, military) to 
change the status quo in accordance with their own national interest. Alternatively, existing 
powers feel threatened and therefore are determined to preserve their status within the 
international area. However, many theorists have a contrary position arguing that the developed 
world is a site of ‘complex interdependence’ among states and societies. These complex 
interdependences can sometimes promote cooperation. From this point of view it is argued that 
China is becoming increasingly part of the larger capitalist system and globally more integrated. 
It implies also that China cannot be defined as a revisionist power in terms of the traditional 
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power transitional theory. They further state that China’s reforms have increasingly changed its 
foreign policy from communist Maoism to a reformist policy. 
 
4.4  Rise to power 
 
Scholars and historians have admitted that China’s rise dates back as far as 1949, but during the 
Maoist era an active approach to gain more international power was not pursued. It was only 
with the advent of Deng Xiaoping that China openly aspired to become a ‘great power’. It 
believed that this mission should be accomplished by 2040 when the ‘Four Modernizations’ will 
become reality. According to Guo Shuyong, China will embark on three major steps to achieve 
its ‘state’s rise’ (guojia jueqi), namely  
1. The construction or preparation stage (ying zao jieduan) when the state builds a 
peaceful neighborhood and prevents splits in the country; 
2. The ‘Mould stage’ (suzao jieduan) when China takes initiatives to recover lost 
territory; 
3.  The ‘Strategic economy stage’ which lays the foundation for a new global 
economic order or political economy and which will enable the international 
community to accept the new order and ensure equality and justice299. 
 
China’s rise or power status in the international arena can be measured by both tangible means 
(such as economic status and its military power which is regarded as hard power) and by 
intangible means like its attractiveness (referred to as soft power). As mentioned in chapter 3, 
Joseph Nye has noted that effective soft power “is a means to success in world politics”300. 
Hence China has calculatedly reinforced these images of softness in its state regulated media. 
The People’s Daily of China regularly publishes articles with titles like ‘The Charm of China’s 
Soft Power’, ‘Making China’s Charm visible by soft power’, ‘how to improve China’s Soft 
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Power Image’ and ‘China’s Soft Power set for global audience’. The Chinese government and 
the general public are aware that China’s rise incorporates soft power and ‘smile diplomacy’301.    
China’s soft power is visible through its foreign policy and programme initiatives within the 
international community.  Joshua Kurlantzick labels it as China’s soft power strategy or China’s 
charm initiative. Kurlantzick pointed out China’s use of discourse, cultural, publicity and 
business tools in cultivating a good image in the developing world, especially in South East Asia, 
Africa, and to a lesser extend in Latin America. Kurlantzick emphasized that China’s ability to 
secure energy deals is gaining popularity in Africa.  
The PRC realized that it had to enhance its public diplomacy by advancing China’s international 
image and pursuing public relations and building up national power. In 2008 Wang made the 
following observation: 
In recent years, China has sought to supplement its traditional use of ‘hard power’ with 
‘soft power’, and thus the Chinese government has paid more and more attention to 
public diplomacy…. To make full use of the modern media … by creating a Chinese 
international image in the twenty-first century, public diplomacy can be the mirror of 
China’s rise….public diplomacy can be the lubricant for China’s rise302.   
One of the key challenges for China is to manage the post-Cold War “chorus of China threat”303 
as a result of its public commitment to rise as a major power. The PRC is cautious and haunted 
by the suspicion of a “China threat” within the international area. The reason that Beijing is 
cautious is because the “China threat” theory could create tension amongst global powers and it 
could work against China’s development. Hence China’s public diplomacy is an important tool 
to reassure the international community, to avert any China threat fears and to prevent forming 
any alliance against each other.  
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4.5 Peaceful Rise and Development 
 
 Discussion of China’s rise took a turn in 1995 when Chinese academic like Shi Yinhong from 
the People’s University used the “peaceful rise” concept to describe China’s foreign policy in 
years to come. It was not yet officially adopted as a new concept. In 2003 Zheng Bijian, a 
professor of the Central Party School and senior adviser to the Chinese leadership, first 
announced the concept of “peaceful rise” at the Boao Forum.  Prime Minister Wen Jiabao 
commented in a 2004 speech that “peaceful rise meant that, unlike past emerging powers whose 
new might had caused shock waves across the world, China would threaten no nation, even as it 
becomes a global power. China’s rise will not come at the cost of any other country, nor pose a 
threat to any other country”304. This quotation encapsulated all the sentiments of peaceful co-
existence earlier articulated by the Soviet leader Khrushchev. According to Joshua Kurlantzick, 
the Chinese leadership created the “peaceful rise” concept as it realized that its hard power was 
not effective and that it created mistrust among First World countries. 
During the 1990s China used its military strength to intimidate its neighboring countries.  It used 
an aggressive approach to try to resolve territorial disputes in the South China Sea, with Tibet 
and India. Similarly Beijing also tried to persuade Asian countries and other developing 
countries to abandon their alliances with the United States. Beijing failed to achieve this as most 
of these countries condemned Beijing’s aggressive behavior and increased their security and 
military links with the USA. It also created other responses like the Philippines convening its 
National Security Council to deal with the Chinese military presence in the region. This created 
hostility and mistrust between China and its neighboring countries. As a result David Shambaugh 
argued that in the 1990s China appeared to have had no coherent or effective foreign policy in 
Asia305. 
 By the late 1990s, Beijing realized that its aggressive foreign policy turned many countries 
against China. As a result it adjusted its strategy by offering financial assistance to Asian 
countries during the financial crisis in 2000.  Financial assistance” became the core strategy that 
helped China turn enemies into friends.  The Chinese leadership decided to downplay their 
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aggressive military approach and instead focused on building China’s global soft power. In the 
Chinese Communist Party report in 2002, it decided to make “becoming friends and partners 
with neighbors that is nearby developing nations - a top strategic priority”306. According to 
Shambaugh, Chinese leaders therefore decided to have a peaceful environment conducive to 
domestic development by focusing on soft power.  
By 2009 Chinese officials were often quoted in public, reiterating “that the west will need to get 
used to the rise of China. China will rise, is rising, and that is a fact of life now”307. They also 
insisted that the rise of China is an indisputable fact308.  According to Yan Xuetong in his article 
Zhongguo Jueqi (China Rise), “the Chinese regard their rise as regaining China’s lost 
international status rather than obtaining something new”309. He further argued that “the Chinese 
people take the rise of their nations for granted”310 and “the rise of China is an indisputable 
fact”311.  
Peaceful rise is soft power language suggesting that China’s rise is all about soft power.  The 
People’s Daily suggested in 2004 that “the peaceful rise of China is the most favorable 
counterblow at the theory of ‘China threat”. In the Beijing Review it was argued that “the 
proposed peaceful rise provides a theoretical instrument to refute scares of China threat”312. With 
reference to International Relations (IR) theory, the official interpretation of the “peaceful rise” 
concept is the opposite of offensive Realism. Political scientists like John Mearsheimer argue 
that China’s peaceful rise serves as a framework of what other hegemonic powers (like France, 
Germany, Japan and Soviet Union) have failed to establish. Instead China sends out a message 
“not to challenge but observe existing international law and regulations”313. 
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On the other hand China advocates argue that: 
Peaceful Rise is now very much an idea …. that the world, including other major 
countries, can live side by side with a rising giant as a peaceful partner to do business 
with, not a big bully for others to contain or fear for. They can share China’s 
development dividends314. 
According to Chinese authorities peaceful rise is a “mutually beneficial situation for China and 
for the world. It is win-win situation and common prosperity”315.  
In 2004 China’s Premier Wen Jiabao explained that peaceful rise is a “tool to help China’s 
ongoing national strengthening in promoting China’s peaceful rise; we must take full advantage 
of the very good opportunity of world peace to endeavor to develop and strengthen ourselves. 
China’s rise will require a long period of time and probably the hard work of many generations 
of Chinese people”316. 
Prime Minister’s Wen words can be interpreted to mean that peaceful rise is a mechanism for the 
Chinese leadership to delay completion of China’s four modernizations317.  In Wang Yiwei’s 
article in the Beijing Review it was mentioned that ”China is a rising power… right now China is 
keeping a low profile but preparing….this build-up period is expected to last for twenty 
years”318. For Wang this “low profile current transition period will be used by China to serve its 
grand strategy of peaceful rise … to grasp the 20 year period of opportunity, winning time at the 
cost of…. a degree of concession”319 in the short term. According to Wang, in the long term, 
though, “China could look for changes in the international system whereby the US is today’s 
only superpower while China will be tomorrow’s world power”320. 
                                                          
314People’s Daily, 2 May 2004, China’s peaceful rise,  Lin, S 2 May 2004 
315Interview with Ms. Wu Jin Lan, (Deputy Director-General: Foreign Affairs Office, Shanghai Municipality), 
Shanghai, 25 May 2010 
316Jiabao Wen, Premier Wen Jiabao’s press conference at the conclusion of the second session of the 10th National 
People’s Congress, 15 March 2004, available at: wwwfmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/lianghuizhuanti/t80119.htm, 
accessed 22 December 2010 
317Lai Hongyi and Yiyi Lu (eds) China’s Soft Power and International Relations, Routledge, 2012, page 49 
318Scott, David, Soft language, soft imagery and soft power in China’s diplomatic lexicon, in China’s Soft Power 
and International Relations, edited by Lai Hongi and Yiyi Lu, Routledge, 2012, pages 40. 
319Scott, David, Soft language, soft imagery and soft power in China’s diplomatic lexicon: in China’s Soft Power 
and International Relations, edited by Lai Hongi and Yiyi Lu, Routledge, 2012, pages 42 
320Beijing Review, Beijing hands Moscow a long rope, Wang Y, 11 November 2004. 
~ 98 ~ 
 
However, the phrase of peaceful rise encountered many criticisms from both the domestic and 
international arena. On the domestic front, criticism was that peaceful rise could mean that 
countries like Taiwan or Japan could invade China. Internationally, the notion of a peaceful rise 
can imply a negative meaning associated with aspirations of super power status. 
By 2003 the concept of peaceful rise encountered harsh criticism from within China and Western 
countries. From within China, the term was seen as limiting the PRC’s use of military force in 
confronting Taiwan in the future321. Critics from outside emphasized the noun ‘rise’ as being 
controversial. According to Scott, there is a negative association of “rise” at the expense of 
others, and “that a rise for China inherently meant a Paul Kennedy-style ‘fall’ for others”322. Due 
to the harsh criticism of China’s ‘peaceful rise’ concept it was changed to peaceful development 
(heping fazhan), as an alternative phrase. 
 
4.6 Peaceful Development (Heping Fazhan) 
 
China’s change to peaceful development was to show the world that its image was peaceful and 
civilized. In 2005 the official Chinese media observed: 
In its push for development China will not and cannot retrace the path traditionally taken 
by powers on the rise. Our only option is peaceful development in which all countries are 
winners323. 
 Peaceful development has several advantages as it focuses on China’s socio-economic 
development rather than on its political-military rise. This is less threatening to the international 
community. It is in China’s own interest to pursue peaceful development to enable its peaceful 
rise. Li Junru, the then vice president of the Party School of the Central Committee of the CPC 
argued that “therefore, it is an even more urgent work for China to build up its image of peaceful 
China …. China’s peaceful development means that China will emerge in the world with an 
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ethical and progressive image”324. A White Paper released in September 2011, “China’s Peaceful 
Development Road”, concluded that “looking back upon history, basing itself on the present 
reality and looking forward to the future, China will unswervingly follow the road of peaceful 
development”325. The White Paper further reiterated that “the road of peaceful development 
accords with the fundamental interests of the Chinese people… China is now taking the road of 
peaceful development, and will continue to do so when it gets stronger in the future”326. The 
White Paper therefore made it abundantly clear that it is in China’s own interest to pursue a path 
of peaceful development as a means for its peaceful rise. However, its assertion that China will 
continue to modernize and become stronger in the future, elicited some criticism from Western 
policy makers because they were concerned that China could become a rising threat327. With 
China’s military expenditure increasing, its rapid economic development drive (i.e. acquiring 
large amounts of foreign assets) and its ‘Going Out’ policy China has raised some external fears. 
In response to these fears China introduced in 2004 the concept of a “harmonious world”. 
 
4.7 Harmonious world 
 
“The term “harmonious world” is associated with the term “great harmony” which is rooted in 
old Confucian norms”328. According to Chinese commentators like Shen Ding, the notion of a 
harmonious world is a “globalist phrase, appropriate in an age of globalization and one of the 
most popular lexicons for talking about Beijing’s ideal of international order in the age of 
China’s rise”329. 
 “Harmonious world” has been given prominence by Hu Jintao’s UN World Summit speech in 
September 2005, entitled “Building towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common 
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Prosperity”. It received similar prominence during the 17th National Congress in 2007, when the 
Party’s Constitution was formally amendment to strive for the building of “a harmonious world 
characterized by sustained peace and common prosperity”330. 
According to former Chinese foreign minister, Tang Jiaxuan, “building a harmonious world is a 
major strategy and a new vision that the Communist Party of China and the Chinese Government 
put forward in the new stage of development in the 21st century”331. The harmonious world 
concept, according to the minister in 2006, was a strategy by the PRC to enhance its foreign 
cultural strategy and to strengthen its soft power. “China‘s own national interests have also been 
materialized on a broader scale with its positive image and international status increasing 
globally”332.  
“It can also be used to differentiate China from other types of overbearing big powers; our 
philosophy on building a harmonious world… should set a good example for the rest of the 
world, especially other big powers like the USA”333. The concept harmonious world can be seen 
to deflect the criticism from China’s international rise. The People’s Daily commented that the 
“harmonious world” helped to rebut the “China threat” theory334. According to the People’s 
Daily the “harmonious world was very inspiring to the world, as a way to strengthening China’s 
soft power”335. 
According to Yu in 2007, “the idea of harmonious world expresses a long coveted dream of 
human-kind building a new international political and economic order characterized by peace, 
tranquility this new takes on the development of the ancient Chinese dream of Tianxia Datong 
(great harmony of the world)”336. 
                                                          
330Lai Hongyi and Yiyi Lu, China’s Soft Power and International Relations, in China’s Soft Power and International 
Relations, edited by Lai Hongi and Yiyi Lu, Routledge, 2012, page 51 
331Tang Jiaxuan, Working together to pursue peaceful development and build a harmonious world, Speech at the 
International Seminar on China’s Peaceful development and Build A Harmonious world, Beijing, 8 November 2007, 
available at: http://laoag.china-consulate.org/eng/lgxw/t379193.htm, accessed 25 April 2014 
332People’s Daily, China’s first step forward in its harmonious world-oriented diplomacy. Yan, X, 19 December 
2006 
333China Daily, Building a World of Peace and Prosperity, Wang, Y, 3 March 2008 
334People’s Daily, Harmonious World helps rebut China Threat, Wu Jianmin, 20 March 2006 
335China Daily, We must work to create a harmonious world, Yu, K, 10 May 2007 
336China Daily, We must work to create a harmonious world, Yu, K, 10 May 2007. 
~ 101 ~ 
 
 The harmonious world concept has its own shortcomings and created also controversial issues. 
One of the criticisms is that it does not incorporate the issues of diversity or human rights 
especially when it comes to individual political liberal democratic norms337. The Chinese 
rebuttal, however, was that human rights are defined as “human rights with Chinese 
characteristics”.  
 
4.8  Chapter Summary 
 
Most Chinese believe that China was predetermined to be a great nation. Their mentality that 
China’s Middle Kingdom had to be restored, informs us that China wanted to be the center of the 
world in the past. At present, China’s Africa policy and behavior still reaffirms a continued 
presence of the Middle Kingdom mentality. The logic is that if other countries recognize or 
respect China as a great power, China will reciprocate with economic benefits to them.   
 
This chapter presented the view that the PRC uses concepts deliberately in the way it wants to 
project its soft power image. Phrases and words like “peaceful rise”, “peaceful development” and 
“harmonious world” are all strategically chosen to emphasis that China’s intentions are peaceful. 
China is careful to use language that does not present a negative image.  The concept “peaceful 
rise” has been replaced with “peaceful development” and more recently China decided to project 
an image of a “responsible power”. Therefore the phrase “harmonious world” is intended to 
reduce potential international friction between China and other major powers and to prevent 
possible counter measures and blocks on China’s rise338 to be imposed.  According to Yan 
Xuetong “whether nationalists or communists Chinese people consider ‘peaceful rise’ as a 
mechanism for the great revival of the Chinese nation after years of humiliations”339. 
As already indicated, China’s emergence as a “rising power” leading it towards a super power, is 
regarded as a given in this discussion. There is almost no evidence that can challenge China’s 
rise as a global power. It already passed Japan as the second biggest economy in GDP terms. In 
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this chapter the focus was on soft power and how it influences China’s self-perception of its 
emergence as a major power. These perceptions were articulated in a series of terms (i.e. rising 
power, peaceful rise, peaceful development and others) chosen to maintain or protect China’s 
motivation to appear attractive and non-threatening to the international community. In that sense 
soft power considerations were paramount in determining China’s public diplomacy language.  
  
~ 103 ~ 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: 
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF CHINA’S SOFT POWER IN AFRICA 
 
 5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the economic relations between China and Africa, and how China uses 
economic ‘soft power’ in its engagement with African countries. This chapter will focus on trade 
and investment, oil and raw material, energy and China’s financial aid as a means of soft power.   
This century has witnessed expanded economic engagement between China and Africa, resulting 
in China’s immediate economic needs being met and also contributing towards the achievement 
of China’s economic development. Beijing’s relations with Africa are largely premised on 
economic nationalist goals, particularly the maximization of national power through economic 
development which is facilitated by state intervention. It will be argued here that China’s 
scramble for Africa is not based on humanitarian idealism but rather on a preoccupation with 
accessing Africa’s raw materials and markets. China needs commodity and energy assets and 
should it failed to securing these vital assets, China’s economic growth will be undermined. Oil 
procurement for China is a matter of ‘national security’. According to Akwe in Foreign Policy in 
Focus, “in its engagement with Africa, China certainly aims to build a political constituency for 
its much-touted peaceful development”340. But its primary interest is petroleum and raw 
materials. If Beijing’s goal of quadrupling the size of the economy by 2020 is to be met, energy, 
consumption, and therefore demand, will increase. According to Akwe, “Africa has resources in 
abundance but almost no capacity to process those resources: a perfect opportunity for a rising 
economy like China. Africa can supply its raw inputs and also provide a market for China’s 
manufactured products”341. Most African countries dependent on imported manufactured goods 
and consumables and therefore need investments and stable infrastructure in order to develop 
their economies, whilst China requires raw materials to feed its manufacturing base and suitable 
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markets to export its cheap manufactured goods. From a Chinese point of view this situation 
provides it with an opportunity to create a link between its growth needs for basic materials and 
African states’ development needs for imported goods and financial assistance for their 
infrastructural development. China’s challenge is to make it attractive enough for African states 
so that it is not out-maneuvered by other powers that are also competing for new African 
markets. For that purpose China needs to develop its economic resources into soft power. 
 
Paul Hubbard argues that the “absence of conditionality is the key element of China’s soft power 
diplomacy”342. China differentiates itself from other world powers by refusing “to make 
demands upon other nations’ sovereignty, economic models, governance or political culture”343.  
China’s political thrust, while focusing on preventing foreign interference, has moved to poverty 
alleviation which has appealed to many African leaders.  Africans are also impressed by China’s 
rise in such a short space of time. China also offers financial and social appeal to Africans 
through many supportive and cooperation programs, projects and policies such as low or no-
interest loan programs, low cost road construction projects and debt forgiveness. He Wenping of 
the Chinese Academy of Social Science refers to it as “soft power to magnify their influence”344. 
Evans and Downs explained that the tenets of soft power exercised in Africa, such as extensive 
aid and loans with few strings attached, are indirect sweeteners which are an added appeal to 
Chinese bids for resources345. 
Recently scholars like Kurlanzick and Li346 have underlined the limitations of Nye’s soft power 
theory, in its classical forms, particularly in the case of Chinese expansion in Africa. Other 
sources of soft power not mentioned by Nye, namely business, economy and development are 
also significant. It is argued in this chapter that business and development-related tools of soft 
                                                          
342Hubbard, Paul, Aiding Transparency: What WE can Learn About China Exim Bank’s Concessional Loans, CG 
Working paper No.126, Washington D.C., Centre for Global Development 
343Kurlantzick, Joshua, The Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World, Yale University 
Press, 2007, page 44 
344Interview with Dr He Wenping, (Director of African studies section: Chinese Academy of Social Science),  
Stellenbosch, 14 September 2012; also interviewed her in Beijing on 12 January 2008  
345Down, Erica, Testimony before the U.S-China Economic & Security Review Commission. 13 April 2011 
346Anshan, Li, China New Policy Towards Africa, in R.I. Rotberg, ed. China into Africa: Trade Aid and Influence, 
Brookings Institution Press, 2008 
Kurlantzick, Joshua, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World, New Republic Book. 
Yale University Press, 2008 
~ 105 ~ 
 
power are very important, especially in the relationships with poor, underdeveloped countries. In 
fact they are probably even more important than freedom and democracy, which Nye 
characterized as the most important American soft power tools. Lum et al 347 applied this kind of 
expanded interpretation to the economic constituents of Chinese soft power in South East Asia. 
Along with its economic success, China’s development model is also referenced as an important 
source of Chinese soft power, not only in developing countries but also in the USA348. 
The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission claims that China is building 
African infrastructure without looking at direct benefits to African people, but only for its 
corrupt leaders349. An International Monetary Fund document reported in 2006 that Beijing’s 
“policies risk unleashing a new wave of hidden debt for Africa”350. Whilst the World Bank, 
under Paul Wolfowitz, states that Chinese loans gave borrowers an opportunity to avoid 
governance safe guards, multilateral banks are “losing projects in Asia and Africa to Chinese 
banks because (the Chinese) don’t bother about social and human rights conditions”351.  
In the early 1990 Chinese policymakers made a strategic decision to diversify and secure energy 
and resource supplies across the globe. Policy makers encouraged “a go out and buy policy”, 
“primarily focused on a strategy which has seen Chinese oil and resources companies move into 
Africa”352. Stephanie Rupp argues “that the alignment of Africa’s natural resources endowments 
with China’s core economic interest has placed Africa at the center of emerging geopolitical 
tensions”353. Rupp claims that in this century, “China will succeed to become Africa’s biggest 
and largest economic trading partner who will ultimately displace traditional relations with Euro-
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American partners who have dominated over 150 years of colonial rule and neo-colonial 
influence”354. 
5.1.1  Historical understanding of China’s economic growth 
 
There is a traditional view among Westerners that China has been an economically backward 
country. This is an historical inaccuracy because since the 18thcentury China was regarded as one 
of the greatest trading nations in the world. The Mongol Empire stretched halfway around the 
globe, and the Silk Road was one of the greatest trading routes. In the early fifteen century, 
Emperor Zhu Di developed one of the largest shipping fleets in the world. Chinese ships reached 
Africa and established trading posts a decade before the Portuguese. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, structural economic reforms undertaken by the Chinese government 
transformed an agrarian economy into one of the largest and fastest growing economies. Since 
the 1980s, China has consistently averaged an economic growth rate of eight per cent per 
annum355. Broadman states that: “A signal of China’s growing economic strength was its rising 
need for oil imports. In 1993 China became a net importer of oil, and in 2003, overtook Japan to 
become the world’s second largest consumer of oil behind the US”356. Between 1978 and 2000, 
energy demand in China grew by four per cent per year, but since 2001, demand increased by 13 
per cent, outpacing annual economic growth. China’s net oil imports were approximately 3.9 
million barrels in 2008. An indication of this need for oil is illustrated by the potential growth of 
motor vehicles from 27 million in 2004 to an estimated 300 million in 2030. According to Dow 
Jones Commodities News Service, China’s oil consumption in 2010 reached 8.6 million 
barrels357. It is not surprising that China considers oil procurement as a national security 
priority, using all state resources to satisfy the nation’s need for energy.  
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5.1.2  How do the Chinese see Africa as an economic investment the backdrop? 
 
Africa is a highly heterogeneous continent with fifty four countries, each with different sized 
economies, from small to vast populations and with diverse languages. There is also a 
differential level of income - with GDP per capita ranging from US$200 to US$7000358. But 
most importantly, it is highly fragmented geographically, with extremely poor infrastructure 
networks, underdeveloped market institutions, constraints on business competition and weak 
governance, which makes trade and investment extremely difficult. Furthermore, countries are 
characterized by corruption practices and the continent is prone to conflict and instability. For 
foreign investors, Africa is a difficult place to do business, relative to other regions in the world. 
In this respect the following context should be kept in mind:  
After the Cold War, the importance of Africa as a strategic region diminished within the USA, 
Europe and Russia; the ideological battles were no longer relevant. As a result Africa 
experienced a period of marginalization, which saw a decrease in investments and increase in 
debts. Although Africa was undergoing structural adjustments fostered by the Bretton Woods 
institutions, 43 of 139 British companies withdrew from Africa359.  The total debt of sub-Saharan 
Africa was US$6 billion in 1970; in 1980 the figure grew to US$84.3 billion; Africa’s debt 
reached US$200.4 billion in 1993 and US$210.7 billion in 1994. According to the World Bank, 
in 1995 the debt-export ratio of 28 African countries was over 200:1360. 
However, with the recent discovery of oil and other raw materials on the continent, Africa’s 
GDP growth rate has been 5.4 per cent on average in the last decade. From early 2000, many 
African countries like Ghana, Uganda, Mozambique and Ethiopia have made significant 
economic progress.  
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Despite these developments, Africa’s export market shares have continuously fallen. Making 
African firms more competitive and thus increasing the volume of exports are clear priorities for 
Africa. It is through this prism that Chinese investment and trade on the continent is being 
viewed by the Chinese and by African policy-makers, business people, workers and the 
international community361. Economists have argued that while Africa in 1980s minimized its 
dependence on raw materials, it has failed to take advantage of international trade to leverage 
growth. A prominent debate among scholars is whether Chinese investments in Africa will serve 
to exacerbate or help reduce the continent’s export dependency on natural resource commodities. 
One of the reasons that Africa and Latin America are eager to do business with China is because 
it provides an opportunity for developing countries to prosper. Prolonged decades of 
underdevelopment and not being able to benefit from globalizations have caused many African 
countries to look for new partners and new economic relations, beyond their historic ties to 
Europe and the United States. In this Chapter, it will become clear that China’s economic 
relations with the continent are driven by economic nationalist imperatives, by consolidating 
national power through economic development that is facilitated by the state. 
 
5.1.3  Trade between China and Africa 
 
In this section the focus is on bilateral trade in order to determine its importance as an element of 
China’s bilateral relations with African states. Its scope will present a case for demonstrating its 
influence and importance in China’s overall strategy in Africa over and above the policy 
statements made by Chinese officials.  Overall Sino-African trade has expanded since 1990:  
between 1989 and 1997 trade increased by a massive 43.1 per cent; between 1999 and 2000 trade 
increased by 60 per cent from US$6.5 billion in 1999 to US$10 billion in 2000; by 2002 trade 
had reached US$12.39 billion362, jumping to US$18 billion in 2003363. In 2004 “overall trade 
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saw an increase of 58.9 per cent over 2003 to US$29.46 billion. By the end of 2005, trade had 
reached US$39 billion”364.  
 
According to the Beijing Axis, an independent South African consulting company based in 
Beijing, the latest statistics indicate that in 2013, China Africa trade had reached US$ 210.2 
billion, an increase of 6.2 percent365. On average, since 2001, Sino-African trade has grown by 
31.2 per cent per year366. By 2010, China became Africa’s largest trade and investment 
partner367. 
 
Figure 2: African Exports to China 2012368 
 
 
The above table indicates that in 2012 China became the largest export destination for the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Zambia, Angola, the Republic of Congo, South Africa 
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and Zimbabwe.  For the DRC, the exports to China were mainly copper, crude oil, and cobalt. 
Zambia’s export to China was dominated by copper. For Angola and the Congo exports to China 
consisted almost completely of crude oil.  Another sub-Saharan African country for which China 
was an important export destination in both 2002 and 2012 was Sudan. 
For South Africa the table indicates that the exports to China were iron ore which accounts for 
35 percent, platinum for 14 percent, coal for 10 percent and diamonds nine percent. This shows 
that China’s imports from South Africa are more diverse than from other African countries. 
According to Sanne van der Lugt’s table it can be concluded that China is predominantly buying 
crude oil, copper and iron from Africa. Like many other analysts, she concluded that China is 
mainly interested in Africa’s natural resources369. 
A key element of the development of Sino-African trade is the improved quality of the products. 
In the early 1950s, this trade focused on cotton, minerals and other primary agricultural products, 
while from 1960s to the 1970s, the trade led to an increase in the export of manufactured and 
semi-manufactured goods. In the 1990s China mainly exported textiles, light industrial and other 
labour-intensive products to Africa. This led to a gradual move to electromechanical products 
with greater value.  However, since 2000, mechanical, electrical and high-tech products have 
accounted for more than 50 per cent of China's exports to Africa370. 
 
Another aspect of this development is the increased diversity of trade. In the early stages of the 
partnership, this trade was non-governmental, while currently Sino-African trade includes 
foreign investment, project contracting and foreign aid to governments.  During the 1950s and 
1960s, only North African countries such as Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia traded with China, 
today China trades with all African countries371. 
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In the 21st century, relations between China and Africa have grown closer because the volume of 
trade has increased and they are better quality products372. While China has trade relations with 
more than 50 African countries, it has also signed bilateral trade agreements with more than 40 
of them373. It has established a Committee on Economy and Trade with 28 African countries and 
signed a "Bilateral Agreement on Encouragement and Protection of Investment" with these 
economies374. Furthermore it has signed an agreement to avoid double taxation with eight 
African countries375. Since 2005, China has allowed Africa's twenty nine least developed 
countries to be eligible for tariff-free imports across 190 products376. These agreements and 
policies are mutually beneficial and have led to the promotion of the sustainable development of 
Sino-African trade. 
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Figure 3: China’s Trade Volume (2000-2012)377 
 
 
 
 
According to the China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation (2013) database, “From 2000 
to 2012, the proportion of China-Africa trade volume as a part of Africa’s total foreign trade 
volume increased from 3.82% to 16.13%: the proportion contributed by Africa’s exports to 
China went up from 3.76% to 18.07%, and that by Africa’s imports from China from 3.88% to 
14.11%” 378. 
 
Nevertheless, China’s trade with Africa “from 2000 to 2012, the proportion of China-Africa 
trade volume as a part of China's total foreign trade volume increased from 2.23% to 5.13%"379.  
 
This shows that the overall percentage of 4 percent is not that high (see table below).  
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Figure 4: China’s Total Trade Volume April 2011380 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The China-African relationship is reflective of the classic North-South model, where Africa 
exports mostly raw materials and imports mostly value-added goods. China’s main exports to 
Africa are machinery, electronics, textiles and apparels, technological products and 
manufactured goods. The manufactured exports to Africa are intermediate components of 
products assembled in Africa and afterwards shipped to third market regions, such as the EU and 
USA. Others are capital goods (such as machinery and equipment) destined for African 
manufacturing sectors, and some are consumer nondurables, which compete with domestic 
manufacturers in Africa381. 
 
China imports mainly primary products (fertilizers, grains, ores, etc.) and raw materials 
(including oil, iron ore, cotton, and diamonds from Africa382. Trade between China and Africa is 
skewered in favour of China. It is argued by some economist that this imbalance is caused by 
China’s surplus industrial capacity, together with its tendency to export products through third 
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countries383. Recently, statistics have shown that Africa’s “exports to China have grown rapidly, 
reaching US$93.2 billion in 2011 and increasing 39% year on year. In 2012, African exports to 
China totaled US$113.17 billion, an increase of 21.4% over the previous year”384. These 
increases, however, can be credited to oil exports, without which these imbalances would be 
severely negative385. 
 
 In 1993, China emerged as a net oil importing country, and since 1995 has pursued “outward-
looking oil economy policy”386. Energy security has become an important component of China’s 
economic policy. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation 
(Sinopec) are regarded as Ministries and part of the State Economic and Trade Commission. 
China now imports 800 million barrels of oil annually and is the world’s second largest importer 
of oil (after Japan)387. 
 
After the USA, China has become the second largest consumer of oil388 with the Energy 
Information Administration predicting that China's oil demand will reach 9.4 million bbl/d by 
2020, with net imports of 5.9 million bbl/d, making it a major factor in the world oil market389. It 
was estimated in 2006 that by 2010 China will depend on imports for 45 percent of its oil use390. 
Many scholars have stated that China has developed closer ties with African countries that are oil 
producing, for example Sudan, Angola, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and now recently 
Kenya. 
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China’s imports from Angola and Sudan grew from US$1.47 million in 1998 to US$1.71 billion 
in 2004391. Currently, Angola and Sudan are China’s largest suppliers of oil, and it is Sudan’s 
number one trading partner, with 64.3 per cent of its exports in 2004 going to China392. 
According to Jeremy Steven, a Beijing-based economist at Standard Bank, some of these imports 
are oil, coal, with iron ore and copper making up 14 per cent of imports393. Manufactured goods 
and machinery equipment account for the majority of exports, while chemicals and food products 
account for less than 10 per cent of the total. Chinese manufactured goods (e.g. electronic toys, 
textiles) have relatively low prices, thus making them affordable to lower income Africans394. 
 
Figure 5:  Structure of China’s imports from Africa, 2010395 
 
 
China’s top trading partners are resources based. Angola’s trade with China consists mainly of 
oil, whilst South Africa’s exports to China are largely ore and metal-based products. These base 
metals and mineral products account for 70 per cent of South African‘s export to China396, whilst 
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machinery and equipment, as well as chemicals, pulp, paper, textile, clothing and live animals 
have shown increased growth. China’s trade with Africa is highly concentrated (see the pie chart 
in figure 2 above). Angola has been China’s main trading partner, accounting for 24 per cent. 
South Africa occupies second position (16 per cent), followed by Sudan (8 per cent), Nigeria (7 
per cent) and Egypt (6 per cent)397. 
 
Figure 6: China’s Main African trading partners in 2012398   
 
According to Raphael Kaplinsky, there are many advantages for China’s entrance into Africa.  
Firstly, China accounts for 20 per cent of the world population; secondly China’s high trade 
intensity makes China the second largest trading nation in the world399. Finally the most 
important fact is that China holds the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves, valued at $2 
trillion in March 2009400. According to a working paper by SAIIA, “China and Africa have a 
strong interest in developing the continent’s infrastructure as this will allow the countries to fully 
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realize the potential of their resource endowment, and will enable China to access much needed 
commodities to fuel the increasing demand of its booming economy”401. 
Evidence from an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) study 
shows a possible link between China’s increased demand for commodities and Africa’s 
expanded growth402. Africa’s real GDP grew at an average (year-on-year) of 3.3 per cent 
between 1997 and 2000, compared to 4.2 per cent between 2001 and 2004, reaching 5.4 per cent 
by 2009403. This can be attributed to an increase in commodity prices, which is determined by 
Chinese demand. Africa’s terms of trade have improved through increased commodity prices and 
favorable market conditions. African countries with favorable trade increases are those that 
export mainly oil, metals or agricultural products. These include Sudan and Angola (oil), South 
Africa (metals, agriculture), Uganda (agriculture) and to an extent Zimbabwe (agriculture, 
minerals). 
 
The study by the OECD’s Development Centre indicates that the benefits of China’s increasing 
demand for African goods are offset by the high volatility of demand. This is increased by the 
fact that a “large percentage of China’s manufacturing exports are produced by multinational 
corporations, some of which have moved their production sites to China from elsewhere. 
Increased demand from China, therefore, may in some cases be merely a reflection of the 
movement of production”404. 
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Figure 7: China Africa Trade (USD bn), (2012-2013) 405 
 
 
 
 
 
This increase of trade has a potentially positive impact on the extractive industries in Africa, but 
there is a danger that it will encourage corruption and the enrichment of elites in oil export-
dependent African countries, with benefits likely to trickle down to the affluent only. 
 
5.1.4   China’s Investment in Africa - FDI 
 
It has been reported that China has one of the largest foreign reserve holdings406, exceeding, for 
the first time Japan’s foreign reserves, up recently ranked first in the world407. By December 
2011, China’s foreign reserve holding had reached US$3.3 trillion408 compared to US$609.9 
million by the end of December 2004409. 
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Accordingly, China has the resources to pursue an aggressive foreign investment policy. In 2003 
China was the fifth largest investor in the world after the United States, Germany, the United 
Kingdom and France410. The country’s foreign investment totaled US$2.087 billion, which 
represented an increase of 112 per cent over the amount for 2002, giving it an active presence in 
160 countries411. 
 
Chinese investment in Africa concentrates on key sectors that are of strategic importance to it – 
namely the extractive industries. Chinese firms have invested billions of dollars in African 
countries and have used their engineering and construction resources to develop the oil, gas and 
other natural resources in these countries412. Since the early 1990s China has targeted developing 
countries for its investment projects413 with the result that it has increasingly sought new 
investment opportunities on the continent, often signing joint venture agreements with local or 
foreign companies414. 
 
African governments have welcomed Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) which provides 
much needed capital due to decreasing FDI from developing countries. Statistics indicate that 
Chinese investments in Africa have being growing steadily. By the year 2000, the total 
contractual investment amounted to US$200 million, and by the end of 2011 Chinese investment 
into Africa had reached to 2.9 billion415.  By 2012 it had reached US$ 166 billion.416 Chinese 
companies have invested in resources, transport, agriculture, and in construction, (largely in 
infrastructure development). Making China the largest developing country investor in Africa. 
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Figure 8: Breakdown of China’s foreign direct investment in Africa417 
 
 
 
China’s FDI in Africa is motivated by strategic considerations. The Chinese government plays a 
key role in determining which sectors Chinese firms (mostly State Owned Enterprises) should 
invest in. This is done in order to ensure investment in select industries that would contribute 
towards China’s overall economic plan. It therefore encourages investments in manufacturing, 
resources and technology418. More often than not, Chinese investments in Africa are driven by 
the central state rather than by market forces.  Consequently, many Chinese investments in 
Africa lead to the formation of joint ventures with African companies, which forms part of 
China’s aid program to Africa. 
 
 China’s investment strategy is to move manufacturing goods first to Africa for export to Europe 
and North America. In the process, China takes advantage of the preferential trade terms for 
African countries under the US’s Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the EU’s 
Cotonou Agreement. By exporting these goods from third countries, China avoids the strict 
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import quotas levied on Chinese goods imposed by the USA. In this regard investments in the 
clothing and textile sectors have been encouraged. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the African countries that receive the largest FDI from China are Sudan, 
Nigeria, Angola, Guinea and South Africa. These countries mineral and oil reserves are 
strategically important for China. For example, South Africa is a rich source of platinum and 
ferrochrome while other countries provide oil resources419. It is clear that Chinese FDI in certain 
African countries is very strategic and is specifically selected to secure resources and raw 
materials. 
 
5.1.5  China’s involvement in Africa for Commercial Interest 
 
In this chapter we have seen how China uses economic power as one component of soft power.  
We have primarily focused on China’s attraction to Africa’s natural resources and how it used its 
economic diplomacy to make itself attractive for African governments. However another 
important soft power element that is often neglected is China’s potential to expand its goods and 
manufactured consumables into the African markets. China regards African markets to be 
suitable for its manufactured goods and consumables. To understand the impact of Chinese 
exports on African economies it is necessary to consider the significance of Africa’s imports 
from China for individual countries.  
According to a DFID report in 2005, China accounted for more than five per cent of total imports 
in Uganda (5.1 per cent), Kenya (6.4 per cent), and Tanzania (9.1 per cent) as well as in Sudan 
(14.2 per cent) and Ethiopia (6.4 per cent)420. An influx of Chinese goods can have two effects: 
either, imports may jeopardize the jobs of unskilled African workers, and therefore increasing 
poverty; or, on increase in affordable consumables could reduce living costs and thus raise the 
real incomes of the poor421. Studies have indicated that Chinese consumables in African markets 
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have a positive impact on living standards, for example, Uganda imports a high percentage of 
basic Chinese consumer goods422. 
 
Economics Professor at Cape Town University, Mike Morris argues that Chinese imports have 
had a positive impact on the poor. It has enabled the poor communities to afford luxury items 
that they would otherwise not be able to afford, like washing machines, television sets, DVD 
players etc.423 A DFID study supports this finding that basic consumer goods comprise 37 per 
cent of Uganda’s total imports from China, and in Tanzania they account for 17.7 per cent. In 
both cases the poor have potentially gained from their increased access to basic consumables424. 
A textile worker in Qwa Qwa interviewed by the author commented: “A Chinese television set 
might not last me 20 years but at least I own a television set… I am not looking for quality but 
rather I want cheap goods”425. While anecdotal, it can be assumed that more similar cases exist 
and therefore it can be assumed as a general proposition that Chinese imports into local African 
markets have had a positive impact on the lives of the poor. 
 
However, the influx of cheap Chinese goods into other African markets is at the same time 
potentially devastating for local producers and manufacturers. Critics argue that Chinese goods 
are an “economic malignancy spreading across African markets, displacing African-made goods 
and in the process destabilizing African industries”426. Stephanie Rupp reiterates this in his 
research observing that Chinese investors view “African people as a substantial, undersupplied 
market for their manufactured goods. Chinese manufactures take aggressive advantage of this 
opportunity to supply the African Market, bringing in massive quantities of low quality, 
inexpensive goods. Africans consumers note the bitterness, the substandard quality of Chinese 
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goods imported into Africa versus those produced for Euro-American markets, and intuit their 
position as second-class consumers”427. In the Zimbabwean markets, Chinese goods are often 
referred to in derogatory terms as ‘zhing zhong’, alongside racial epithets against the Chinese428.  
A common remark regarding these goods is that they are “cheap, nasty and likely to fall apart at 
the first attempt to use” them429. Other Zimbabwean complaints include that “they come here, 
sell all their zhing zhong rubbish, don’t do anything for Zimbabweans and take all the money 
they make out of the country”430. 
 
 Job losses and factory closures in the South African textile industry amply illustrate this threat 
and statistics reveal that compared to the rest of Africa’s imports from China, South Africa 
imports the greatest proportion (21 per cent) of goods431. Since Beijing regards Southern Africa 
as one of its most important trading partners, trade relations between China and South Africa will 
be analyzed carefully in the following section. 
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Figure 9: African imports and exports from/ to China by country432 
 
 
 
 
The bulk of China’s current trade with Africa is concentrated within a few countries which are 
more or less the same for both imports and exports. The chart above depicts China’s respective 
African trading partners for both imports and exports in 2010 together with the market share of 
each country. Amongst the major trading partners, as already highlighted, trade is concentrated 
among the few countries. For imports Angola (36 percent) and South Africa (18 percent) account 
for over 50 percent of total trade while in terms of exports South Africa (18 percent); Nigeria (11 
percent) and Egypt (10 percent) account for about 39 percent share. 
 
The discussion in this section presents evidence that China’s efforts to become attractive for 
African states by using economic means can also have negative consequences. The impact of 
Chinese imports on local industries and economies can stifle their own development, which in 
turn will have a negative impact on China’s soft power in relation to those states. A proper 
evaluation has to incorporate both the positive consequences of Chinese lending, trade, 
investments and infrastructural developments and the negative consequences of Chinese exports 
to these countries, and how it affects the public perceptions in those countries. 
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5.1.6 Case study: China–South Africa trade relations: The textile industry 
  
Since formal diplomatic relations were established in 1998, bilateral trade between China and 
South Africa has increased. Two way trade in 1997 totaled about US$1.5 billion433 by 2000 it 
had doubled to US$3 billion,434 and according to official Chinese statistics, by the end of 2005 
bilateral trade totaled US$7.27 billion, an increase of 23 per cent over 2004435. 
 
While China exports mainly manufactured goods, including footwear, textiles, electrical 
appliances, plastic products and glassware, South Africa exports minerals, base metals and 
primary products to China, including gold, diamonds, platinum, timber, and aluminum and 
chromium ores436. 
 
In 1993 South Africa’s exports to China comprised almost fifty percentages of manufactured 
products, while in 2003 these goods accounted for only eight per cent of South Africa’s exports 
to that country437. In that year advanced manufactured were 46.8 per cent438 of South Africa’s 
imports from China. While China’s manufacturing base seems to be expanding, South Africa’s 
manufacturing market is appears to be diminishing largely because of the importation of cheap 
Chinese goods. The importation of these cheap goods has had a detrimental effect on South 
Africa’s economy as it is saddled with severe unemployment problems. 
 
The sectors worst impacted by these Chinese goods are the labor-intensive industries, including 
light manufacturing, construction, textiles, clothing and footwear439. For example, in 2003 
approximately ten per cent of the manufacturing workforce (i.e. 20 000 blue-collar workers) 
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became unemployed as a result of retrenchments and factory closures440. Furthermore, local 
traders and merchants have also been affected by competing with Chinese entrepreneurs. The 
textile industry in South Africa has been severely affected. Trade unions in South Africa have 
voiced their opposition to Chinese imports calling for greater protection for the industry.  
 
By 2006 imports of clothing from China increased by 480 per cent and job losses in the apparel 
industry reached approximately one million441. Not only was South Africa affected but countries 
like Lesotho, Swaziland, Madagascar, Mauritius, Ghana and Kenya also experienced a massive 
downturn in the textile industry. Many factories were closed down resulting in massive 
unemployment in families and communities. While conducting research in Botshabelo in the 
Free State near Lesotho in 2007, I was alerted to the closure of six textile factories, resulting in 
over 10 000 workers losing their jobs and thereby affecting thousands of other dependents442. 
For every job lost, there is an exponential increase in poverty rates as there are a number of 
people dependent on a single person’s wages for their livelihood. Furthermore, unemployed 
textile laborers (often women in the Western Cape) are often unable to be absorbed into the 
economy, resulting in long term unemployment. 
 
It is estimated that in South Africa, a single job in the formal sector supports approximately four 
people443. The Chinese argue “that increased competition is a natural result of economic 
globalization, and the only reason for the increase in Chinese textile exports to South Africa is 
the extremely high demand for “Chinese goods, which [are] of high quality and reasonable 
price”444. Furthermore, in alluding to the textile issue, Liu Guijin, the Chinese ambassador to 
South Africa said that it is only natural for an “intimate relationship to engage in a minor 
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bickering, and that the textile dispute is quite common as a result of [their] fast growing bilateral 
trade”445. 
 
 In conclusion, the experience of the South African textile industry as a result of Chinese trade 
dominance is a good example of the problems experienced by China to sustain its soft power in 
all sectors. South Africa is not a unique case and anti-Chinese xenophobia is also prevalent in 
countries like Zambia and Angola. China’s challenge is that it wants to establish new markets for 
its surplus manufactured goods as a matter of self-interest but on the other hand it wants to use 
its financial and economic power as a means to build friendship with African governments. 
Sometimes these objectives create internal contradictions that don’t serve China’s soft power 
ambitions. 
 
5.2  Energy and Resources 
5.2.1   The need for oil and raw materials 
 
Energy security is an important concern for China’s involvement in Africa – often referred to as 
the “scramble for Africa’s resources”. Oil and minerals are the key resources concerned. While 
China is a latecomer to the global oil industry, its oil companies take high risks and outbid their 
competitors to gain upstream opportunities and also invest in countries that have been ignored by 
multinationals446. It has been accused of pursuing neo-colonial policies   and solely interested in 
extracting resources from Africa. There is nothing unique in China’s engagement with Africa for 
importing raw materials with little or no processing done inside these African countries. 
However, China faces a dilemma in trying to balance its national interest of accessing energy and 
raw materials as cheaply as possible and at the same time fostering relations with African 
countries.447. 
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In the past twenty years China has sustained an annual average GDP growth rate of eight per 
cent448. Its rapid economic growth and the rise in living standards have increased the demand for 
raw materials, especially oil. 
 
Rognvaldur Hanneson maintains that there is a link between increased GDP and energy 
consumption449. This rapid economic growth would lead to similar growth in energy demands450. 
According to Hanneson “scarce resources would drive China to look beyond its boundaries to 
secure resources at whatever the cost”451, and that is making Africa a viable and stable source of 
scarce resources. It is estimated that China will use 10.9 million barrels of oil per day by 2025, 
with net imports of 7.5 million barrels per day452. With its large population and huge energy 
consumption, China continues to be plagued by constant energy shortages.453 In January 2006, 
5.8 million cars were sold in China, a 26 per cent increase from 2005.454 It is estimated that by 
the year 2030 China will have 300 million vehicles on the road455. The dramatic increase in 
vehicles, air travel, and road links have increased oil demand beyond China’s limited domestic 
supply, forcing it to seek oil resources elsewhere. However China’s reliance on imported oil as a 
percentage of total energy remains relatively low (approximately eight per cent)456 but as China 
rapidly urbanizes and its demand for transport increases so will its demand for oil.  According to 
a BP report: “Between 2000 and 2006, China’s oil consumption increased from 4.7 million to 7.4 
million (47 per cent derived from imports)”457. Barclays analysts in London claim that China’s 
oil demand grew to 480,000 barrels daily in 2013, or roughly five per cent of the 2012 annual 
levels458. 
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Although China is the third largest geographical country in the world, it has limited oil reserves. 
In parts of the Daquing and Shengli areas oil is in limited supply but declining in production.  
The rich basins of the Junggar and Tarim areas have modest oil reserves to supply the vast 
Chinese population. The International Energy Agency predicts that China’s oil consumption will 
increase from 1.5 million barrels per day in 2009 to approximately 10.9 million in 2030 – by this 
time China will be importing 77 per cent of its oil459. China realized that its demand for oil will 
outstrip its domestic supply, hence in 1977 it took the decision ‘to go and buy’ outside its 
borders. However it is important to mention that Western multi-national companies had an 
advantage of at least fifty years in dealing with major oil producing countries. In the last decade 
China had to compete with countries like the US, Japan and Europe on the open market. China 
had to ensure it was self-sufficient, should supplies be terminated in times of global conflict.  
 
Although China has huge coal reserves, pressure from the international community to cut back 
on pollution level has put into question its efficacy as a reliable energy source. Consequently 
China has also made investments in alternative sources of power – the Three Gorges Dam is an 
example of its investment in hydro-electric power.  It has also invested in nuclear power and 
natural liquid gas. However, there is limited infrastructure for hydro-electricity, with nuclear 
power seemingly expanding only incrementally. Hence the need and pressure for oil remains a 
major part of China’s energy requirements. In 2003 China exceeded Japan as the second largest 
importer of oil and in 2004 became the second largest energy consumer globally after the United 
States460. In order to meet these domestic demands, Beijing has attempted to secure oil and 
minerals from foreign sources. Its use of soft power is regarded as one of the most important 
means to guarantee secured oil imports. An illustration of this point is how pragmatically the 
Chinese moved from the (northern) Sudanese to the South Sudanese government to secure access 
to its oil resources despite continuing conflict and political instability in the south. 
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Figure 10: China imports from Africa461 
 
5.2.2 China’s dream of energy self-sufficiency 
 
By the early 1990s China realized it needed to be self-sufficient in energy resources; hence 
China’s ‘going abroad strategy’ was officially adopted in 1997462. 
With this in mind, it restructured the state oil and gas enterprises into two major companies: the 
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the Chinese National Petrochemical 
Corporation (Sinopec). Both companies produce and import oil. Sinopec is involved in refining 
and thus is a major buyer of foreign oil463, while the smaller China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC) focuses on offshore investments. 
In earlier years (1990s) Sinopec and CNPC were regarded as agencies of the communist party 
but in 1998, when China changed to the ‘go out policy’, these companies moved towards more 
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market orientated and commercial practices. This resulted in a combination of state control with 
a small percentage of free market activity. During interviews with officials it was difficult to 
ascertain the exact percentage, as there is little transparency in the industry. Erica Downs, a 
leading U.S. expert on Chinese oil policy argues that “investment decisions often have been 
generated from the bottom up and have not been highly coordinated with the relevant 
government agencies”, adding that the “more high-quality assets a company acquired, the more 
likely it was to obtain diplomatic and financial support from the Beijing government for its 
subsequent investments”464. 
Although the employees of the oil companies, Sinopec, CNPC and CNOOC, argue that they 
operate independently from the party, it was clear in interviews that all senior board members 
belong to the CPC465. Employees of these oil companies maintain that it is “difficult for them to 
ignore ‘requests’ made by the central government since failure to respond could decrease the 
probability of future promotion”466. 
China’s success in penetrating the African oil market has been a combination of team work with 
Chinese oil companies, the country’s export-import bank, its economic and trade agencies, and 
key trading companies, many of which are still state run. This combination gives China the 
advantage to offer low-financing and other complementary economic ventures like infrastructure 
development. According to Shalmon and Lee, “China’s oil companies are now an unusual 
agglomeration of modern entrepreneurial talent striving for earnings growth and ever-greater 
profitability, while at the same time remaining arms of government increasingly focused on 
China’s long-term energy needs”467. 
With China’s growing demand for oil and gasoline, it has three choices: firstly to import 
gasoline, secondly, to build new refineries to maximize gasoline production, and lastly, to 
purchase light crude oil that result in greater gasoline production.468China decided not to import 
more gasoline but pursued joint ventures with Middle East state oil companies to build new 
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refineries. Therefore, for China to access light crude oil has become extremely valuable (crude 
with lighter viscosities are easier to refine into products such as gasoline, and aviation and diesel 
fuel). Unfortunately, the availability of light crude as compared to heavy crude is declining, and 
this trend will continue. However, there have been new discoveries of light crude on the 
continent especially in the Gulf of Guinea and off the Southern African coast. With oil from 
Angola and Nigeria becoming increasingly valuable in today’s market, China is determined to 
access this oil. 
In the developed world, most of the oil has already been explored while in Africa many countries 
have only recently discovered oil and gas, especially countries like South Sudan, Kenya, 
Uganda, Ghana and Mozambique. Hence opening trade links with these countries proved to be 
extremely valuable for China. It is therefore not surprising that China aggressively pursues these 
countries. 
However, an exception has been Libya, where China has been limited to bidding for one or two 
production sharing agreements. Oil from Libya has to be taken out through the Mediterranean 
Sea, which lies within the European ambit469. According to the former Libyan Ambassador to 
South Africa, China’s relations with Qadaffi (then leader of Libya) were not so easy – compared 
to other African countries that were desperate for capital and investment. Libya employed a 
transparent bidding process for new oil and gas licenses, which does not favour China”470. 
According to the Chinese, oil from Angola, Sudan, Mauritania or Kenya was more easily 
available471. 
China has signed multiple trade agreements with Nigeria, which has significant reserves of light 
crude oil and forecasts a doubling of production by 2025472. While China is very keen in 
developing this relationship, continued attacks by militant insurgents have forced Nigeria to cut 
back on production. As Down points out: “the value of Chinese oil companies’ investments in 
Africa is just 8 per cent of the combined commercial value of the private multi-national 
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investments”473. In fact in the next decade, China will purchase more oil from African state than 
it produces from its own concessions. 
 
5.2.3 What has been China’s competitive advantage (soft power) to Western governments/ 
companies in acquiring oil from Africa?  
 
What gives China a competitive edge over other energy clients in acquiring oil from African 
countries? Firstly, the CNPC and the CNOOC, two state-owned enterprises, act on behalf of 
Beijing by purchasing land and developing joint ventures with domestic producers. An example 
of this was when in 1997 the CNPC outbid Exxon, Texaco and Amoco to acquire and develop oil 
fields in Iran, Venezuela and Sudan474. Chinese companies or state enterprises are more successful 
in outbidding other competitors and other Western companies because Chinese businesses are 
not “short stay but rather strategically orientated to position themselves for the future”475. 
 
Secondly, Beijing is able to operate in high risk and conflict areas in exchange for energy. A 
good example is when Angola ended its 27-year civil war in 2002. The country was 
ungovernable and economically devastated and it became difficult to do business with it. Most 
Western countries had disengaged with Angola years ago. In March 2004 Beijing extended a $2 
billion loan to Angola for a contract to supply 10 000 barrels of crude oil per day476.  The 
agreement stipulated that the loan must be reinvested in infrastructure construction, with 70 per 
cent of the loan set aside for Chinese companies and the rest to local subcontractors477. Angola 
became the largest supplier of oil to China, replacing Saudi Arabia as the top supplier by 
2008478. 
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During Premier Wen’s visit to Angola in 2007, the country received $2 billion in aid. Similar 
arrangements have been made with other African oil producing countries. In July 2005, Petro-
China entered into an $800 million deal with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation to 
purchase 30 000 barrels of oil per day for one year479. 
In January 2006, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), after failing to acquire the 
American-owned Unocal, purchased a 45 per cent stake in the underdeveloped Nigeria AKPO 
fields, for $2.27 billion480. The Nigeria National Petroleum Company would own 50 per cent of 
this concession481. Gabon’s poor oil industry has attracted huge investments from the China 
National Petrochemical Corporation (SINOPEC), which hopes to explore Gabon’s onshore and 
offshore oil reserves. 
 
Thirdly, Chinese companies have committed huge capital for exploration in remote areas. It has 
also imported Chinese skilled labour like engineers to assist with these developments.  Sudan 
was one of the earliest and largest overseas energy projects conducted by China’s major energy 
companies. Chinese investments in Sudan include pipeline building, excavation of sites and 
deployment of labour482. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has a 40 per cent 
stake in Greater Nile Petroleum, which dominates the Sudan oilfields.483 In 2006 China 
purchased more than half of Sudan‘s oil exports.484 In 2007, China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC) bought a 35 per cent stake of an exploration license in the Niger Delta for 
$60 million485. Using Chinese companies, the Chinese government controls a significant 
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proportion of its oil demands while shielding the Chinese economy from potential price hikes or 
supply disruptions. 
Fourthly, China is not selective in who its partners are, even if they experience domestic political 
legitimacy problems or are criticized by the international community. In 2007, China accounted 
for 65 per cent of Sudanese total exports at the time of the Darfur crisis486. Another example of 
not making political judgments was in 2004 when China and Zimbabwe reached an energy and 
mining deal worth US$1.3 billion.487 In exchange for building three coal-fired thermal power 
stations, Zimbabwe paid China with rich deposits of platinum, gold, coal, nickel and 
diamonds488. 
By 2006 China had made successful oil investments in most parts of the world. In a short space 
of time it has become one of the largest importers of oil. According to some observers “China’s 
ability to link its oil investments to government-to-government financial assistance gives its 
companies an unfair advantage”489. Human rights lobby groups accuse China of leveraging its 
investments to back some very abusive, corrupt and violent governments. China’s support for the 
Sudanese government was already mentioned and its reluctance to condemn the genocide 
practice of the Janjaweed militias in Darfur or to support UN sanctions (discussed in Chapter 6). 
The other contentious issue is China’s refusal to interfere in domestic or political issues of 
African countries and that it tries to keep the nature of its relationships strictly commercial. 
Critics argue that without “China’s investment and tacit support, African governments like 
Sudan would be forced to amend their behavior”490. 
At this juncture, it is important to address the question: how does China successfully woo 
and win African countries to obtain what it desires? 
The first strategy China employs is its policy of non-involvement or non-interference in the 
domestic policies of the host country. China does not interfere or pass judgment on the behaviour 
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of other countries with which it trades. Furthermore it does not link its commercial relationship 
with any standard of conduct or conditionalities. A Chinese government official explained in an 
interview conducted in Beijing that China understands how colonial powers have interfered in 
countries’ development – “China itself experienced what is referred to as the ‘hundred years of 
humiliation’ in the nineteenth century at the hands of Western interest and therefore China 
respects a country’s sovereign rights and resents any foreign interference in its domestic 
affairs”491. In 1964 Zhou Enlai stated in his speech in Khartoum that “China was grateful to the 
Sudanese for killing British General Charles Gordon in 1885”492. During the reign of Mao 
Zedong China resented outside interference, even rebuking the US for its criticism of its human 
rights. Others argue that China’s unwillingness to criticize unethical behavior stems from its own 
national interest goals. By continuing to assist undemocratic states, China obtains a competitive 
advantage by acquiring unlimited supplies of oil where other countries would not support these 
countries based on moral or human rights concerns. It is clear that China’s non-interference 
policy is motivated by economic concerns. Critics argue that without China’s financial aid, 
repressive and corrupt governments will not survive in Africa (for example, Sudan, Angola and 
Zimbabwe). China’s support for the “Sudanese government has enabled Khartoum to purchase 
arms to use against the rebels in the South and to supply the Janjaweed militias in Darfur, 
enabling them to slaughter thousands of civilians”493. Human Rights Watch had severely 
criticized China for supporting the northern government in North-South war in Sudan. 
A second element in China’s strategy is to create a level of interdependence that promotes trade 
and building stronger bonds, simultaneously securing a constant flow of oil to China. By 
purchasing oil supplies or investing in oil production, “China would invest in the economies of 
African oil producers and would help the host governments meet their immediate infrastructural 
or commercial needs”494. For example China is rebuilding Angola’s transport network, 
constructing a large hydroelectric dam in Sudan, and opening up commercial enterprises 
throughout the continent doing over US$11.7 billion worth of business495. Finally, another 
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component of China’s soft power is the direct link with China’s arms trading with Africa, where 
China pursues oil-sales and exploration-investment relationship. 
To understand what motivates China’s participation in Africa, it will be useful to examine two 
oil producing countries in Africa: Sudan and Angola. In both countries, in order to leverage its 
influence, China has promised to increase trade and investments (besides oil) and to provide 
access to cheap capital through its unregulated and government-controlled financial institutions. 
  
5.2.4 The cases of Sudan and Angola  
 
Since the 1990s, Sudan has become one of the largest suppliers of oil to China. In 1996 the 
CNPC acquired a 40 per cent stake at a cost of US$441 million in the Greater Nile Petroleum 
Operating Company (GNPOC)496. Since 1997, the CNPC has been actively involved in the 
Mughlad Basin, where it is engaged in the production and transportation of oil. 
 
 In 1999 CNPC built a new refinery north of Khartoum, by providing half of the investment of 
US$540 million497. The CNPC has a 41 per cent share in the Petrodar Operating Company 
(PDOC), which was established in October 2001. Sinopec also holds a six per cent stake498. 
China has also provided finance for the construction of oil pipelines in Sudan as well as provided 
expertise, supplies, equipment and construction materials. China has also built a two million 
tonnes oil terminal at Port Bashir, 25km south of Port Sudan499. 
 
Chris Alden indicated that “Chinese firms are acquiring equity shares in ventures that are 
engaged with already established oil fields instead of securing rights for future exploration and 
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development”500. Alden argues that “such behavior shows that Chinese firms prefer to integrate 
vertically because it ensures higher energy security, and allows firms to provide oil to Chinese 
consumers at cheaper prices than on the international market”501. 
 
Chinese companies have made investments in infrastructural projects that ultimately support oil 
production. For example, China’s Harbin Power Company constructed the Qarre I Station 
(approximately 50km north of Khartoum), which was funded by China’s Central Bank to the 
amount of US$149 million502. Furthermore it has invested in hydropower plants – with an 85 per 
cent stake in the construction of the Kajbar Dam and the Merowe (Hamdab) Dam. Both were 
financed by credit loans issued by the Chinese government503. 
 
Sudan derives large oil revenues from Chinese investments. However, the Chinese favor 
importing their own labor, effectively marginalizing local jobs. In the Merowe project, 90 per 
cent of the engineers and 75 per cent of the technicians are Chinese, while local Sudanese make 
up only 20 per cent of the workforce504. The Sudanese government argues that only skilled labor 
can facilitate technological transfer and skills creation505. However, this is not possible when the 
skilled Chinese workers (with their language and cultural differences) are not equipped to 
transfer skills in an effective manner506. In many cases Africans are unable to absorb these new 
skills without adequate education and training507. 
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China’s relationship with Sudan indicates its capacity for providing ‘package deals’ that include 
aid, credit lines and investments in infrastructure and other sectors which commercially-minded 
companies and Western donors would not entertain. 
 
China’s “no-questions asked” policy also applies to other oil-producing African countries, like 
Angola, which has become China’s number one source of oil imports. China’s willingness to pay 
more for assets is linked to its eagerness to tie oil sector participation to non-oil sector perks508. 
Sinopec is in a joint venture with Sonangol to finance and manage a new refinery in Lobito. For 
more than a decade this has been a pet project of the leadership, but despite the involvement of 
major foreign consulting firms, its doubtful revenue streams meant that Western companies were 
not interested in investing in the project509. 
 
The refinery project is far more than just a simple business exercise for Sinopec. By providing 
three credit lines of almost $5 billion in just two years, the Chinese have allowed the Angolans to 
pursue their post-war reconstruction strategy while at the same time keeping their distance from 
the IMF’s transparency prescriptions or conditionalities510. 
 
Both these countries (Sudan and Angola) illustrate a Realist interpretation of a state pursuing its 
national interest. Not surprisingly, China considers oil procurement a matter of national security, 
using all state resources to satisfy the nation’s need for energy. China utilizes its diplomatic and 
economic muscle in order to leverage oil imports from whichever source it can, regardless of the 
moral implications of these engagements511. 
 
5.2.5 China’s telecommunications footprint in Africa 
 
                                                          
508Lyakurwa, W. M, High Oil Prices and African Economy, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
African Development Bank Group, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 15-16 May 2006 
509Lyakurwa, W. M. High Oil Prices and African Economy, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
African Development Bank Group, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 15-16 May 2006 
510 Lyakurwa, W. M, High Oil Prices and African Economy, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
African Development Bank Group, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 15-16 May 2006 
511 Rotberg, Robert, China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence, World Peace Foundation, 2008, page 1-20 
~ 140 ~ 
 
China’s increased involvement in the African telecommunications industry is part of a 
multidimensional engagement in the continent to serve its broader strategy to enhance its global 
standing, counter Western influence and to obtain resources and new export markets to feed its 
rapidly expanding economy. Alongside construction, energy and mining, telecommunication is 
one of the four strategic pillars underpinning China’s economic development and providing the 
necessary platform from which to challenge the West for global technology. It is therefore 
regarded a vital industry for Chinese strategic interests on several fronts; firstly the acquisition of 
foreign technology, dual use of military application, reinforcing China’s space and satellite 
development programme and breaking into new markets512.  
Such assessments are closely driven by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and related 
ministerial and strategic planning institutions that have as their primary mandate, the emergence 
of competitive international companies aligned with strategic political consideration of the 
motherland. Importantly, Chinese telecom companies do not operate in isolation but operate in 
tandem with Chinese geo-strategic objectives. This makes the need for effective countervailing 
strategies all the more important in dealing with the Chinese telecommunication challenge in 
Africa513. Initial assessments suggest that China has chosen several hubs to roll out its 
telecommunication strategy on the African continent. These include Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa514. Chinese companies that are leading projects are Huawei and 
Zhongxing Telecom (ZTE) - both are linked to the Chinese military and intelligence515. These 
companies have the added advantage of access to cheap state subsidized funding sources, state 
political support and low costs production. As a result these companies have a competitive edge 
that other private independent telecom companies don’t have.  
 
5.2.6  Infrastructural development projects 
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China’s efforts to rebuild African infrastructure is one of the most important aspects of its 
investment in Africa and efforts to make it attractive for African states. This was largely 
neglected by colonial powers and even more so in the post-colonial period. In the twentieth 
century, trade and aid were mainly confined to building democratic institutions. 
For many African countries infrastructure development has been retarded, because of interstate-
conflicts and civil wars. Transportation and communication networks have fallen into disrepair 
and neglect. Chinese assistance in refurbishing these national assets also serves the political 
interests of African governments.  Former Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade publicly 
expressed his “sense of relief that African nations have a newfound power to choose not to 
accept funding from traditional Euro-American partners, a sense of power so 
fresh…..embracing Chinese efficiency and snubbing former overbearing development 
partners”516. These African political elites now take credit for infrastructural improvements, 
especially high profile construction projects like stadiums for national football teams. These 
projects “have proven effective in sweetening popular perceptions of both Chinese economic 
presence in Africa and the African leadership”517. Some critics argue that this entrenches 
relations between Africa and China and reinforces many of the current less democratic African 
political regimes. 
For the Chinese, these trade and aid packages accomplished several important strategic 
objectives, namely: 
• Offering infrastructural development to African governments and especially political 
leaders enhances China’s economic soft power and confidence building and most of all 
its appeal to Africans. 
• The aid package assisted with refurbishment, reconstruction or development of roads, 
ports and airports and it benefited local Africans communities. 
•  Basic infrastructure projects are essential to transport African resources to ports that can 
be exported efficiently to China and other destinations. Thus Chinese (re)development of 
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roads, railroads, ports, and airports reflect the impact of Chinese investments. For 
example, the construction of colonial railroads along the West African coast was intended 
to connect African markets and communities within the continent. Rail lines were 
developed to transport resources from the interior to coastal port cities, where European-
owned vessels took them directly to European industries and markets. Another example, 
on the other hand, is the Chinese reconstruction of the Benguela rail line in Angola (built 
during the Portuguese colonial period), which runs from the Angolan coast directly 
eastwards towards the rich mining zones of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
Zambia. It is clear that some of these large-scale projects are designed primarily for 
external commercial interests and less for African benefit. However, it is fair to say that 
much of the infrastructure development by the Chinese is also of great importance to 
African states and citizens518. 
• China is able to build and construct at an accelerated speed compared to its Western 
counterparts who require environmental impact reports, approvals and confronting other 
bureaucratic hurdles that impede progress. International lending agencies like the World 
Bank, the IMF and Euro-American nations unable to compete with China in these areas. 
Many African elites view this as refreshing and an efficient approach.  
• Chinese support to refurbish presidential palaces and funding of their militaries is 
detrimental in achieving political reform.  
While the link between trade and aid seems ambiguous, aid to African countries has been 
influential in securing trade deals for the Chinese. China has redeveloped Angolan infrastructure 
(which was devastated by civil war), and has extended a US$2 billion soft loan in exchange for 
Angola’s promise of unrestricted supply of crude oil to China519. This agreement enabled China 
to secure a monopoly on access to deep water oil sources outbidding the European and Indian 
investors520. Bilateral trade between Angola and China increased by US$5 billion in 2006521, and 
                                                          
518Rupp, Stephen, Engaging Post-Colonial Interdependencies, in Rotberg, Robert, China into Africa: Trade, aid and 
Influence, World Peace Foundation, 2008, page 75 
519Ferreira, E. Manuel,”China in Angola: Just a Passion for Oil?” in Chris Alden, Daniel Large, Ricardo Soares de 
Oliveira (ed).China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace, Hurst, 2008, page 280 
520Myers, Amy, Jaffe and Stevens W. Lewis, Beijing’s Oil Diplomacy, Survival, Academic Research Library, 
vol.44, issue 1, spring 2002, page 115-129 
521 Ferreira, E. Manuel, “China in Angola: Just a Passion for Oil?”, in Chris Alden, Daniel Large, Ricardo Soares de 
Oliveira (ed) China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace, Hurst, 2008, page 280.  
~ 143 ~ 
 
by 2010 trade between the two countries had reached US$ 120 billion522.  The value of Angolan 
oil exports has risen from US$7.6 billion in 2002 to US$ 68.5 billion in 2012523. Angola became 
China’s second largest oil trading partner, supplying 15 per cent of its oil imports and surpassing 
Saudi Arabia’s oil flows to China524. The details regarding trade relations between China and 
Angola are not transparent and are often secretive, serving the interest of both the Chinese and 
Angolan governments which means that “neither the international observers nor domestic civil 
society groups are easily able to challenge Angola’s use of the enormous receipts it has gained 
from China”525. 
Likewise, many African civil society organizations and communities have openly criticized the 
potential negative repercussions of oil exploration on African social and natural environments. 
“Many African commentators note with trepidation the environmental degradation of China’s 
own landscapes and resources, and express serious concerns about uncritical acceptance of 
Chinese development initiatives in Africa”526. China’s engagement in African infrastructural 
development with the aim to create a positive image of itself in Africa and at the same time 
develop an infrastructure that will support its trade with African economies are therefore not 
without complications and its success with developing a soft power foundation for itself is 
therefore not an unqualified success.  
 
5.2.7  China Seeking Other Resources: Zimbabwean agriculture and South African and 
Zimbabwean minerals 
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Another major priority for the Chinese government is ensuring adequate food and agricultural 
products for its growing population. As a result, Chinese firms are encouraged to invest in 
agriculture, fisheries and similar secondary production sectors in Africa.527 Zimbabwe has been 
targeted for these types of investments even though it is seen as a pariah state. President 
Mugabe’s regime has been sanctioned by Europe and the USA following the land reform crisis, 
human rights abuses and generally undemocratic practices. This has reduced aid and investment 
from the West and the imposition of sanctions. China has however deepened its relations with 
that country, leading to a shift in Zimbabwe’s foreign policy over the last six years to favour the 
East, often referred by Mugabe as the “Look East” policy. The “Look East” policy emphasizes 
Zimbabwe embracing China and shunning the former colonial powers in Europe and the USA. It 
is characterized by deepening political and economic bilateral relations between Zimbabwe and 
China (and other Eastern countries like Singapore and Malaysia). 
 
China has acquired vast tracts of land in Zimbabwe in order to engage in agricultural and beef 
production528. It has entered into similar deals in Zambia and Tanzania529. China’s interest in 
land and agriculture is due to the increasing domestic demand for these products, and because of 
its expanding manufacturing base, resources are being redirected from agriculture into 
manufacturing. Consequently, China would have to import more agricultural products in the near 
future. By investing in these sectors, China has been able to secure these products for its own 
domestic market.  
 
China has shown keen interest in Zimbabwe’s vast untapped mineral reserves – another key 
sector in China’s strategy. It has the second largest platinum deposits in the world, as well as 
huge deposits of gold, ferrochrome, silver and copper. Due to financial constraints  
and lacking other resources, Zimbabwe has not been able to fully exploit these reserves. As a 
result, Beijing has entered into a number of deals, including the construction of a ferrochrome 
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smelting plant in Selous530. Zimbabwe will grant the company a five-year tax break as well 
allowing the entry of foreign technical expertise for the construction of the furnace531. Many 
analysts argue that it is ironic that while Zimbabwe has a large unemployment rate, it still needs 
to acquire foreign labor from China. 
 
China is keen to exploit South Africa’s rich mineral reserves and in this regard the China Steel 
and Iron Industrial and Trading Corporation have invested US$74 million in the exploitation of 
chromium reserves in the country532. China’s interests in both Zimbabwe and South  
Africa also involves the exploitation of these country’s coal reserves. China is particularly 
interested in South Africa’s Coal-to-Liquids (CTL) technology, developed by SASOL during the 
sanctions era, which converts coal to oil. SASOL has agreed to a joint venture with China to 
develop two CTL plants in the country and signed in June 2006 an agreement to embark on a 
second feasibility stage for this project533. However, some commentators argue that this venture 
solely benefits China as it acquires South African technology to fuel its own industries with very 
little benefit for South Africa534. 
 
Zimbabwe has also been offering its mineral resources (coal and coke) to China in exchange for 
finance assistance and mining equipment.535Furthermore, two Zimbabwean firms, Hwange 
Colliery and Ele Resources have recently entered into a deal with China Machine-Building 
International Corporation worth US$1.3 billion to construct coalmines and three thermal power 
stations. The thermal power stations are to assist Zimbabwe’s state power company to supply 
electricity. The deal will, it is reported, grant Beijing access to Zimbabwe’s minerals, including 
platinum, gold, chrome, nickel, coal and diamonds536.  
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Although Chinese investments in industries such as mining and agriculture can have a positive 
impact on job creation, analysts have warned that trading Zimbabwe’s precious mineral 
resources to China in exchange for short-term cash assistance might be detrimental to 
Zimbabwe’s long-term economic development. This resource-seeking investment has led to an 
increase in the number of Chinese entrepreneurs immigrating to Africa. Often, Chinese firms 
employ expatriate managers and supervisors, who tend to leave the employing firm to establish 
their own company’s in the host country. The number of Chinese immigrants to Sudan had 
reached 24 000 by 2004, triple the amount in the late 1990s537. 
 
 
5.2.8  Concessional Loans 
 
This section examines China‘s concessional lending program, which is referred to as preferential 
or low-interest loans extended to developing countries by the Chinese government. The 
concessional lending program is separate to the bank’s commercial lending facilities. 
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Figure 11:  China’s Exim Bank project cycle538 
 
 
As the diagram indicates, the first stage is the signing of a bilateral agreement between the 
borrowing country and the People’s Republic of China. The second stage is drawing up of a loan 
agreement between China’s Exim Bank and representatives of the borrowing country’s 
government. These agreements are signed between a high-ranking government official, a 
Minister or Deputy Minister and the President of Exim Bank. The signing agreement is preceded 
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by an elaborate signing ceremony. On the Exim Bank website, details are given of the 
agreements that have been signed but no information is provided on the interest payments, the 
kind of loans or any other details. Harris notes that “although the newswire Reuters did carry a 
report of China’s 2006, concessional loans to Eritrea, the story did not provide project details 
other than a quote from the Eritrean information minister Ali Abdu, that the US$23 million loan 
would be for the development of infrastructure for both fixed and mobile telephone”.539 
Although the terms of the loan are not reported, the size of the loans is stated as RMB 166 
million, (US$23 million), and very little information is given about the wireless network project. 
The network project is aimed to increase telephone subscription in Eritrea from 1.5 to 6.5 per 
cent540. From 2009 to 2012, China provided US$ 10 billion in financing to Africa in the form of 
“concessional loans541. 
According to the China Daily, in 1997 the Exim Bank has provided RMB 1 billion (US$138 
million) in concessional loans to fifteen projects in six countries, namely Botswana, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Kenya and the Sudan. The China Daily reported that Beijing 
had funded, through concessional loans, 30 projects in Cameroon, Guyana, and Papua New 
Guinea542. In 2001, the People’s Daily reported that there were seventy-two concessional loan 
projects in thirty-six states. By 2002, the Chinese claimed they were funding ninety projects in 
forty-one states543. 
From 2002 to 2006, it appears that the lending activity process was partially handed over to The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These bilateral agreements were called ‘economic cooperation 
agreements’ or development loan agreements. It is unclear if these were all concessional lending 
or not. According to the Foreign Affairs Minister, there are twenty-one bilateral agreements 
referred to as concessional loan framework agreements. Although the framework agreement 
makes it possible to borrow under the concessional scheme, the existence of a framework 
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agreement does not guarantee that a loan is actually disbursed by the Exim Bank. The framework 
agreement sets the broad parameter for Exim Bank to extend a loan, but the framework 
agreement expires if the loan is not finalized within a fixed period544. 
 
5.2.9  How much is borrowed? 
 
Official Chinese reports of Concessional Loan signing ceremonies and documentation from 
China’s Exim Bank indicate that twenty-eight separate concessional lending agreements were 
entered into. In figure 12 (China’s Exim Bank Concessional Lending Agreements) one is able to 
identify the size of the loan and the sector in which the concessional loan was provided for. 
Between 1998 and 2007 there were RMB5.9 billion (US$773 million) loans made. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
544The Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Kingdom of Tongo Framework 
Agreement Concerning Preferential Loans Extended by China to Tongo – March 30 2001. Available: 
www.gsfzb.gov.cn/law, accessed on 23 July 2013 
~ 150 ~ 
 
 
Figure 12: China’s Exim Bank Concessional Lending Agreements, 1995-2007545 
Loan amount 
Borrower Millions of 
RMB 
Millions of US 
dollars 
 
Year 
 
Sector 
Equatorial Guinea 48 5,75 1995 Forestry 
Morocco 150 18.12 1998 Health 
Morocco 50 6,03 2002 Dam 
Congo-Brazzaville 200 24.16 2000 Cement 
Congo-Kinshasa 80 9,66 2000 Telecommunication 
Mali 150 18,12 2000 Cement 
Mauritius 150 18,12 2000 Sewage 
Mauritius 100 12,07 2002 Housing 
Zimbabwe 62 7,45 2001 Local infrastructure 
Djibouti 99 12,00 2003 Telecommunication 
Botswana 200 24.13 2004 Housing 
Botswana 150 18.29 2005 Road 
Tunisia 140 16.89 2004 Telecommunication 
Tunisia 50 6.26 2006 Telecommunication 
Egypt 130 15.85 2005 Textiles 
Eritrea 166 20.80 2006 Telecommunication 
Kenya 161 20.17 2006 Electricity 
Kenya 239 29.94 2006 Telecommunication 
Eritrea 350 45,28 2007 Cement 
 
Kurlantzick argues that China’s definition of aid does not necessary qualify as official 
development assistance (ODA) nor does it apply to concessional loans546. Qualification as ODA 
depends on the specific terms of the loan. In the Chinese case, these terms are routinely omitted 
in reports about the Exim Bank loans. The bilateral framework agreement that authorizes the 
loan does, however, set the broad parameters for the loan. Although these details tend not to be 
reported, electronic copies of six of these framework agreements appear on a provincial 
government’s information website. 
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A series of articles on trade and investments in Africa, published in the Market Daily (a 
publication of the People’s Daily), noted that, in order to support and assist Chinese firms 
trading in Africa to overcome insufficient funding, Beijing had already signed reduced interest 
concessional loan funding agreements with 26 African countries547. These funds were tied to 
certain conditions, namely: that a Chinese firm should purchase and import from China as much 
equipment, technology, and services as possible; and the host site should have plentiful local 
resources, vast markets for goods and favorable economic prospects548. 
 
5.3  AID 
5.3.1. China’s Foreign Aid to Africa: A Means of Soft Power 
 
China’s aid and assistance program needs to be viewed against the backdrop of China’s 
economic engagement with the African continent.  Aid is China’s most important tool in wooing 
African countries and therefore it is one of its most important components of soft power. 
Aid is primarily tied to China’s political and strategic goals on the African continent, rather than 
for humanitarian reasons. According to Kurlantzick, “aid has played an important political role 
in China’s strategy to win support and protect its interest in Africa”549. China has provided aid as 
a form of exchange or gift-giving which is a pivotal component of China’s ancient culture, dating 
back to imperial times. However, today it can be referred to as a form of soft power or a tool of 
diplomacy: an instrument to meet political, strategic and economic objectives.550 A South 
African businessman working in China claimed that Chinese loans are conditional on the basis 
that contracts are given to Chinese companies.551 According to Kurlantzick, in 2004 Beijing had 
given a US$2 billion loan to Angola, where 70 per cent of the contracts were reserved for 
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Chinese firms552. China’s aid and debt forgiveness allows China significant leverage among 
African states and in turn gets support for China in the UN and other multilateral forums553. 
China’s aid program assists in developing stronger political and economic ties between China 
and other countries and abroad it is often perceived as a rising and responsible power.  At the 
same time Kurlantzick believes that “China also demonstrates little respect for transparency and 
other aspects of good governance”554. In the past decade aid has been an important component of 
China’s foreign policy, in winning support against Taiwan with developing countries and it’s 
lobbying at the United Nations Security Council.  
The question one needs to ask is why African countries are attracted to China’s aid? It can be 
argued that Africa’s socio-economic conditions are conducive for China’s aid. African countries, 
burdened with high-interest loans and underdevelopment, were attracted to China because it did 
not interfere in their internal affairs and more importantly aid was offered without any 
conditionality. Brautigam notes that in the early days, China’s main focus was to gain as much 
support for Taiwan’s exclusion in the UN. China sent ‘special envoys’ on secret missions to 
court African leaders in exchange for aid555. 
 
5.3.2 China’s history of aid to Africa 
 
China’s engagement with the African continent is not a new phenomenon. Some would argue 
that it dates back centuries ago to the period of trade with the communities at Great Zimbabwe 
and others along the east African coast. Its engagement in the form of aid is however a more 
recent phenomenon and was originally in the form of support to liberation movements. After 
independence that historical relationship was converted into official bilateral relations that most 
of the time also included an aid component. While in the past it was often tied into the Cold War 
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contestations, more lately it assumed the role of a soft power instrument. According to Chinese 
policy documents, Egypt was the first African country in 1956 to receive development assistance 
and thereafter Beijing became increasingly occupied in Africa as these nations won their 
independence.556 Development finance was initially provided in support of socialist leaders in 
Ghana and Mali, but later expanded for direct political goals such as leveraging support from 
these new states to recognize Beijing instead of Taipei. The initial aid-giving was confined to 
neighbouring countries like North Korea, North Vietnam and other socialist countries that were 
in close proximity to China. 
In 1964, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai introduced the ‘Eight Principles of Economic and 
Technical Assistance’, which included, amongst other, mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty 
and helping aid recipients become more self-sufficient. During the Cold War, China expanded its 
involvement in Africa to counter United States and particularly the Soviet Union’s influence557. 
 
 In the 1970s forty-three African countries received Chinese aid programs for the next three 
decades. China established formal diplomatic ties with all African countries except those that had 
formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan or where not yet independent. In the late 1970s and 
1980s, under Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese economy opened up to foreign investment and trade, 
leading to a greater emphasis on projects for mutual benefit, intersection of aid, trade, and 
investment558. The resource-credit swap model was used where loans were repaid in local 
products and primary goods, from cattle hides in Mali to cotton in Egypt and copper in Zambia. 
The Chinese adopted this model from Japan, who supplied loans to China in return for shipments 
of coal and oil. This model would become a key feature as China sought access to important 
natural resources from petroleum to minerals. By 1979, Chinese companies were legally 
permitted to transfer their businesses abroad, allowing them to bid on international projects, 
including those funded by the multilateral banks. 
 
The Cold War pushed China to engage more actively with African countries and to 
counterweight the Soviet presence and “capitalist imperialism”, and more importantly, it 
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strengthened its international position by winning the UN seat, which was held by Taiwan. 
George notes that “from 1961 to 1971, when Beijing took its seat as one of the five permanent 
members of the UN Security Council, China extended aid to twenty-three new countries, sixteen 
of them were African”559. 
By 1987 the ‘new open door’ to the West and a change from a socialist to a market-driven 
economy reshaped China’s foreign aid program, blurring the lines between foreign aid and other 
forms of economic relations. During this period China was ‘promoting joint prosperity’ as a 
foreign policy goal, through the use of foreign aid.  In December 1982, Chinese Premier Zhao 
Ziyang travelled to Africa to promote South-South cooperation “aimed at gradually switching the 
emphasis of China’s cooperative economic and technical relations with other Third World 
countries from extending loans to developing cooperation which can benefit both partners”560. 
By 1983, China had shifted away from foreign aid to technical cooperation programs. China’s 
aid commitment of US$258.9 million to Africa made it Africa’s sixth-largest donor for that year, 
surpassing Japan, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom561. In 1987 Beijing announced that 
69 per cent of China’s aid funds were spent on Chinese equipment, the rest presumably was 
spent on local cost (local labour, energy, and material)562. According to Michel and Beuret, 
Chinese aid was entirely tied to the purchase of Chinese goods and services563. In the early 
1980s, economic gain was not the primary focus, but rather building relationships with African 
government officials564. 
By the 1990s, Beijing had restructured its foreign aid programmes as interest-free government 
loans were replaced by guaranteed discount loans from Chinese banks, and aid grants being 
superceded by joint ventures and other forms of cooperation565. 
During this period there were a number of tripartite cooperations or agreements, where China 
jointly funded a project with other government agencies, international aid agencies, and private 
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companies.  For example, China would supply equipment or manpower for a project while 
another donor would supply the funding566. Kewi notes that “the Chinese have supplied 
technicians, equipment, and management to the World Bank and financed projects such as well 
drilling and rice cultivation in Somalia and rice cultivation in Rwanda”567. These can be viewed 
as economic cooperation, or joint ventures between China and African countries. According to 
the China statistical yearbook, “Between 1976 and 1988, Chinese firms worldwide had fulfilled 
$6.9 billion type of profit-oriented contracts; between 1989 and 2005, the value of completed 
contracts increased to $166.7 billion”568. 
In many cases, China encouraged debt-equity swaps, which allowed debtor governments to 
invest part of their loan debt (in local currency) in joint ventures. During Zhao’s visit to Zaire in 
1983, he promised to write off a tenth of Zaire’s debt-equity swap569. Brautigam noted another 
example in the form that “Chinese companies originally established by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations to implement aid projects also 
became part owners of a sugar company in Togo and Tanzania”570. 
In the 1980s Western donors experienced financial meltdown caused by austerity cuts and 
liberalization in structural adjustments policies that failed to address the fiscal and balance of 
payment crises caused by plummeting commodity prices. China offered ‘assisted sustainability’ 
to countries that suffered during the economic crisis. This assistance provided aid at very 
reasonable rates. It would assist with repairing decayed railways tracks, renovating irrigation 
dams or companies that had fallen into bankruptcy571. According to Brautigam, “the state-owned 
corporation China Complaint sent a team to Africa in 1982 to survey fifty-two projects to 
determine the need for spare parts and ways to improve their supply”572. 
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Another success was what Brautigam referred to as ‘aid to profit’. Chinese state-owned 
corporations, who first came to Africa to provide aid, realized the vast opportunities to make 
money. These contractors realized that they could compete against their US and European 
counterparts, because Chinese labour was cheaper and furthermore China was willing to 
undertake projects for ‘cheaper prices’ in order to secure long term contracts. Thus under the 
banner of aid, Chinese companies stayed on in the host countries either setting up independent 
companies or establishing joint ventures with local partners573. For example, in many African 
countries, airports and sports stadiums were completed on the basis of such an arrangement. 
Under the guise of development and aid, Chinese companies “ brought over for construction, and 
charging only depreciation against aid project accounts, worked to give the new companies a 
tremendous cost advantage when bidding for commercial construction contracts in their host 
countries”574. Confusion arose when African countries were unable to distinguish between a 
Chinese aid project and a commercial entity. 
During the CPC congress in 1995 foreign aid became a very contentious issue. As a result 
Beijing decided to convene a large conference to reform China’s foreign assistance program in 
line with the economic rationality used in China’s domestic decisions575. By 2000, Chinese 
businesses in Africa had become well entrenched; trade with African countries had dramatically 
increased and as a result, foreign aid became a smaller component of China’s economic relations 
with African countries. This shift in policy also resulted in China restructuring its Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation to become the Ministry of Commerce in 2003. 
From 2000, China adopted a ‘win-win’ strategy, where Beijing and forty-four African countries 
launched a multilateral ‘strategic partnership’ known as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC). Pledges from China to Africa have doubled at each FOCAC summit: in 2006, US$5 
billion was pledged; in 2009, US$10 billion and in 2012, US$20 billion. The release of a White 
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Paper on China’s Foreign Aid in April 2011 also represented a major step forward for Beijing, as 
it classified some of the government’s outgoing financial flows as foreign aid576. 
 
 
 
Figure 13: China’s Foreign Aid to Africa - April 2011577 
 
 
 
The Chinese government’s White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid, shows that 45 per cent of all 
Chinese aid in 2009 went to Africa, 32 per cent to Asia, and 13 per cent to Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Of this, two fifths was spent on projects conceptualized, planned, financed and 
delivered by Chinese actors. From 1978 China has aggressively followed a policy where aid 
equaled trade. This has boosted Chinese export and foreign exchange earnings and secured 
contracts for state-owned companies. Corporations like China Complete Plant Imports and 
Exports and China Civil Engineering and Construction Corporation are ranked today as China’s 
largest companies and have successfully done business in infrastructural projects in Africa. 
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Some scholars and critics argue that China provides aid to African countries that have natural 
resources, while at the same time enhancing its own economic growth. A recent report by the 
Centre of Global Development explains that Western policymakers accuse “China of expanding 
its presence in Africa for largely self-interested reasons: securing access to natural resources, 
subsidizing Chinese firms and exports, cementing and expanding political alliances, and 
pursuing global economic hegemony”, while it claimed that “rogue” donors like China “couldn’t 
care less about the long-term well-being of the population of the countries they aid”578. However, 
there is no evidence to prove this.  
 
In August 2012, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on her trip to Africa stated “that America 
is committed to democracy and human rights in Africa, even when it might be easier or more 
profitable to look the other way to keep the resources flowing”579. China’s official People's Daily 
newspaper responded that “China's investment in Africa is based on respecting the will of Africa, 
listening to the voice of Africa and caring about the concerns of Africa, thus earning the trust of 
most African countries”580. 
African policymakers are also divided as to what impact Chinese development aid will have on 
social, economic and environmental outcomes. In 2008, then President of Senegal, Abdoulaye 
Wade, in a Financial Times op-ed, took umbrage with Western donors for criticizing Chinese aid 
and investment programs: “China’s approach to our needs is simply better adapted than the slow 
and sometimes patronizing post-colonial approach of European investors, donor organizations 
and nongovernmental organizations. ... With direct aid, credit lines and reasonable contracts, 
China has helped African nations build infrastructure projects in record time - bridges, roads, 
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schools, hospitals, dams, legislative buildings, stadiums and airports. … I have found that a 
contract that would take five years to discuss, negotiate and sign with the World Bank takes three 
months when we have dealt with Chinese authorities. I am a firm believer in good governance 
and the rule of law. But when bureaucracy and senseless red tape impede our ability to act - and 
when poverty persists while international functionaries drag their feet - African leaders have an 
obligation to opt for swifter solutions”581. However some African officials are more skeptical, 
with Papa Kwesi Nduom, Ghana’s former Minister of Public Sector Reform, worrying “that 
some governments in Africa may use Chinese money in the wrong way to avoid pressure from 
the West for good governance”582. But Zambian President Michael was more scathing, referring 
to Chinese investors as “infesters” and threatening to deport Chinese owners accused of 
mistreating Zambian workers583. 
 
5.3.3 The nature of Chinese aid to Africa 
 
When it comes to aid and developmental assistance, China has focused on “mutual benefit” and 
“diversity of form”. According to Brautigam, Chinese aid takes the form of mutually beneficial 
agreements in various sectors, including education, health, agriculture, infrastructure 
development, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping and at the same time establishing profit-
generating joint ventures involving Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)584. 
 
More “conventional” aid is usually in the form of soft loans and debt relief, rather than direct 
grants. Chinese aid to Africa is an important plank in Beijing’s foreign policy and is linked to 
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strategic and political objectives585, of which one is to use aid and assistance to cement ties with 
resource-rich African economies586. China’s other goals for aid assistance include the desire to 
augment Beijing’s domestic legitimacy by enhancing local perceptions of China’s as an aid-
giving nation. Chinese aid to Africa differs from Western aid to Africa, in that it does not impose 
any economic or political conditionalities, maybe with the exception of adherence to the ‘One 
China Policy’, on African clients.  
 
When offering aid to developing countries Western donors conditionalities are rooted in a 
particular history. When developing countries were steeped in the debt crisis of the 1970s and 
early 1980s, the IMF and World Bank offered aid that was tied to the implementation of 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs)587. These neo liberal economic prescriptions, known as 
the “Washington Consensus”, claimed that the debt crisis was attributed to excessive government 
spending588. The result is that “developing countries today are overwhelmed by economic and 
political conditionality attached to economic assistance from the North”589. 
 
However, Chinese aid, which does not contain Western economic prescripts, is greatly 
appreciated by African governments, who resent the policies imposed by Western governments, 
or are unwilling to adhere to reforms dictated by conditionalities. 
 
On the surface, the types of projects that China invests in or funds varies and is not consistent 
with any clear plan. Some of these projects seem strange, as they are not aimed at promoting 
development or investment – for example, the building of sports centers or stadiums in Kenya, 
Uganda, Liberia, Mali and Zimbabwe. Other projects such as the construction of government 
offices or parliament buildings in Liberia, Guinea and Mozambique, or conference centers in 
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Mali and Mozambique can be viewed as development projects. The value of building a cinema in 
Guinea remains unclear. Other projects providing infrastructure development are clearly aimed at 
facilitating Chinese business ventures and economic interests. The development of a power 
station in Ethiopia and a hydropower station in Guinea, methane-generating pits in Kenya and 
Uganda, and various factories or mills in Liberia, Mali, Mozambique and Zimbabwe590, are 
indicative of such ventures and interests. However, other projects are typical development 
projects, such as the dispatch of technical assistance in the form of medical teams and providing 
scholarships for African students to study in China. 
 
5.3.4 Institutional structure of Chinese aid 
 
The institutional arrangement through which the Chinese government provides aid or assistance 
consists of a number of key bodies. They include two types of banks and two important 
Ministries. PRC assistance or aid to Africa is controlled by the state-owned Export-Import 
(Exim) Bank of China, established in 1994. Exim Bank is the vehicle for which official PRC 
bilateral concessional loans, export credits and international loan guarantees are provided. The 
Aid to Foreign Countries Department of the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) manages and 
executes the PRC’s bilateral foreign aid policy, budgeting and project implementation. It does 
this by controlling the bidding and vetting processes for soft loan contract projects undertaken by 
PRC firms. Another important entity is the China Development Bank (CDB) established in 1994, 
whose core function is to serve as a ‘development orientated financial institution’ under the 
direct jurisdiction of the State Council (this is the supreme decision making body of the PRC 
leadership). The CDB is the main source of funding for the China-Africa Development Fund. 
The various ministries (e.g. Health, Education) deploy technical and advisory teams to Africa 
under the MOC guidance. Other export agencies and provincial organizations such as chambers 
of commerce and export promotions also play a role in foreign assistance projects. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and MOC officials advise top policymakers on 
assistance to Africa. However, political and policy decisions are made by the PRC leadership, 
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commonly referred to as the State Council, in conjunction with the leading Group on Foreign 
Affairs of the Communist Party. The State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC) 
focuses on economic aspects of Africa’s assistance591. 
During my interviews for this study I was informed that Chinese ambassadors meet periodically 
to propose aid levels for their countries and that individual projects are vetted by country desk 
officers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For example, the construction of the African Union 
headquarters in Addis Ababa, estimated at US$150 million, was also vetted by the Ministry of 
Finance592. Large scale projects, like energy investments in Africa are first passed by the Office 
of the National Energy Leading Group, the SDPC and the MOC with advice from China’s three 
key state-owned oil companies, which also implement such policy goals593. 
Aid programs in Africa are designed and managed based on the requirements of an individual 
country, but within the PRC policy objectives for Africa. However, the common factor is that the 
aid is offered “as part of or contingent upon sealing of larger, integrated bilateral commercial, 
military, and/or political package agreements”594. Government officials claim that the country by 
country approach allows China not to apply a monolithic Chinese model of socio-economic 
development on individual African countries595. Officials also claim that PRC bilateral 
cooperation is designed to meet the needs and priorities of each individual country. However, 
critics argue that the PRC targets countries that are of relevance to them economically or 
politically. China does not coordinate its aid in Africa with other donor countries; however, it is 
beginning to consult with successful donor-oriented Nordic countries.  
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5.3.5  How much aid does Africa receive? 
 
China has committed US$75bn in aid and development projects in Africa in the past decade, 
(2000-2011)596. According to some researchers the scale of aid is often referred to as “Beijing's 
escalating soft power charm offensive” to secure political and economic clout on the African 
continent597. 
Aid is one of the most important policy instruments for China applied in its various engagements 
with Africa. The Chinese government releases very little information on its foreign aid activities, 
which remain state secrets and thus it is difficult to obtain accurate figures. It is estimated that by 
the end of 2009 Africa has received 45.7 percent of the RMB 256.29 billion cumulative foreign 
aid of China598.  
China provides eight types of foreign aid, namely goods and material, technical cooperation, 
human resources development cooperation, medical assistance, emergency humanitarian aid, 
volunteer programs and debt relief599. China’s aid to Africa covers a wide range of activities 
from agriculture, education, transportation, energy, communication, to health. 
According to the Ministry of Commerce, external aid includes grants and zero-interest loans and 
concessional loans made by Exim Bank600. Most of the Exim Bank loans come from capital 
raised domestically and on the international capital markets. Exim Bank is given a strict quota of 
concessional loans it offers annually. From 2009 to 2012, China provided US$10 billion in 
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financing to Africa in the form of concessional loans601. During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 
first overseas trip to Africa in March 2012, he doubled this amount to US$20 billion602. The head 
analyst of Export-Import Bank of China predicts that by 2025, China will provide Africa with 
US$1 trillion in financing, including direct investment, soft loans and commercial loans603. 
A detailed analysis of Chinese budget expenditures, reports and media announcements, 
supplemented by interviews with Chinese officials, have provided interesting insights into 
Chinese aid to Africa (for details, see Brautigam 2011). Figure 14 compares China’s official 
African development aid in 2008 with ODA as reported by major donors. 
 
Figure 14: Official development assistance to Africa, 2008604  
 
The above diagram indicates that the USA provided US$7.2 billion of aid to Africa in 2008. The 
second largest donor was the World Bank which gave US$4.1 Billion, whilst China as seen in 
the graph is one of the smallest aid donors to Africa (US$1.2 billion)605. Although development 
aid provided by China to Africa has increased, it is still not as large as compared to the USA, the 
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World Bank and other European countries. A comparison in the above graph indicates that China 
is still modest and a medium sized donor contrary to what other researchers have indicated. 
  
Between 2001 and 2005 concessional loans had grown almost 35 per cent per year. By 2005, 
Exim Bank had approved 200 projects in Africa amounting to US$6.6 billion. However a World 
Bank report revealed that in 2005, Exim Bank had only funded US$800 million worth of 
concessional loan projects in Africa (approximately 55 projects)606. In 2007 China pledged US$3 
billion for preferential loans and $2 billion export-buyer’s credit over the course of the following 
three years. This was doubled in 2009 when it pledged US$10 billion and also pledged US$1 
billion for small and medium sized businesses607. 
These pledges were seen favorable by the former Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi who 
stated: “We, the Africans leaders are able to take the necessary measures to benefit us from the 
opportunity created by our partnership with China in a manner that is consisted with our 
principles of solidarity”.608 The Ethiopian Minister of Trade, Girma Biru, also commented on 
Chinese policy, stating: “China has become our most reliable partner and there is a lot we can 
learn from Beijing”609. In Angola, after three decades of civil war, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) convinced the government that oil revenues should be allocated to social programs. 
Angolan Ministers were initially receptive to the IMF loans; however at the last minute the 
Angolan government broke off talks with the IMF and instead decided to receive loans and 
credits for oil reconstruction from the Chinese. Beijing offered Angola loans and credits worth 
$5 billion without the conditionalities that the IMF had attached to the credit arrangements610. 
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This indicates that China’s official loans provide a major challenge to Washington-based 
institutions such the IMF and the World Bank. It is important to note that in 2005, OECD 
countries’ funding for African grant projects was still larger (US$30.7 billion) compared to 
China’s611. The remarks made by the Ethiopians and Angolans are classic indicators of the 
success of soft power or a state’s attractive power for others. Chinese aid based on the “Beijing 
Consensus” model (discussed in Chapter 6) is therefore a key element of its economic soft power 
configuration. 
According to some think tanks, most Chinese financing to Africa is associated with securing 
Africa’s natural resources612 - referred to as the ‘Angola Model’, where China provides low 
interest loans to nations who rely on commodities, such as oil or mineral resources as collateral 
security613. 
In addition to securing Africa’s natural resources, China’s capital flows into Africa also create 
business opportunities for Chinese service contracts, such as construction companies. According 
to Chinese analysts, Africa is China’s second largest supplier of service contracts: “we provide 
Africa assistance of RMB 1 billion, we will get service contracts worth USD 1 billion (RMB 6 
billion) from Africa”614.  In exchange for Chinese financial aid, Beijing requires that Africans 
favor a Chinese service provider, which means that 70 percent of contracts go to ‘approved’ state 
owned Chinese companies615. In some cases local joint ventures with Chinese companies are 
encouraged as an alternative. In this sense, China’s financing for African states creates business 
and employment opportunities for Chinese workers. 
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Figure 15:  Distribution of Chinese Foreign Aid616  
 
In most African countries China had constructed public buildings, such as ministerial office 
blocks, cultural centers, schools, hospitals, clinics, roads and bridges. China has also supported 
light industry – factories that produce bricks, textiles, paper or cement. It has also funded 
projects in the agricultural sector. However, most of China’s aid went towards supporting small 
to medium size projects, such as a loan of US$8.6 million to construct two administration 
buildings in Burkina Faso, or the launch of a US$3 million irrigation project in Ghana617. 
China has provided only a small quantity of aid to South Africa and this has been limited to 
education and training. In support of the government project AsgiSA aimed at training and job 
creation, China has provided US$6.3 million for technical training in South Africa. During 
President Hu Jintao’s visit to South Africa in 2007, he promised an additional US$25 million. 
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The funding was originally intended to assist the textile industry with skills development618. 
However, due to the lack of response from the South African textile industry, the fund was 
diverted to technical training in agriculture, tourism, defense and foreign affairs. Thus China’s 
small aid package to South Africa has had almost no impact on employment or poverty 
alleviation. Embassy officials emphasize that ironically South Africa has a relatively higher per 
capita GDP than China619. 
 
As China’s population increases, it faces growing pressures to meet internal demands for natural 
resources620. Taylor observes that “African nations such as Angola, Sudan, and Nigeria also have 
significant untapped natural resources and are witnessing a donor race to gain access to these 
resources”621. Some analysts believe that this need for resource security is the main motivator for 
Chinese aid and investment622. Others argue that “China’s ‘tied aid’ for infrastructure usually 
favors Chinese companies (especially state-owned enterprises), while its loans are in many cases 
backed by African natural resources”623. Similarly, Foster et al. conclude that “most Chinese 
government-funded projects in Sub-Saharan Africa are ultimately aimed at securing a flow of 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s natural resources for export to China”624. However, Beijing flatly rejects 
the claim that its aid program is only designed to secure access to other countries’ natural 
resources625. 
 
China’s policy of non-interference in the domestic politics of sovereign governments has raised 
the assertion that China is underwriting “rogue states” or very undemocratic states and its 
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support is enabling their continued survival626. The Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-
Africa Cooperation (2000) states that “[t]he politicization of human rights and the imposition of 
human rights conditionalities on economic assistance should be vigorously opposed”627. To 
Western analysts, this is a convenient rationale for China “turning a blind eye” and doing 
business in undemocratic and corrupt regimes with a poor human rights record628. A common 
view is that when Western donors withhold aid because of undemocratic practices or human 
rights violations, African governments simply make a deal with China, thereby undermining aid 
conditionality629. Scholars have argued whether easy access to cheap Chinese loans with “no 
strings attached” has delayed good governance and the introduction of anti-corruption 
reforms630. Lombard points out that the Angola government was able to resist IMF pressure for 
oil revenue transparency because it was able to access an interest-free loan from the Chinese 
Export-Import Bank631. There is a belief amongst analysts that China has effectively become a 
lender of last resort for those governments with poor economic governance who are unable to 
secure loans from the Bretton Woods Institutions. For example, Downs (2011a: 93-94) points out 
that, in spite of “gross economic mismanagement” by the Venezuelan government, the Chinese 
Development Bank gave a US$20.6 billion loan that helped “finance [Hugo] Chávez’s bid to win 
a third consecutive six-year term as president”632. There have been similar claims about China’s 
support for Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos, who has been in power for 33 years and 
Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, in power since 1980.  
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5.3.6  Sudan, Angola and Zimbabwe: Cases of aid 
 
Beijing’s aid programs are link to a country’s own economic and political objectives. In Sudan, 
China has been able to secure Sudanese oil partly because of its attractive offers of aid. In 2002 
the Sudanese government received a US$2.5 million grant for the refurbishment of a hospital, 
and in June 2004 they signed a preferential loan agreement for US$3.6 million for the 
construction of a new International Conference Hall and the training of Sudan’s Ministry of 
International Cooperation’s employees633. 
 
Since 1997, China’s State Council has provided preferential loans with interest deductions to 
enterprises involved in specific projects in strategic industries. Simultaneously, the State Council 
began to rapidly expedite a number of different projects, and increased the amount of aid thus 
facilitating increased trade and commercial engagement with Africa634. In Zimbabwe small and 
medium sized enterprises (SME) have been granted credit from Chinese banks, which has 
enabled Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises to reserve US$12 billion for the 
country’s SMEs engaged in the textiles, soap, and tile and fiberglass manufacturing635. Huge 
state-owned enterprises are also assisted in this manner: an example is the Zimbabwe Iron and 
Steel Company and the China Capital Iron and Steel Corporation’s joint venture in June 1999 to 
reconstruct a blast furnace with the assistance of buyer’s credit from China’s Export-Import 
Bank636. 
 
These soft loans are often provided to improve or construct infrastructure that facilitates trade 
and investment, as well to leverage commercial opportunities. In Sudan, the Chinese government 
credit loans are financing the construction of hydropower plants, including an 85 per cent 
investment in the construction of the US$470 million, 300 megawatt Kajbar Dam and the 2 500 
megawatt Merowe Dam, totaling US$1.73 billion. When completed in 2008 these dams will 
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potentially increase two or three fold Sudan’s capacity to generate electricity637. In Mozambique, 
China’s Export-Import Bank extended a US$2.3 billion loan for the construction of a new 
hydroelectric power plant that will be utilized in mineral exploitation638. During Wen Jiabao’s 
tour to Africa in June 2006, an agreement was signed to finance the construction of a railway line 
from Pakwach (in Uganda) to the southern Sudanese capital of Juba639. 
 
In 2004, Beijing extended a US$2 billion soft loan to Angola for infrastructure projects, 
including repairing railroads, building roads, constructing offices, construction of a fiber-optic 
network, and exploring for oil640. The loan was granted based on the understanding that Chinese 
firms will secure a 70 percent portion of these projects, which was guaranteed by a contract for 
the sale of oil from an Angolan oil field that produces 10 000 barrels per day641. The Angolan 
government welcomed the loan, especially as it was reluctant to turn to the IMF who was 
pressuring the government to improve transparency in its oil sector and combat widespread 
government corruption. It was China that benefited from providing loan since it secured 
contracts for Chinese firms as well had access to Angolan oil642. China has been criticized by the 
IMF and World Bank for extending such loans to poor African governments with little prospect 
of repayment. 
 
There is clear that China provides financial aid to African countries for developing infrastructure 
that will facilitate even more Chinese commercial involvement as well as to gain favour with 
African elites. Ultimately China’s foreign aid is linked to Chinese companies who are contracted 
to provide the services for which the aid is intended. This guarantees that China gains political 
and economic benefits through its assistance to Africa. The question is whether the Chinese aid 
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and assistance makes it more attractive to the African recipients. From the evidence presented 
above it can be concluded that the governments or elites, especially of states with problematic 
democratic records, see it as an attractive alternative for the IMF and World Bank. The same is 
not clear in the case of local businesses and the public in general. One of the key elements of 
Chinese aid is acceptance of Chinese businesses and labour to implement the assistance projects. 
Local economies already in the field can be threatened by the Chinese presence while economies 
not yet active in that field might benefit from the Chinese presence. Its implications for Chinese 
soft power in Africa are therefore not one-dimensional. 
 
5.4   Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter attempted to explore the economic relations between China and African states, with 
specific focus on trade and investment as elements of China’s projection of its soft power into 
Africa.  It revealed that general trade between China and Africa grew exponentially over the last 
decade and that this increase has seen China importing mostly raw materials, commodities and 
primary products while African states importing mostly manufactured and value-added goods 
from China.  
 
Africa’s exports to China has increased, largely as a result of China’s growing need for energy 
security which has resulted in increased oil imports from Africa, particularly from Sudan.  
 
China’s increasing demand for commodities has the potential to have a positive impact on 
Africa’s growth, as this is linked to the growth in their foreign exchange and capital for more 
investments.  However, these benefits could be outweighed by the high volatility of demand for 
Africa’s commodities depending on tendencies in the Chinese domestic market.  
 
A further problem is that China’s presence in Africa has the potential to encourage rent-seeking 
behavior, where the elites are enriched with little or no benefits for the masses. In addition, 
China has carefully developed relationships with Sudan and Zimbabwe, which allows it to 
extract oil (in Sudan) and commodities like tobacco, diamonds, gold and agricultural products (in 
Zimbabwe) in exchange for weapons and military equipment.  
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The influx of cheap Chinese manufactured goods and consumables has a potentially positive 
impact on the purchasing power of the poor, such as in Uganda where the general population has 
benefited from access to affordable consumables at no expense to local industry. However, in 
economies such as South Africa, where there is a mature manufacturing sector, Chinese imports 
have been detrimental to the textile and footwear industries, which have seen numerous factory 
closures and job losses. The trade relationship between South Africa and China was singled out 
because South Africa is China’s largest trading partner in Africa.  
 
It is clear that China is seeking new investments opportunities in African countries and for the 
most part, these investments are welcomed by African governments, especially in the light of 
decreased European and North American investments. It is important to note that it is the state 
rather than the market, that determines Chinese investment projects and that many of these 
companies are State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), which are accountable to party officials rather 
than commercial managers.  
 
China’s economic involvement in Africa conforms to an Economic Nationalist explanatory 
framework. The nature of China’s business in Africa is premised on the notion of promoting its 
national interest as its primary priority and as such bolstering China’s domestic economy 
irrespective of its impact on the African economies. In particular, China’s interests in African 
minerals and oil are aimed at bolstering its domestic manufacturing base and energy security and 
therefore these relations with African states are aimed at furthering its own economic 
development, and, within Realist terms, its national power. 
 
China decided to make its largest investments in Africa’s energy sector in order to secure its own 
oil flow. Most African companies see China as a reliable partner and one that allows them to 
offset the influence of the private multinationals oil companies. China has become a major player 
in almost all the oil producing countries on the African continent. China’s strategy of 
aggressively offering economic investment package and trade opportunities is working, while at 
the same time improving its ability to gain opportunities either to purchase additional oil supplies 
or to develop partnerships with state oil companies. 
~ 174 ~ 
 
It is evident that China’s investment interests lie in raw materials, primary products and the 
extractive industries. While these investments have some positive consequences, such as 
employment creation and technological transfer, it is “likely that these investments are adding to 
the riches of the elites, with little positive impact on the poor and needy”643. China’s aid to 
Africa is not unusual by any standards. Many Western countries have provided generous aid 
since colonial times; however, China uses aid in a sophisticated manner that is disguised in many 
forms which enhances its soft power. China uniquely operates its aid program by its own rules 
and terms, different to Western norms – aid channeled through Exim Bank.  
 
The intention of China’s aid to Africa is benign but not altruistic. China publicly states that it 
does not seek to use aid to influence the domestic politics of African countries or dictate policies. 
Instead, its stated motivation is to assist African countries’ development. However, China is not 
helping Africa in exchange for nothing. Chinese projects create access to Africa’s natural 
resources and local markets, business opportunities for Chinese companies and employment for 
Chinese laborers. Chinese officials often refute this statement by claiming that China also 
provides aid to countries that are not rich in natural resources, but neglect to mention that China 
may have other intentions like support for Beijing’s “one China policy”, or for China’s agenda 
for its multilateral forum. China’s aid policy to Africa is complex, comprehensive and multi-
dimensional and defies any simplistic view. 
 
China’s success lies in that its bankers do not impose governance preconditions on lending by 
African governments. The one positive aspect to China’s foreign aid has been the boom in 
Africa’s infrastructural projects, creating much needed electrical, transportation and 
telecommunications capacity.  
Finally, inclusion of economic elements in the discussion of China’s soft power does not follow 
closely the Nye approach to soft power. It suggests that China uses its economic means and trade 
relations with African states in a manner different from the USA and most European countries. 
Hence this chapter argued by way of demonstration that the Chinese economic elements assume 
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the role of soft power components much more than in the case of the American approach – hence 
the deviation from the Nye approach. It should not, however, be understood that the Chinese 
approach is not an unqualified success, as explained earlier, and therefore that inclusion of 
economic elements as part of soft power should be regarded as an unqualified new theoretical 
contribution. Its theoretical implications should however be more closely investigated in future. 
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CHAPTER SIX:    
How China Uses Political Soft Power in Africa 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter concentrated on China’s use of economic soft power in Africa. This 
chapter is concerned with its ancillary element, namely political soft power. Nye’s notion of soft 
power remains the main point of reference but in addition one can include also specific 
articulations of soft power by scholars on China. Bonnie Glaser and Melissa Murphy noted in 
their study that China’s leading philosophers and sociologists tend to think that China’s soft 
power stems from its culture, while international relations scholars view political power as the 
critical element of soft power644. Men Honghua, an expert at the Central Party School, identified 
five key aspects of soft power: culture, concept, mode of development, international institutions 
and international image645. In 2006, Tsinghua University Professor Yan Xuetong regarded soft 
power as the government’s ability to politically mobilize a nation for internal and external 
purposes646. While Yan posits that hard and soft power work together, other Chinese scholars 
argue that military soft power is necessary to consolidate political, spiritual and hard power. In 
this chapter we will therefore focus on how China uses political soft power in its relations with 
African countries. 
Chinese government leaders have identified soft power as a key component of national power. 
At the 16th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress in 2002, President Jiang Zemin said: “in 
the present day world, culture is interactive with economic and political activities and its status 
and functions are becoming more and more outstanding in the competition in overall national  
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strength”647. In recent years, Chinese experts have developed a better understanding of the role 
of soft power and concluded that soft power will help address both external and internal 
interests648.  
In this chapter we discuss China’s political soft power in Africa. Firstly we look at China’s grand 
strategy, its foreign policy objectives in general and its foreign policy towards Africa. It is 
followed by an examination of how China uses political soft power in Africa. In this regard we 
look at four areas of Chinese soft power in Africa, namely the “one China policy” (and the issue 
of Taiwan’s diplomatic recognition), the Beijing Consensus as an alternative for the Washington 
Consensus, how China uses the United Nations as a means to demonstrate soft power. Sudan and 
Darfur is used as case study to illustrate the use of political soft power. The fourth and final area 
of Chinese soft power is FOCAC.  
The next instrument of Chinese soft power in Africa is how military and peacekeeping 
operations are used to make it attractive for African states. Another instrument that is discussed 
in this chapter is China’s political outreach as means of soft power. It is followed by a discussion 
of Chinese image-building in Africa. The final two instruments of soft power are the role of state 
security and intelligence and the embassies as used by China in Africa.  
 
6.1.1 China’s Grand Strategy 
 
Scholars like Deng, Wang and Shambaugh have argued that during the 1990s China developed a 
new grand strategy for its global relations which also included its relations with Africa. They 
argued that there has been a marked shift in the orientation of Chinese foreign policy that dates 
back to the mid-1990s. Goldstein (2005) calls this a neo-Bismarckian strategy, where “China’s 
capabilities were increasing and its military was improving, both compared with its own recent  
past and relative to others. Yet its modest increase in power hardly seemed to justify the alarmed  
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reaction it elicited, and it was this reaction that would shape China’s emerging grand 
strategy”649. 
 
The contours of the Chinese grand strategy remain somewhat vague, but most scholars point to 
China’s active role in regional and international organizations, commitment to multilateralism, 
proliferation of partnerships and alliances around the globe, and leadership role in international 
issues, including arms control and nuclear non-proliferation. Collectively, these examples 
represent a marked shift in Chinese foreign policy, which in the past focused almost exclusively 
on economic relations650. 
 
However, before we look at China’s grand strategy, it is important to define what that grand 
strategy is. International relations scholars define grand strategy as an approach examining how a 
state can best protect its core interests given its available national resources and international 
constraints651. There is very little distinction between grand strategy and foreign policy.  Foreign 
policy determines state behavior in specific policy areas or issues (with an emphasis on tools and 
tactics), while the broader notion of a grand strategy includes a state’s strategic objectives, 
intentions, and plans for achieving them. A grand strategy does not exist in a vacuum, but rather 
reflects the external security environment, domestic political concerns, and available resources. 
To understand China’s grand strategy, one must consider the underlying beliefs that drive state 
behavior. Since ancient times China was seen as a ‘World Empire’ without any rivals in East 
Asia. Its political and cultural influences were very strong in Japan, Korea and Vietnam and on 
the northern nomadic tribesmen, the Mongols652. However, the empire suffered a major blow 
during the 19th century when the West and Japan controlled large parts of China, practically 
rendering it a protectorate. Being at the receiving end of colonial Japanese and Western 
aggression, both regarded as ‘inferior barbarians’ in Chinese cosmology, Beijing adopted an 
ambiguous position of 'admiration and indignation' towards Japan and the West653. This sense of 
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injustice, termed the ‘Century of Humiliation’, is still dominant and drives Beijing’s ambitions.  
Since the early 20th century Chinese elites as well as nationalist leaders like Sun Yet-Sen and 
communist leaders such as Mao proffered two reasons for the Chinese elites to reassert this 
strong nationalism, which became part of its foreign relations. First, the Chinese regard their rise 
as regaining their lost international status rather than obtaining something new. Second, they 
consider the rise of China as the return of fairness rather than gaining advantages over others. 
Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin repeatedly called for the ‘rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation’ and this is evident more than ever during the last three decades. 
 
Under Mao Zedong, China’s bilateral relationships and foreign policy behavior was guided by 
the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, which included mutual respect for sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in one another’s internal affairs, 
equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. After China opened up to the world in 
1979, the country embraced Deng Xiaoping’s dictum that China should not seek a global power 
status, but should instead emphasize ‘peace and development’654. Even after the Cold War, 
China remained committed to this slogan, as part of its grand strategy. However, the dramatic 
changes in the regional and global environment, along with China’s increased engagement with 
global institutions and its rapid economic growth, prompted many members of China’s foreign 
policy elite to re-examine China’s grand strategy for the 21st century. 
 
China’s booming economy, aggressive military modernization plans and increased diplomatic 
activity has confirmed the ‘rise of China’ in the international arena. Realist theorists of 
international relations predict that as China’s international status improves, it will begin to seek 
more influence on other actors and institutions. In its own statements Beijing has called for 
greater national power and an end to hegemony and has encouraged the international community 
to pursue a multi-polar future. According to Realist theorists, China’s foreign “policy 
preferences, and likelihood that a rising China will engage in conflict with other states is a 
given”655.  
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Authors like Avery Goldstein, Michael Swaine, and Ashley Tellis who examined China’s rise 
and grand strategy policy, argued that a rising power essentially has two options: to either 
balance against the hegemony through competition and confrontation or to assimilating with 
hegemony or with the existing system656.  
 
As China designs its grand strategy, its leadership must determine which grand strategy best fits 
its objective and beliefs: either (1) to become a regional hegemony, or (2) to establish a 
superpower status through spheres of influence, or (3) to become a responsible stakeholder with 
global influence or (4) to challenge American hegemony and replace the United States as the 
world’s only superpower.  
 
All these four possibilities will reduce American influence in the global landscape, resulting in 
China taking a greater leadership role on the international stage657. Below is a schematic 
summary of the Grand Strategy: 
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Figure 16: China’s Grand Strategy658 
 
                             
 Political influence                 Increase trade in favour of China 
                             One China Policy                   self-sufficient in energy 
                            Multi-lateral forum                 economic power      
                            Power in UN Security Council 
                                   
6.1.2 Political or Ideological Sphere of Influence. 
 
 
China’s recent emphasis on building soft power may be accompanied by an attempt to spread its 
political ideology, taking into account that soft power is driven by ideology and extends beyond 
cultural ties, to shape political, economic, military, social and diplomatic relations as well659. 
Although China continues to insist that it does not seek to export a particular ideology, Beijing’s  
call for anti-hegemony and non-interference in another state’s affairs is very appealing to 
developing countries. This will be discussed later in the chapter. 
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6.1.3 China’s Foreign Policy Objectives 
 
Ye Zicheng, a professor at Peking University, argues that China should try to strengthen its soft 
power in the areas of politics, economy, and foreign policy in order to avoid following in the 
footsteps of the former Soviet Union. In his opinion, the Soviet Union collapsed because of its 
weak soft power which reduced its influence in the international arena. According to him, 
China’s foreign policy is based on four objectives, namely:  
1) Modernization 
2) To protect is sovereignty 
3) To enhance its security 
4) To attain a great power status 
These objectives are not only unique to China’s foreign policy, but are shared among all super 
power states. However, what make China’s objectives different is its historical experience, (i.e. 
its ‘Hundred Years of Humiliation’), its Communist tradition, and its strong nationalism. A 
challenging question for China watchers is whether China will, as a rising power, “become a 
rational, peaceful, and pragmatic power or an irrational, bellicose and expansionist state”660? As 
Nye argues, foreign policy is a key element of soft power resources, and the implementation of a 
well-thought out foreign policy can greatly affect a country’s soft power. China is no exception. 
In this regard, the peaceful rise and peaceful development policies have been regarded as 
diplomatic strategies to realize China’s development into a global power. According to Cho and 
Jeong, China’s rise has great significance with regard to its foreign policy. Firstly, there is a 
change from the American-centered diplomacy to a neighbour-centered diplomacy; secondly, 
China’s diplomatic objective is to be accepted into the international area with the ultimate goal 
of being a global leader and increasing its comprehensive national power661. In other words, the 
‘peaceful rise’ theory maintains that China’s global strategy has been transformed from an 
internal to an external orientation. Cho and Jeong argue that the “peaceful rise theory now 
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reflects China’s continued expansion of national power, the change in perception of domestic 
and foreign conditions within China, and the desire to search for a new foreign policy facilitating 
China’s emergence as a global power”662. 
From the outset, in order to understand China’s foreign policy, one needs to comprehend China’s 
national interest. According to Chinese policy documents, the national interest is often used 
interchangeably with state interest. This concept is essentially an appeal to nationalism663. In the 
1980s, Chinese policy documents categorized national interest under two broad ideas: first, 
“preservation of existing national interests and the second the protection of its future national 
interests”664. The former included preserving “it’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
developing national economic and industrial and trade systems, as well protecting the people and 
their properties”665. The second element was to operationalize or promote national development, 
in other words, the resources that would enhance China’s national power. In fact, national 
interest actually reflects China’s “lessen concerns with survival of the nation, and instead, 
reveals China’s overarching dream of attaining great power status”666.  
During the last decade, China’s pursuit of multilateralism, multi-polarism, the New Security 
Concept and good neighbourly relationships are the essence of China’s desire to create an 
external environment favourable to itself and to protect and maximize its national interest667. 
Similarly, China’s African policy is also directed at protecting and maximizing its national 
interest. Scholars and researchers have argued that the concept of national interest is referred to 
as China’s Comprehensive National Power (CNP)668 (zonghe guoli). This refers to the “totality 
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of its economic, military and political power in a given period”669. According to Cho and Jeong, 
“soft power is an important component of this comprehensive national power (CNP)”670. 
The CNP was first mentioned in 1992 in the 14th Party Congress Report. China’s investment in 
building strong military and self sufficient resources is some of the ways to enhance CNP and is 
part of China’s grand strategy. China’s grand strategy is not only for survival but is “increasingly 
contingent on its rise as a great power”671. Another pivotal part of its grand strategy is rapid 
economic growth to ensure the survival of Communist Party rule. According to author Fei-Ling 
Wang, “China’s primary motivation behind its foreign policy remains the preservation of the 
political system of the Chinese Communist party” (CCP)672. Hence the Chinese leadership is 
currently focused on economic and technological development as opposed to previous great 
powers that focused primarily on military security. 
Many Chinese scholars regard the strengthening of China’s soft power as a key national 
objective. In the Theory on Comprehensive National Power Huang Shuofeng describes 
comprehensive national power as comprising of hard power (i.e. economic power, science and 
technology power, national defense power, and natural resource power) and soft power (i.e. 
political power, diplomatic power, and cultural and educational power). Some observers 
conclude that discussion of soft power in China falls under two categories: soft power as national 
development strategy and soft power as a tool for foreign policy. 
 
6.1.4 China’s Africa policy objectives 
 
China’s wielding of soft power diplomacy has been most successful on the African continent 
when compared with Latin America. The contemporary Sino-African relationship can be traced 
back to former Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai’s ten-country tour from 13 December 1963 to 5 
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February 1964673. In those early years China’s interest in Africa was to build ideological 
solidarity with other developing countries and to promote Chinese–style communism and repel 
Soviet revisionism and American imperialism in the Third World. Its mantra was anti-
colonialism, anti-imperialism and anti-revisionism. In many ways, China in the Maoist era 
strongly supported the non-aligned countries even thought it had limited military and economic 
capabilities during that period. 
In the early 1960s and 1970s, China’s Africa policy was unclear and it was unsure which 
national liberation movement to support in post-colonial Africa. In those early years Chairman 
Mao Zedong considered the Soviet imperialism more of a threat than US imperialism674. The 
Chinese leadership, at the time, was faced with a serious dilemma regarding which national 
liberation movement to support. In South Africa, for example, Beijing supported the Pan 
Africanist Congress (PAC) instead of the African National Congress (ANC). In Mozambique, it 
supported the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee against the Liberation Front of 
Mozambique. In Angola, China supported the National Front for the Liberation of Angola 
(FNLA) – which was supported by the US’s Central Intelligence Agency and the South African 
Apartheid regime against the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)675. In all 
three cases the Chinese leadership supported the wrong side. 
By the late 1960s and 1970s, China’s Africa policy was mainly focused on competing with 
Taiwan’s Nationalist Government for international influence and diplomatic recognition. China’s 
main objective, besides promoting a ‘one China policy’, was also to lobby African countries to 
reject Taiwan’s seat at the United Nations. (This will be discussed in more detail later.) 
By the early 1980s, China’s rapid economic growth prompted it to redefine its international 
relations policy goals. It began to pursue bilateral ties defined by more pragmatic economic and 
trade-related motives rather than political or ideological ones. “China increasingly began to use 
cost-benefit analyses in making decisions about investing in projects in Africa”676.  During this 
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period, Africa was no longer considered a strategic priority by Western countries. The United 
States’ interest in Africa was diverted to other regions like the Middle East while European 
countries became indifferent to Africa’s problems. In the 1980s, China’s shift in its foreign 
policy to promote South-South co-operation culminated in Premier Zhao Ziyang’s visit to Africa 
in January 1983. He put forward his four principles on strengthening South-South co-operation 
namely “equality, mutual benefit, stress on practical results, diversity in the form and attainment 
of common progress”677. 
China’s new diplomatic campaigns in Africa started to primarily focus on economic co-
operations on the basis of respect for state sovereignty and a win-win strategy, rather than 
political rhetoric.  
During the last decade (1990), the style and substance of Beijing’s Africa policy have shown the 
following features that are closely associated with Chinese soft power strategy. 
China’s political-economic bilateral goals and relations in Africa are defined in its new African 
policy document announced in January 2006, entitled China’s Africa Policy. This document 
outlines the PRC’s goal of creating “a new type of strategic partnership with Africa”678 which 
also provides the foundation for a long-term relationship with the African continent. It consists 
of diverse types of cooperation guiding Chinese foreign policy principles. The document is based 
on past policy papers such as the Beijing Declaration, the Programme for China-Africa co-
operation in economic and social development (October 2000) and the Addis Ababa action plan 
(December 2003)679. 
The 2006 document consists of six aspects of China’s relationship with Africa. It emphasizes 
China’s intention to promote an ‘independent foreign policy’ with each individual African 
country based on China’s ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence’ and China’s commitment to 
‘peaceful development’. It identified key elements, namely ‘sincerity, equality, mutual benefit, 
solidarity and common development’ as the driving force between China and Africa. 
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6.2  Non-interference, the respect for sovereignty and human rights as 
China’s relationship policy issues in Africa 
 
China emphasizes the need to respect sovereignty and equality among nation states. This is due 
to the fact that past violations and interventions of China’s sovereignty by outside powers are 
still regarded as major diplomatic threats since the foundation of the PRC680. China’s past 
experience with foreign countries has led it to embark on a principle of “non-interference” in the 
internal affairs of other sovereign countries. It emphasizes sovereignty among all nations and 
maintains that all countries should be treated equally with no country having the right to dictate 
or interfere in the affairs of other states.681. 
China’s adherence to the principle of non-interference has served to protect its own sovereign 
rights. While western countries believe that human rights arise from the need to protect citizens 
from state abuse and therefore obliged to intervene and protect people wherever they are, 
developing countries, including China and most African nations, argue that state sovereignty key 
in that the human rights protection regime is a state-based mechanism. Ultimately non-
interference means that no country should interfere in another’s internal affairs682 and by holding 
to this principle, China has ensured its own sovereignty and gained the trust of African nations. 
This principle has served China well over the past decade as many human rights resolutions 
against China were defeated at the United Nations. 
 
It is evident that China’s Africa policy is silent on human rights issues, considering that its own 
domestic policy on human rights is problematic.  However, one can argue that prior to 1970 the 
United States’ foreign policy was also absent of any human rights considerations. While the U.S. 
pioneered the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 and was the main 
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architect of human rights in the United Nations, “it took until the late 1970s for human rights to 
be explicitly made a major part of the US foreign policy formulation”683. 
The Chinese interpretation on human rights focuses on the right to food, clothing, shelter and 
economic development (similar to African needs)684. Many critics argue that China deliberately 
ignores and become indifferent to human rights issues in Africa. The Executive Director of 
Human Rights Watch, Kenneth Roth comments that: “when it comes to human rights, China’s 
foreign policy is deliberately agnostic”685. China’s perceived indifference is rooted in its policy 
of non-interference in internal affairs of sovereign states. According to Beijing, the “human 
rights issue is relative to different cultural perspectives - in other words, each country must 
define its own understanding of human rights”686. There is a concern that Beijing’s disregard for 
human rights in Africa could undermine unilateral and multilateral efforts to marginalize pariah 
governments in Africa. According to Roth, “China’s policies have not only propped up some of 
the continent’s worst human rights abusers, but also weakened the leverage of others trying to 
promote greater respect for human rights”687. 
According to China’s African policy document, it advocates ‘Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence’, namely mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-
aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefits and 
peaceful coexistence. These are guiding principles of the China-Africa cooperation and exchange 
between the two countries. However, the human rights component is unclear. According to Dr. 
Uche Ofodile, a human rights lawyer and Professor of Law at the University of Arkansas, the 
“absence of human rights considerations in China’s Africa policy is a concern to critics”688. 
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David Zweig and Bi Jianhai observe that human rights have “little room for morality”689. This is 
supported by four aspects of China’s policy in Africa. Firstly, China’s indifference to the human 
rights situation on the continent; secondly China’s unconditional support for brutal dictators; 
thirdly, China’s non-involvement in unilateral and multilateral human rights initiatives; and 
finally China’s insensitivity towards trade and human rights issues. Referring to the crisis in the 
Sudan, China’s Deputy Foreign Minister Zhai, is quoted as saying “business is business. We try 
to separate politics from business. Secondly, I think the internal situation in Sudan is an internal 
affair, and we are not in a position to impose on them”690. In 2006, he further stated: “We’ve 
never imposed on other countries our values… and we do not accept other countries imposing 
their values on us either”691. China appears to be resolute in defense of its policy of non-
interference. He Wenping, head of African Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Science, 
states that this principle has had a positive impact in building Chinese influence and “that 
developing countries appreciate very much and that won’t change in the future”692. 
Critics argue that China’s non-interference policy is used only when it is in China’s interest not 
to intervene. As Roth argues, “when Western governments try to use economic pressure to 
secure human rights improvements, China’s no-strings rule gives dictators the means to 
resist”693. Sophie Richardson, Deputy Director at Human Rights Watch (Asia Division) argues 
that “China insists that it will not ‘interfere’ in other countries domestic affairs, but it also claims 
to be a great friend of the African people and a responsible major power. But that doesn’t square 
with its silence while mass killings go on in Darfur”694. Many human rights organizations have 
accused China of supplying arms to Sudan, to be used in Darfur. Darfur Human Rights Watch 
has urged China to stop aid to Sudan and for Sudanese President, Omar al Bashir to allow UN 
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peacekeeping into the region695 (which has happened in the meantime in the form of the UN/AU 
hybrid force). The US Congress also informed Beijing that the 2008 Olympic Games would be 
severely affected if China does not halt the bloodshed in Darfur696. 
China’s principle of non-interference and respect for national sovereignty should be investigated 
beyond its formal statements and should also look at its practices. China’s military development, 
in recent years, has been reinforced by increasing arms sales to African states. Any military 
engagement has direct political implications and often influences the domestic political situation 
in the recipient state. The weapons can be used either against internal opposition or in regional 
relations. It means that ostensible non-interference can become implied or covert interference. 
Human Rights Watch has criticized China’s arms sales to autocratic or undemocratic regimes in 
Africa. According to Le Monde, China sold approximately US$142 million worth of military 
equipment to Africa between 1955 and 1977697. Arms sales from China made up 10 per cent of 
all conventional arms transfers to the continent from 1996 to 2003698. China is the largest 
supplier of arms to Sudan, selling, in 2005, US$8 million in weapons, aircraft and spare parts699. 
Weapons and military training has also been provided to Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe. A Rand Corporation report of 1999 indicated that China’s arms deals 
were motivated primarily by foreign policy considerations and not driven by commercial 
imperatives700. Arms sales and deals are not contravene international human rights laws, except 
when UN sanctions are in place, but considering that Africa has been plagued by genocide wars 
and brutal dictators have used arms against innocent civilians, such a policy and practice can 
have disastrous effects. 
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An example of this was when the media revealed on 18 April 2008 that China was supplying 
arms to Zimbabwe. ‘An Yue Jiang’, a Chinese ship carrying 77 tons of ammunition to Zimbabwe 
was halted at the eastern coastal port of Durban, South Africa. An investigation by the Institute 
for Security Studies, (ISS) revealed that the cargo originated from Beijing and that the shipping 
company was a parastatal of the Chinese Ocean Shipping Company. The delivery address was 
the Zimbabwe Defence Force in Harare701 and at the time Zimbabwean President Robert 
Mugabe had been accused of violating human rights against his own people. 
The South African Transport and Allied Workers Union (SATAWU) called on its members not 
to unload the weapons from the ship and the South African Litigation Centre (SALC) applied for 
an urgent interdict to stop the arms being offloaded. The shipment consisted of approximately 
three million rounds of ammunition, 1500 rocket-propelled grenades, and 2500 mortar rounds702. 
Initially, the South African government confirmed that these weapons were on board a ship in 
South African waters, and that Pretoria would not intervene in what it regarded as trade matters 
between China and Zimbabwe. However it later retracted this statement.  China’s Foreign 
Ministry issued a statement stating: “China and Zimbabwe maintain normal trade relations. What 
we want to stress is China always had a prudent and responsible attitude towards arms sales, and 
one of the most important principles is not to interfere in the internal affairs of other 
countries”703. Unofficial reports indicated that the An Yue Jiang arms shipment landed on 
Angolan shores and did eventually find its way to Zimbabwe.  
In the final analysis, Beijing’s economic and security interests may override human rights 
considerations. According to Breffni O’Rourke, “China has never been known for shying away 
from business on the grounds of human rights abuses”704. As Ian Taylor noted: 
According to China’s non-interference policy, sovereignty trumps everything and so it is 
up to each country to decide what to do with Beijing’s assistance. But if sovereignty is 
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the guarantor of human rights and that sovereignty is being used to effectively undermine 
developmentalism, then there is a profound contradiction at the heart of China’s 
discourse on human rights. Surely, in such cases China is complicit in not only siding 
with autocrats and undermining a nascent human rights regime (one now supported by a 
number of African states). It is also undermining its own conception of human rights 
based on developments, as well as its own interpretation of the linkage between human 
rights and sovereignty705. 
 
Both China and Africa have suffered from the disastrous colonial periods and this shared 
experience underlines the respect for sovereignty that each has in their approach to international 
relations. For example, China shares the African Union’s position with regard to the 
Zimbabwean issue. When Robert Mugabe demolished countless urban dwellings in 2005 in a 
crackdown on illegal shantytowns in Harare, Britain and the United States urged the AU to act. 
However the African Union desisted and gave Mugabe its blessings to resist sanctions imposed 
by the West706. 
 
With regard of Darfur, there is debate whether the situation there should be described as a 
“genocide,” which would oblige the international community to intervene and protect the 
Darfurians.  
 
It was only United States who described the conflict as “genocide”, while neither the United 
Nations nor regional organizations applied it to describe this complex issue. China and some 
Africa countries believe that developing countries must not be judged using the same standards 
by which developing countries are judged. This foreign policy imperative has not changed since 
the beginning of Sino-African relations. 
 
But this principle of non-interference is not an absolute in the Africa Union as on membership, 
countries agreed bringing an end to intra-African conflicts. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, the 
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African Union intervened to stop humanitarian disasters, while in Togo and Mauritania the AU 
stepped in to support democracy707. The AU’s Constitutive Act also acknowledges the principle 
of collective intervention in domestic affairs when “grave circumstances” prevail (Article 4(h)). 
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle, however, remains very controversial in Africa, 
especially after the events in Libya in 2011. 
 
China respects these AU’s principles and goals but does not consider it has the right to intervene 
in the domestic affairs of African countries as a foreigner. And though it has been criticized for 
adhering to the principle of non-interference, China considers itself incapable of making 
pronouncements on African domestic affairs and considers the AU more qualified to do so.  
 
China’s policy of non-interference is presented as not deliberately ignoring humanitarian 
disasters, but as a justification for respecting the sovereignty of nations and acknowledging its 
limitations in solving such a crisis. In diplomatic engagements with African nations, China 
refrains from discussing issues of governance and intra-state affairs. 
 
The difference between Chinese interventions and Western pronouncements is that the Chinese 
adopt a friendly rather than a coercive manner. 
 
On Darfur, China has consistently opposed economic sanctions on Sudan708 and believes that it 
is a developmental issue, and which sanctions can only do more harm to the region, especially in 
view of a United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 2007 report which states 
that”environmental degradation, as well as regional climate instability and change, are major 
underlying causes of food insecurity and conflict in Darfur”709. From a realpolitik point of view 
it is understandable why China does not support sanctions against Sudan or even other African 
states. Sudan is one of its main providers of crude oil. Sanctions would therefore sever vitally 
important economic links for the Chinese and be an impediment to its own growth. Principle and 
interests are therefore delicately balanced. 
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China’s aid policies are positioned as targeting poverty. China has built schools, hospitals and 
water projects for Sudan and has already provided US$10 million in humanitarian aid and 
promised to offer more710. Beijing insists on using influence without interference and regarding 
respect as vital for finding solutions. For example, China has persuaded the Sudanese 
government to cooperate with the United Nation over Darfur. Since it has sought to alleviate the 
suffering of the Sudanese people with a solution agreeable to all parties, Khartoum trusts China. 
For example, the Sudanese government has accepted the “hybrid peacekeeping force” in Darfur, 
which China claims that the turning point for the political process resulted from negotiations 
with the Sudanese government based on equality, not coercion or the threat of sanctions.  
 
Other members of the UN Security Council have also claimed credit for the progress made in 
Sudan (Darfur) but the important point is not who must receive credit for it, but how the Chinese 
explain or justify their involvement in the situation. 
 
The principle of non-interference points to China’s respect for the economic and political choices 
that African nations make although this is not always advantageous to China. In fact, during the 
past 50 years, China has seldom used its aid commitments to intervene in African internal affairs. 
An example of this was in 2003 when a Canadian oil firm decided to sell its interests in Sudan, 
which the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) wanted to purchase. Khartoum 
rejected the Chinese offer and awarded the shares to an Indian firm instead. Beijing accepted the 
decision without meddling in the affairs of Sudan711. 
 
The principle of equality in China’s relations with other countries is more than just a slogan. 
Although this concept is largely the norm between individuals, it has never been effectively 
applied in the realm of international relations. Powerful countries have always created and 
dictated the rules in the global community and perhaps China’s practice in Africa challenges this 
reality and offers an alternative model for inter-state behavior. 
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The intention of this section was to demonstrate that China is using its stance towards 
sovereignty, non-interference and human rights in a strategic manner to make relationships with 
it more attractive than relations with its competitors. This approach is therefore used as a form of 
soft power in a diplomatic or political sense and is meant to provide China with a strategic 
advantage over other major powers. 
  
6.2.1 Mutual Benefit and Win-win Cooperation 
 
The most important principles driving China’s policy in Africa are mutual benefit, reciprocity 
and common prosperity. Based on these principles, “China supports African countries' endeavor 
for economic development and nation building, carries out cooperation in various forms in the 
economic and social development, and promotes common prosperity of China and Africa. It will 
strengthen cooperation with Africa in the UN and other multilateral systems by supporting each 
other's just demand and reasonable propositions and continue to appeal to the international 
community to give more attention to questions concerning peace and development in Africa. 
China and Africa will learn from and draw upon each other's experience in governance and 
development, strengthen exchange and cooperation in education, science, culture and health. 
Supporting African countries' efforts to enhance capacity building, China will work together with 
Africa in the exploration of the road of sustainable development”712. 
 
Prior to the 1980s, China supported the anti-colonial struggles and independence movements in 
Africa and many of these states reciprocated by giving political support to China. In 1972, 
Beijing regained its seat at the United Nations with the assistance of 26 African votes (out of a 
total of 76 affirmative votes). 
 
Chairman Mao Zedong described it clearly: “We were brought back into the United Nations by 
our black African friends”713. While more recently China has backed African candidates for the 
position of United Nations Secretary-General and for reforming the Security Council in favour of 
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greater African representation, African countries have backed China on the issue of human rights 
and Taiwan714. However, a shift in focus in China’s policy towards Africa has prioritized 
economic cooperation. Africa’s rich natural resources meet China’s increasing demand for raw 
materials and energy. Conversely, Chinese investment in Africa energy is often accompanied by 
aid for infrastructure, which helps to attract more foreign investment in these countries. For 
example, Chinese companies have been involved in the oil production industry in Sudan for 
almost a decade. Beijing not only imports a large percentage of Sudan’s total oil exports, but 
these companies also assist Sudan to establish a productive oil export industry ranging from 
exploration, production and refining to sales of crude oil, gasoline and petro-chemical 
products.715 
 
Some African scholars have acknowledged that China has played a significant role in helping 
African economies to achieve long-term growth through the principle of mutual benefit. One 
poignant analysis points out that “unlike Belgium, which built roads solely for the extraction of 
resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo, China is constructing or improving roads that 
are suitable not only for the transport of resources but which citizens can also use to travel”716. 
 
This mutual benefit is also reflected in areas of fair trade and debt reduction. China has also 
opened its market by lifting tariffs on the number of items (from 190 to over 440 before the end 
of 2009) exported by least developed African countries that have diplomatic relations with 
Beijing. Also, when China benefits economically from Africa’s emerging markets, it reduces and 
relieves African countries’ debts. At the Beijing Summit of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum 
in 2006, China waived the debt of the twenty one heavily-indebted African countries from 
governmental interest-free loans due at the end of 2005717. 
 
Western countries have largely refused technical assistance and cooperation in science and 
technology with African countries, but this is now rapidly becoming part of Sino-African 
relations.  
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Following the principles of mutual respect, “China will promote its cooperation with Africa in 
the fields of applied research, technological development and transfer, speed up scientific and 
technological cooperation in the fields of common interest, such as bio-agriculture, solar energy 
utilization, geological survey, mining and Research & Development of new medicines. It will 
continue its training programs in applied technologies for African Countries, carry out 
demonstration programs of technical assistance, and actively help disseminate and utilize 
Chinese scientific and technological achievements and advanced technologies applicable in 
Africa”718. Recent collaboration between China and Nigeria in a ground-breaking project to 
launch a communication satellite, Nig-Sat I, saw China provide much of the technology 
necessary for the launch, on-orbit service and even the training of Nigerian command and control 
operators. While Nigeria acquired the satellite technology, China gained from the collaboration 
by enhancing its credentials as an important player in the international commercial satellite 
market719. Additionally, China has recently sent oil expert and engineer Wang Qiming of Daqin 
to Sudan to provide African engineers with new extractive technologies that assist in seemingly 
exhausted oil fields720. 
 
Key to the principle of mutual benefit is the establishment of exchange cooperation in areas such 
as Human Resources Development and Education. The Chinese Government will fully promote 
the role of its "African Human Resources Development Foundation" which will train African 
personnel. Its aim is to identify priorities, expand cooperation and provide more input to meet the 
needs of African countries so as to achieve greater results. China wants to increase the number of 
government scholarships, continue to send teachers to assist in Chinese language teaching and 
carry out educational projects to help develop Africa's weak disciplines.  
 
The Foundation intends to strengthen cooperation in the fields of vocational education and 
distance learning while at the same time encouraging educational exchanges and cooperation 
between academic institutions of both sides. Educational influence on the students of African 
countries has been established as one of the most successful means used by European countries 
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and the USA to make themselves attractive to the young professional elite. A similar approach 
was used by the Eastern bloc countries during the Cold War period and especially during the 
anti-colonial struggles in Africa. Arguably China learnt important lessons from it for its soft 
power approach. 
 
China implements agreements of cultural cooperation reached with African countries, by 
maintaining regular contacts with their cultural departments and increasing the number of 
exchanges of artists and athletes. It also promotes cultural exchanges between people's 
organizations and institutions in line with its bilateral cultural exchange programs and market 
demands. China will continue to send medical teams and provide medicines and medical 
equipment to African countries and assist them to establish and improve medical facilities and 
train medical personnel. 
 
China has increased cooperation with African countries in the prevention and treatment of 
infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS and malaria and other diseases. It intends to expand its 
research and experience of traditional medicine regarding public health emergencies721. 
According to the policy paper the second emphasis is that China’s Africa policy should be 
designed to promote a win-win exchange and that African countries will adhere to the ‘one 
China policy’, which implies that they will terminate all diplomatic ties with Taiwan. As part of 
the win-win approach the policy paper also identified six areas for strengthening China-Africa 
co-operation; firstly by increasing high level exchange visits between legislative bodies, 
exchange between political parties, consultation mechanism (such as bilateral committees), co-
operation in international affairs and exchange between local governments722. 
These six areas of strengthening China–Africa cooperation suggest that China’s intention is to 
intensify political relations with African countries. The Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister, Lui 
Guozeng stated: “Our objectives is to show the international community the importance China 
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accords to Africa, and to demonstrates China’s strong will to develop friendly relations with 
African countries”723. 
Several measures were proposed to strengthen Sino–African political and economic co-
operation. In the economic sphere, China’s Africa policy seeks to boost Sino-Africa trade, 
including PRC duty-free treatment for some African countries; negotiating Free Trade 
Agreements with African countries and regional organizations and the provision of export credits 
for PRC investments and business activities in Africa, notably in infrastructure and utilities 
contracts. They also include establishing China-Africa joint Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry. These organizations will be responsible for establishing preferential loans and buyer 
credits to encourage Chinese investments and business in Africa. It seeks to enhance dispute 
settlements, investment protection, and double taxation accords, and seeks enhanced joint 
business promotion efforts. Organizations such as the China-Africa Agricultural Co-operation 
Programme and the Beijing’s African Human Resources Development Foundation were also 
established. The latter was set up to increase the number of government scholarships to promote 
student exchange; science and technology co-operation; medical and health co-operation724. 
In the context of China’s on-going program to broaden links with Africa, the China-Africa policy 
document also included the cultural aspects of soft power that includes education, science, health 
and culture. China has promised continued training for African students in China; increase 
science and technology co-operation, more cultural exchanges, better quality medical personnel 
and information exchanges, media co-operation, administrative co-operation, including the 
training of African government personnel, consular co-operation to ensure the safety of 
nationals, people to people exchange among youth, environmental cooperation; and, disaster 
relief assistance and training725. 
One typical example of China’s increased activity in diplomatic exchanges with African states 
was the five major diplomatic events in 2006: between 11 and19 January the Chinese Foreign 
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Minister visited Cape Verde, Senegal, Mali, Liberia, Nigeria, and Libya; on 12 January the 
Chinese Government released China’s first official policy paper on Africa; between 24 and 29 
April Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Morocco, Nigeria and Kenya; from 17 to 24 June, 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao toured Egypt, Ghana, Republic of the Congo, Angola, South 
Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda; and finally in November, Beijing laid out the red carpet for fifty 
heads of African states to celebrate fifty years of diplomatic relations between China and Africa. 
This was part of the preamble of a decade of ‘political brotherhood’ with African countries. 
 
6.3  How China uses political soft power in Africa: Four areas.  
 
We shall now examine China’s exercise of political soft power in Africa in four areas: the “One 
China policy”; the Beijing Consensus vs. the Washington Consensus or China’s development 
model; China in the United Nations in the context of multilateralism; and FOCAC in the context 
of regional multilateralism.  
As a rising power, China is keen on gaining influence in Africa by actively and aggressively 
seeking new friends and allies. It needs support at the United Nations (UN) and in other 
international forums to sustain its foreign policy and to counter Western pressure on issues like 
human rights, economic openness, and political freedom. Africa, which represents more than one 
quarter of the UN General Assembly, is a significant voting bloc at the world body. To optimize 
implementation of its strategy in Africa, Beijing attempts to navigate between the conventional 
foreign policies of the West and the policies of the global South. In fact Beijing adopts different 
ways and means to do this, including traditional diplomacy, commercial diplomacy and 
increasingly, public diplomacy and soft power. The four areas of soft power are now discussed. 
 
6.3.1  Area one: The Issue of Taiwan and Beijing – the ‘One China policy’ 
 
One of the most important aspects of China’s Africa strategy is winning support from African 
countries to exclude recognition for Taiwan as an independent country and to promote the ‘One 
China policy’ in Africa. The ‘One China policy’ is aimed at obtaining support from all African 
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countries to isolate Taiwan. This has been the cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy since the 
advent of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and has guided Beijing’s Africa policy since 
Zhou Enlai’s tour in 1963-64. 
Taiwan’s status has gradually declined among the African countries since China was admitted to 
the United Nations General Assembly in October 1971. This was further enforced when in 1979  
Washington switched its support from Taipei to Beijing. Between 1971 and 1979, 46 African 
states recognized the PRC instead of the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan). 
 
This has largely been a result of a consistent and aggressive policy by the PRC to obstruct 
Taiwan’s relations with the world community, by maintaining that ‘China’ (which includes 
Taiwan) is governed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing. The ultimate aim of 
such a policy is to try and coerce Taiwan into the PRC fold under the rubric of ‘one country, two 
systems’ (yiguo liangzhi)726. The  aim of opposing Taiwanese influence on the continent is clear 
by the statement issued by the head of the China National People’s Congress, Qiao Shi, who said 
that “at present the Taiwan authorities are very active in the world in an attempt to turn Taiwan 
into an independent country”727, adding, “we will never allow it to do so”728. He added that 
Taiwan is an inalienable part of the Chinese territory, stressing that any attempt to create ‘one 
China and one Taiwan’729 or two Chinas will never succeed. 
 
The main implication of China’s policy towards Taiwan is that it isolates any African country 
that supports Taiwan diplomatically or politically. China severs all relations with any state that 
establishes diplomatic relations with Taiwan. According to Chris Alden, “China punishes 
African countries by withdrawing foreign assistance and other projects”730. China’s White Paper 
on Africa asserted that if African states choose to accept the “one China principle as the potential 
foundation for the establishment and development of China’s relationship with African 
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countries,” China will “co-ordinate positions on major international and regional issues and stand 
for mutual support on major issues concerning state sovereignty, territorial integrity, national 
dignity, and human rights”731. 
 
According to Ursula Van Beek, “China gives money to every country in Africa, with the 
exception of the few that continue to maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan”732. Countries that 
still have diplomatic relations with Taiwan are Burkina Faso, Gambia, São Tomé and Principe 
and Swaziland. These countries are mostly small and weak and do not play a significant role in 
the global environment or in the Security Council. At the UN General Assembly in September 
2005, President Hu offered debt forgiveness and duty free entry to exports from the world’s poor 
countries, except for those that recognize Taipei733.  African nations switching recognition are 
aware of the potential economic gains and are making decisions in their best interest. For a state 
to switch recognition and warm relations with Beijing who will reciprocate with promised aid, 
investment, economic opportunity, and education, the potential costs are very low while the 
advantage is that it will please China greatly and will potentially avoid a missed opportunity. 
 
China is able to pursue its aggressive policy against any African country that supports Taiwan, 
through its economic and political power. In particular, China’s seat on the Security Council of 
the United Nations and the veto power that goes with it is the ultimate trump card that China 
holds against Taiwan. The position that it holds in the Security Council is an extremely powerful 
one, which enables it to use the ‘carrot and stick’ approach to persuade African countries to sever 
official relations with Taiwan.   
 
Hence “no state would wish to be the first to openly challenge China’s policies vis-à-vis Taiwan 
and gamble with the almost certain economic and political fall-out with China”734. In many 
cases, China has been known to react aggressively to any gestures of support to Taiwan. 
Beijing’s reaction over President Lee Teng-hui’s 1995 trip to his alma mater in America is a case 
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in point. Whilst such over-the-top displays appear to outside observers as bizarre over-reactions, 
in the context of Chinese foreign policy they make sense and are quite rational: China is intent 
on serving a warning to others thinking of developing unofficial linkages with Taipei. 
Nonetheless, through generous aid disbursals, Taipei is able to win over some diplomatic allies, 
particularly in economically depressed regions in Africa.  
 
Africa’s importance for China is evident by its advantage as the largest single regional grouping 
of states that engage in ‘bloc voting’ in multi-lateral fora at the Unites Nations and its agencies. 
African governments have supported China whenever its conduct has been criticized. This was 
seen when African votes were crucial for China when the International Olympic Committee 
awarded the 2008 Olympics to Beijing or blocking resolutions at the UN Commission on Human 
Rights which condemn Chinese human rights abuses. As Premier Wen Jiabao has stated: “China 
is ready to co-ordinate its positions with African countries in the process of international 
economic rules formulation and multilateral trade negotiation”735.  
A common practice by China is to reward African countries that support the ‘One China policy’ 
by financial means. For example, US$24 million in grants and interest free loans were granted to 
Tanzania and a US$3.6 million grant to Zambia during Chinese Premier Li Peng’s visit to Africa 
in 1997736.  
 
Chris Alden argues that “a crucial component of expanding China’s presence in Africa has been 
the use of foreign assistance to cement ties with governments….and winning new diplomatic 
allies”737. However, aid is not the only incentive used to gain political favour. Whilst the global 
community considered economic sanctions against Nigeria following the execution of activist 
Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995, China was busy negotiating a US$520 million deal to furnish the 
country with new locomotives and restore Nigeria’s crumbling rail system738. This was the 
period when the West and the Commonwealth countries condemned Nigeria for its human rights 
                                                          
735Alden, Chris, China in Africa, London and New York, Zed, 2007, page 22 
736Taylor, Ian, Taiwan’s Foreign Policy and Africa: The limitation of Dollar diplomacy, Journal of Contemporary 
China, vol.11, issue 30, 2002, page 134 
737Alden, Chris, China in Africa, London and New York, Zed, 2007, page 22-29 
738Taylor, Ian, Taiwan’s Foreign Policy and Africa: The limitation of dollar diplomacy, Journal of Contemporary of 
China, vol. 11, issue 30, 2002, page 135 
~ 204 ~ 
 
abuses. In addition, Li Peng, the Chinese Prime Minister, spent two days in Nigeria in May 1997, 
and invited then Head of State General Sani Abacha to visit China.  
 
6.3.2 South Africa as an example of China’s influence on Taiwanese diplomatic relations 
 
South Africa’s decision to switch diplomatic relations from Taiwan to China brought an end to a 
20 year relationship with Taiwan. The change came after aggressive pressure from Beijing on 
Pretoria to abandon Taipei.  
 
South Africa made the decision to switch to China even though there were 620 Taiwanese 
companies trading in the country, employing 45,000 people and two-way trade between Taipei 
and Pretoria had reached US$1.7 billion739. Taiwan even offered to invest US$3.5 billion in a 
petro-chemical complex in the Eastern Cape, however Beijing countered that with a US$18 
billion investment in an industrial development complex in the Northern Province (today called 
Limpopo), which would create half a million jobs740. 
 
In 1994, after the ANC came to power, President Mandela tried to pursue the ‘dual recognition’ 
of both Beijing and Taipei, but was rejected by Beijing. Pretoria eventually gave in to Chinese 
pressure in November 1996, when all diplomatic ties were severed in favour of the sole 
recognition of Beijing.  
 
It is true that South Africa had its own interest in severing ties with Taiwan in favour of China, 
because according to Taylor, it is “almost certain that Beijing would have expressed great 
displeasure at this state of affairs and in all certainty vetoed any move to promote South Africa to 
the [UN Security] Council. One needs only to remember China’s use of its position on the 
Council to express its displeasure against states with diplomatic links to Taipei”741. An example 
of China’s growing influence in Africa is Beijing’s demonstrably adverse reaction to any 
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invitation to the anti-China Dalai Lama. This is demonstrated by the numerous invitations 
extended to the Dalai Lama by civil society organizations to visit South Africa. In 2011 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu invited the Dalai Lama to his 80th birthday celebrations in Cape 
Town. The South African government prevaricated in issuing a visa for the visit. This was done 
so as not to offend Beijing. After much delay the Dalai Lama was not granted the visa to visit the 
country. It was a victory for the Chinese and is a clear indication of the subtle use of soft power 
in order to achieve its objectives742. 
 
In conclusion, it is clear that China’s growing engagement with Africa has marginalized Taiwan 
and that a pre-requisite for doing serious business with China is to recognize it and sever any ties 
with Taiwan. In the early 1990s, 20 African countries had recognized Taiwan but by 2008 only 
six countries had remained. China’s success in luring states away from Taiwan is an example of 
China’s successful soft and hard power diplomacy in Africa.  
 6.3.3   Area two: The Beijing Consensus versus the Washington Consensus 
 
Both China and the West are associated with macro-economic developmental frameworks or 
models that they promote in other parts of the world. They are captured in the concepts of the 
“Beijing Consensus” and the “Washington Consensus’ respectively. Both models have powerful 
implications, because if accepted, it automatically draws a state into the economic paradigm and 
therefore influence sphere of that sponsor state.  
 
The soft power implications of the Beijing Consensus model cannot be overstated. First, the 
Chinese approach sidelines political reforms in favor of economic growth, something which  
many authoritarian regimes would greatly like to imitate743. Second, countries (notably in Latin 
America) that implemented the Washington Consensus reforms (directed by the IMF and World 
Bank) failed to achieve the growth predicted by proponents of the plan. China’s path to growth 
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represents an attractive alternative to the market reforms advocated by Western governments and 
institutions. The Beijing Consensus has been especially attractive to developing countries that 
have observed China’s rapid economic growth in the last thirty years.744. For their part, the 
Chinese are actively promoting the Beijing Consensus style of reforms in Africa, encouraging 
African governments to develop their economic systems in a similar fashion745. 
 
The concept “Washington Consensus” was first coined by John Williamson in 1989 in his study 
of the policy and structural inadequacies of developing countries. According to him, the 
Washington Consensus contains ten policy imperatives: fiscal discipline, tax reform, re-ordering 
public expenditure priorities, a competitive exchange rate, privatization, trade liberalization, 
liberalizing interest rates, deregulation, liberalizing of inward FDI and property rights. These 
rules mirrored the tenets of liberal market-oriented capitalism and policies of the then Ronald 
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher governments who were strong promoters of capitalism and neo-
liberal ideologies. It is clear from the transformations of China after 1978 that the Beijing 
Consensus promotes a model of top-down control of development and poverty reduction, while 
preventing any real political change but ensuring economic prosperity746. 
 
The concept “Beijing Consensus” was conceived in 2004 by Joshua Cooper Ramo, a senior 
advisor to the investment firm Goldman Sachs and Professor at Tsinghua University. Cooper 
Ramo described the social and economic transformation of China as the new physics of power 
and development. Four key policy characteristics, according to him, constitute the Beijing 
Consensus: a policy toolkit, corporate allegiance, resources, and long-term planning747. The 
policy toolkit refers to Beijing’s ability to interfere in a country’s economy through the use of 
policies that can regulate tax and hand out business contracts or policies that allow meddling in 
financial markets if authorities feel the need to do so748. Corporate allegiance refers to the ability 
of Beijing to not only have state-owned companies, but also to hold all companies accountable to 
the government. It also refers to the ability of the Chinese government to select their 
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management, and those managers’ report to the government749. Resources refer to the vast 
amount of control Beijing exerts in regard to resources, allowing the central government to 
receive not only a steady stream of profit from state-owned businesses, but also allowing the 
control of all land750.  
 
Long-term planning refers to Beijing authorities setting long-term strategic priorities and then 
systematically pursuing them with five-year-plans751. Ramo’s “consensus” was embedded in 
three principles, namely, innovation, promoting work through chaos management and self-
determination752. It implies that China’s economic success was rooted in constant innovations 
that improved its total factor753 productivity, while its quest for economic development was not 
limited to growth only but towards equitable distribution of wealth. The third component 
symbolizes the ability of China to chart and maintain her developmental polices as a model for 
other countries to follow and emulate. Therefore, the term “Beijing Consensus” was the sum of 
the five pillars of the economic policies that China crafted over the years. These included 
incremental reform, innovation and experimentation, export-led growth, state capitalism and 
authoritarianism754. 
 
Ramo states that China has become a competitor to the USA in terms of comprehensive national 
power and argues that the Beijing Consensus is far more appealing than the Washington 
Consensus, especially for developing countries755. The Beijing Consensus refutes Western 
notions of political liberalization or viewing economic reforms as long-term development. China, 
in many ways has exported its economic development model (with Chinese characteristics) to 
African countries by encouraging trade and investment in infrastructure development, without 
dictating any political or economic reforms as preconditions. As a new developmental model, 
Ramo argues, the Beijing Consensus “has given hope to developing countries in an uncertain 
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international situation”756where the financial crises in 2008 and the on-going deadlock of World 
Trade Organization negotiations, are reflections of a weak Washington Consensus. 
 
The Beijing Consensus advocates a strong central government to employ “the principles of non-
interference, multilateralism, and asymmetric power projection in order to secure regime 
legitimacy and pursue further economic development in a way that fits with individual 
characteristics of the country”757. 
 
With decades of economic success and poverty reduction under its belt, China’s anti-liberal 
model appears to be attractive especially to authoritarian or semi-authoritarian nations. Under 
this model, and just as China has, the regime is able to commit to the economic engine as its 
associated elites remain in power. China has liberalized much of its economy, but the 
Communist Party still remains in power. A final aspect of the “win-win” strategy is China’s 
generous offerings to even the smallest of countries. China focuses on small nations, providing 
significant respect, and without notice is able to greatly influence the outcomes of any bilateral 
agreements. Small nations add up and in an ensuing game of balancing power and influence they 
may decide the outcome. 
 
Many scholars argue that this new brand of ‘Chinese style socialism’ may inspire other 
authoritarian regimes to adopt a similar political system and social structure758. While Chinese 
leaders have reassured foreign observers that Beijing does not seek to export the Chinese 
development or political model abroad, leaders in North Korea, Laos, Burma, Cuba, Vietnam 
and Zimbabwe have demonstrated a willingness to apply the Chinese model for their own 
growth759. As China continues to play a more prominent role on the international stage, its 
success may further legitimize its system in the eyes of other states that have been overwhelmed 
by Western calls for more democracy and greater respect for human rights.  
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This could encourage leaders in those countries to seek closer economic ties with China rather 
than accepting the demands placed upon them by the Washington Consensus.  
 
In a February 2007 speech, former Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi maintained that 
China’s inflow of investment was a tangible demonstration that the Western model of 
development has failed: “the need to build a strong development state ….that neo-liberal reforms 
advocated by the World Bank and other have failed to generate the kind of growth expected”. 760 
For good governance to take root, Zenawi suggested, it should be home grown and not imposed 
from the outside. This implied that African leaders should worry less about meeting the demands 
for transparency, accountability, rule of law, and other such neo-liberal objectives and focus 
instead on economic growth and with the presence of China, the resources needed for growth 
will be found761. 
Despite the allure of the Beijing Consensus and the need to justify the one party state and a new 
developmental model, Western and Chinese analysts argue that China’s development model 
cannot work for all countries because it is carefully tailored to China’s economic conditions such 
as national control over its own resources, markets that have been protected from foreign 
completion, and the lack of a powerful capitalist class762. Others argue that China’s current 
economic disparities, widespread corruption, and the lack of democratic practices will prevent 
other states from adopting China’s model of development. According to Blazquez-Lidoy, 
“perhaps the most important aspects of the Beijing Consensus model is an approach to global 
relationship that seeks, in multinational relationships, a new global order founded on economic 
relationships, one that still recognizes politico-cultural differences and variations in regional and 
national practices within a common global framework”763. 
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Although Beijing denies that it is promoting a competing development model against the US and 
other developed nations, China’s political and economic success proves its case. Many 
developing countries, especially those that are disenchanted with the Washington Consensus 
have shown keen interest in China’s reform experience. As the table below indicates, many 
African countries, not only authoritarian or post-communist states but also some liberal 
democracies, are looking to China as a role model for economic growth. 
Whether it is the listening aspects in public diplomacy of the “win-win” strategy or the active 
participation in multilateral organizations or establishing itself as a model for developing nations 
or supporting nations with failing relationships with other great powers or offering the utmost 
respect to the smallest of nations, China’s charm strategy is certain to woo many countries and 
gain substantial world influence. With a box of influence tools afforded to it, China will make 
serious gains in accomplishing its goals through soft power, the power of attraction through 
culture, values, and public diplomacy.  
 
Drew Thompson, a China scholar who studies Beijing’s strategy towards Africa notes, “The 
Chinese government has also actively promoted their own brand of economic development and 
reform model to African countries, encouraging…African governments to fashion their 
economic systems after China’s own”764. China’s ability to present itself as a model for top-
down political and economic development is a success. In contrast to the Washington Consensus, 
which failed in many Latin American and African nations, the Beijing Consensus appealed to 
many authoritarian and semi-authoritarian developing nations. For countries like Uzbekistan, 
Vietnam, Sudan, Bolivia, Argentina, and many others like them, China’s model shows how an 
economy can liberalize to a degree, while ensuring the ruling party remains in power.  
 
The China model is appealing to any struggling developing nation and aids in China’s goal of 
developing a network of allies who share Beijing’s concerns of nations intervening in others 
affairs. 
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Figure 17: Countries in African showing interest in the Beijing Consensus765 
African 
Countries 
Country’s own 
regime type 
Interested in: 
Washington or 
Beijing Consensus 
South Africa Democratic Both 
Zimbabwe Authoritarian 
rule 
Beijing 
Sudan Authoritarian 
rule 
 
Beijing 
Angola Authoritarian 
rule 
 
Beijing 
 
The table below combines indicators of the democratic or open nature of societies with their 
preference for either the Beijing or Washington Consensus. In combination it illustrates China’s 
willingness to maintain close relations with undemocratic African countries. The table is based 
on Freedom House ratings (ranging from 1 as very good to 7 as very poor): 
 
Figure 18: Freedom House ratings (2013)766 
 
Country  Political 
Rights 
Civil Liberties Country Average Beijing 
Consensus 
Washington 
Consensus 
South Africa     2.0      2.0 2.0 free X X 
Zimbabwe     6.0      6.0 6.0 not free X  
Sudan     7.0      7.0 7.0 not free X  
Angola     6.0      5.0 5.5 not free X  
Kenya     4.0      4.0 4.0 partly free X X 
Mozambique     4.0      3.0 3.5 partly free X  
Botswana     3.0      2.0 2.5 free  X 
Ghana     1.0      2.0 1.5 free  X 
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In conclusion, it is clear that the Beijing Consensus has had great appeal to developing countries, 
especially in Africa. However, China’s export of the Beijing Consensus has had very important 
implications – the idea that authoritarian political systems and the perpetuation of non-
democratic structures can be maintained while pursuing high economic growth has been 
attractive to ruling elites. African countries have increasingly acknowledged the Chinese model 
due to its capabilities and effectiveness in coping with the 1998 Asian financial crises and the 
latest global financial crises since 2008. Many developing countries regard some aspects of 
China’s experience of development, such as political stability, economic development and the 
improvement of people’s livelihood, as worth learning. With respect to the Chinese model itself, 
it can be generally considered as part of the Chinese soft power.  
 
However, if the Beijing Consensus is imposed on other countries in future, it will indicate use of 
hard power by the Chinese. In the final analysis it is clear that the Beijing Consensus is an 
important instrument in China’s political and economic soft power objectives in Africa. 
 6.3.4 Area three: China’s use of political Soft Power at the United Nations 
 
 The third component of political soft power is China’s use of the United Nations in order to 
project itself as a world power with an independent position that is sympathetic towards African 
and other states. On 29 October 1971 the United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed 
Resolution 2758, which transferred representation of the seat granted to the “Republic of China” 
under Article 23 of the UN Charter to the PRC. This meant that control of the “China seat” 
shifted from Taipei to Beijing. A few weeks later a delegation led by Vice Foreign Minister Qiao 
Guanhua arrived in New York to declare its “rightful seat” (hefaxiwei) in the UN. In the early 
1970s China’s role in the UN and its role in the Security Council revolved around promoting the 
“revolutionary” principles of anti-hegemony and self-determination, often in opposition to both 
the Soviet Union and the USA.  
 
However, China rarely directly confronted either the USA or the USSR, instead making its point 
by refusing to participate in or abstaining from voting in the General Assembly. One can argue 
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that over the past three decades China, the USA and USSR used the UN General Assembly as a 
forum to demonstrate their soft or hard power among the three powers. 
 
Since the formation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the establishment of the PRC in 
1949, China has aggressively sought UN membership. Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai declared that 
accession to the UN “[is symbolic] as a badge of sovereignty and legitimizes the government and 
its status as a great power”767. He sent correspondence to the UN Secretariat arguing that the new 
government in Beijing should be represented at the UN.  
 
The Soviet Union and the USA both supported China’s inclusion into the UN, however, 
circumstances changed with the Korean War in October 1950, with the PRC finding itself in 
conflict with the USA and the UN. As Bosco observed, “had China abstained from the Korean 
War, it likely would have joined the UN much earlier”768. During the 1950s to 1970s, the PRC 
was excluded from all UN activities, primarily by the diplomatic maneuvering from the United 
States. The US followed a three course strategy: firstly, ensuring that its allies would vote against 
proposals to admit China to the General Assembly; secondly, from 1961 onwards, supporting 
resolutions regarding China’s membership to be postponed because it required a two thirds 
majority in the General Assembly, (hence lowering its chance of success); and finally, in the late 
1960s, advocating that both Taiwan and China must be represented, but China rejected this 
approach, stating that it was a violation of the UN’s principle of only one seat in the organization 
for China 769. 
 
A more important reason why the USA rejected China’s admission to the UN was its Communist 
policies. In 1966 China’s radical views such as the “expulsion of all imperialist countries” from 
the UN and its resolution denouncing the US as an “aggressor” in the Korean War made the US 
reluctant to include China in the UN. However, by the late 1960s, several changes laid the basis 
for China’s entry. Firstly, decolonization, particularly in Africa, led to the advent of a number of 
newly independent states that changed the composition of the UN.  By 1965 almost 76 per cent 
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of its members derived from third world countries, which supported China’s political 
ideology770. 
 
Secondly, countries like Italy, Austria, and Canada, recognizing the PRC’s size, status as a 
nuclear power, and its growing influence in world affairs, switched their recognition from Taipei 
to Beijing. These countries began to support China’s bid for UN representation. 
 
Thirdly, tensions rose between China and the Soviet Union, when the latter invaded 
Czechoslovakia in 1968. Beijing abandoned its “prerequisite conditions of imperial occupations 
and began to support the US view of Soviet hegemony”771. 
 
Fourthly, and probably the most important reason, was Henry Kissinger’s secret negotiations 
with China in July 1971, which culminated in allowing “one China seat” for the PRC. Thus, in 
1971 the General Assembly passed Resolution 2758 by a vote of 76 in favor, 35 opposed, and 17 
abstentions772. Following the election of Richard Nixon in 1968 as American President, the USA 
also began to change its attitude about containing China. In a Foreign Affairs article candidate 
Nixon argued against immediate UN admission for China, but stated that “taking the long view, 
we simply cannot afford to forever leave China outside the family of nations, there to nurture its 
fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors”773. 
 
In July 1971 when China was included as one of the five permanent members of the Security 
Council, Zhou Enlai appointed Huang Hua, former Ambassador to Canada, to represent the PRC 
in the Security Council. The Vice-Foreign Minister, Qiao Guanhua stated in his memoirs that the 
Chinese delegation was quite unfamiliar with this institution.  
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We need to honestly study and become familiar as soon as possible, so that China can carry out 
its duties as a permanent member of the Security Council”774. This echoed what Chairman Mao 
had told the delegation privately a few days earlier: “China needed to adopt the attitude of a 
“student,” avoid “rushing into battle unprepared and “meticulously” consider the complex issues 
with which it would soon be faced before making decisions”775. According to many political 
commentators, these pragmatic decisions in the early years helped shape China’s behavior in the 
Security Council for years to come. 
 
Between 1971 and 1979 China’s tactic was not to vote in the UNSC on resolutions that it had 
ideological misgivings about. These included missions to monitor ceasefires between Israel and 
Egypt, Syria and Lebanon and between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. China either abstained or 
refrained from casting any vote, by using what it labeled the “fifth voting style”. This non-
participation functioned as a form of abstention, allowing China to register its presence and to 
give justificatory speeches. However, China dropped non-participation in favor of the more 
conventional device of formally abstaining in the 1980s776.  By abstaining or not participating, it 
was able to disassociate itself from UN peacekeeping. 
 
Wang Yizhou, a scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, attributes China’s negative 
attitude toward peacekeeping during the 1970s to its experience of United Nations forces during 
the Korean War. Wang also notes that China viewed UN intervention in the Congo in the 1960s 
and Cyprus from 1964 onwards, as a pretext for US geopolitical ambitions777. 
 
A second characteristic of China’s behavior during the 1970s was its support for the Non-
Aligned Movement’s (NAM) condemnation of both Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South  
Africa. The NAM countries were critical of the Western powers for supporting “racist” and 
“illegal” regimes.  Similarly, it was mentioned earlier already that China backed the anti-colonial 
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struggles and independence movements in several African countries.  Often African nations 
reciprocated and gave political support to China. It was mentioned earlier that when China 
gained its seat at the United Nations with the assistance of 26 votes from African countries (out 
of 76 affirmative votes), Chairman Mao Zedong described it bluntly: “We were brought back 
into the United Nations by our black African friends”778. In the last few years, African countries 
have supported China on the issue of human rights and Taiwan779. 
 
During this period the U.S. and the U.K. vetoed a number of draft resolutions and abstained on 
several others. The result was that China’s voting affinity with the West on these issues was 
quite low. Between 1971 and 1979, China’s voting affinity with the U.S. on resolutions 
pertaining to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa was only 29.2 per cent (7 out of 24). In 
comparison, China’s overall voting affinity with the U.S. during these years was 46 per cent (91 
out of 195)780. These voting patterns were used by China to develop its own international 
legitimacy and attraction in the developing world and especially in Africa. 
 
By supporting the liberation movement in Southern Rhodesia (specifically ZANU) and opposing 
apartheid in South Africa (by supporting the PAC), China was able to express solidarity with the 
NAM countries. For example, on 29 September 1972 the Security Council considered a proposal 
by Guinea, Somalia and Sudan, which called on the U.K. to release Zimbabwean political 
prisoners781.  
 
Following a veto by the U.K., Huang Hua said: 
The British Government has once again shown that it stands completely on the side of the 
white racist regime of [Ian] Smith and that it deliberately supports the latter in 
perpetuating its brutal colonialist rule over 5 million Zimbabwe people...The people of 
Zimbabwe and the rest of Africa will surely draw the necessary lesson there-from and 
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will further unite them to carry out the necessary struggles and to put an end, with their 
own hands, to the brutal rule of the Smith racist regime782. 
 
Wang Yizhou argues that “China’s goals were rather to use rhetorical power to support the 
NAM, which it did many times, to use the UN as a conduit through which to forge diplomatic 
ties with states”783. Hence from 1971 to 1979, 57 countries switched from supporting Taipei to 
Beijing. 
 
6.3.5  China in the Security Council from 1980 to 1989 
 
During 1980-1989 China preferred to refrain from using party ideology and preferred to play a 
more passive role in the Security Council. This was evident when China began to vote on issues 
relating to peacekeeping operations. It voted on every draft resolution on peacekeeping 
operations considered in the 1980s. The cause of this shift was that China faced criticism in the 
General Assembly for its failure to contribute to the peacekeeping operation budget since 1971. 
Under Article 19 of the UN Charter, any state may be stripped of its voting privileges in the 
General Assembly for budgetary arrears. 
 
In exchange for revising its policy on peacekeeping, the General Assembly passed a resolution in 
December 1981, stating that China would not be held accountable under Article 19784.  
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Figure 19: Voting in the Security Council, 1980-1989 
Voting 
behaviour 
United States China 
Affirmative 162 196 
Percentage 77.5% 93.8% 
Abstentions 
or non-
participations 
27 13 
Percentage 12.9% 6.2% 
Vetoes 20 0 
Percentage 9.6% 0% 
Source785 
From 1981 to 1988 there were approximately 14 votes on the issue of South Africa. China’s 
delegate offered remarks on only one occasion on 26th July 1985786. Qian Yongnian urged the 
Council to “adopt various measures of sanctions against South Africa and to support the heroic 
struggle of the South African people against apartheid”787. One of the main reasons for China’s 
relative silence in the 1980s was that it subordinated its ideological beliefs to maintain positive 
ties with the USA and with the UN system, both of which it viewed as indispensable to the goals 
of modernizing its domestic economy, acquiring advanced technology, and opening its market to 
foreign trade and investment788. 
 
In the 1980s, China adopted a ’differentiated and flexible policy’ in the United Nations, whereby 
it would abandon its opposition to peacekeeping, contribute to the peacekeeping operations 
budget, participate in subsidiary bodies, such as the Disarmament Commission and the Human 
Rights Commission, and refrain from rhetorical attacks against the superpowers. This was part of 
Deng Xiaoping’s broader “independent foreign policy of peace” announced in September 1982, 
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through which amicable relations with major states and institutions, such as the UN and the IMF 
would be prioritized over ideological struggle789. 
 
However, China did assert itself on one issue during this period. In late 1981 the PRC blocked 
the appointment of Kurt Waldheim to a third term as Secretary General of the UN, favoring 
Tanzanian candidate Salim Ahmed Salim. The result was a prolonged clash with the USA, who 
favored Waldheim and used its own influence to block Salim790. Bosco attributes China’s 
position to its general support for the Third World791. However, as we have seen, China tended 
not to confront the USA when it did not have major interests at stake, relying primarily on 
abstentions. Others argue that China used this situation to express its grievances with Ronald 
Reagan’s decision to consider selling advanced weapons to Taiwan and to pursue what the PRC 
believed was a “two China policy”792. 
 
During the 1990s, the Security Council made increased use of sanctions against delinquent 
states. Compare it with the fact that the Security Council had enacted only two sanctions regimes 
during the entire Cold War (on South Africa and Southern Rhodesia)793. China in principle 
opposed the threat or use of sanctions on the grounds that coercion tends to be 
counterproductive. For instance, in March 1992 the UN authorized sanctions on Libya in relation 
to the latter’s intransigence over international legal proceedings following the Lockerbie 
bombings. Justifying his abstention, China’s delegate, Li Daoyu, said that “In principle we do 
not support the Security Council imposing sanctions against Libya, because sanctions will not 
settle the question but will rather complicate the issue further, aggravate regional tensions and 
have serious economic consequences for the countries concerned in the region”794. 
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By the 21st century, China had moved beyond a restrained posture and toward a more active role 
in the Council. Firstly, the PRC made notable contributions in supporting UN peacekeeping 
operations. China’s motivation in doing so was to improve its image as a responsible power, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Secondly, China took a more active and contentious role in 
discussions on how to address the challenges created by a series of pariah states, including North 
Korea, Iran, Sudan, Burma and Zimbabwe. So far China’s voting behavior in the UNSC in the 
21st century has been indistinguishable from other UN members. In the 636 votes that took place 
between 2000 and 2009, China voted affirmatively 97.8 per cent of the time, abstained on only 
12 ballots and used its veto twice. Its abstention rate was slightly higher than the US’s795. Below 
follows a comparison of the voting patterns: 
 
Figure 20: Voting in the Security Council, 2000-2009 
Votes 
N=636 
United States China 
Affirmative 619 622 
Percentage 97.3% 97.8% 
Abstention 8 12 
Percentage 1.3% 1.9% 
Vetoes 9 2 
Percentage 1.4% 0.3% 
   
Source: 796 
 
The question that follows is: what is the main motivation or national interest consideration for 
China to use soft power in such a manner to shape the outcome of UN action? The most 
plausible response is that it is China’s dependence on energy imports, which are increasingly 
critical for the growth of China’s domestic economy. Its reluctance to support punitive UN 
sanctions is premised on its fear that they may cause domestic or regional instability which might 
threaten China’s supplies from these states, and might strain its political relations with key 
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countries. This point applies particularly to Sudan and Angola, which were the third and sixth 
largest suppliers of China’s petroleum imports in the first half of 2009. The PRC also holds large 
equity stakes in these countries’ national petroleum corporations797. As John Bolton writes:  
 
China’s large and growing demand for energy has been and will increasingly be a driver 
of its foreign policy, leading it to seek assured sources of supply around the world. 
China’s solicitude for undesirable and threatening governments like those of Iran, Sudan 
and Burma can be explained in large measure by its desire to support governments that 
can help China achieve its broader objective of energy security798. 
 
China’s reluctance to be part of decisions that impose sanctions on particular states can be 
understood on the one hand as motivated by its interest-based approach not to jeopardize trading 
partners, especially if they provide energy resources. On the other hand it can also be understood 
as part of its soft power approach to present itself as one of the exceptions in the international 
community who consistently refrains from interventions in the domestic affairs of other states. It 
is designed to make it attractive especially for smaller states that often feel intimidated by big 
powers. Darfur has been chosen as a case study to illustrate these points. 
 
6.3.6 Sudan/ Darfur: A case study of how China avoids sanctions to increase soft power 
 
In response to the international effort to impose sanctions on Sudan because of the civil war in 
Darfur, China opposed any further calls for sanctions in 2007. At face value, it was Beijing’s 
judgment that sanctions would undermine Sudanese stability. He Wenping, director of African 
studies at CASS, wrote in 2007 that sanctions would harm Sudan’s development, and thus create 
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more instability799. Jin Liangxiang, a researcher at SIIS, held a similar view, arguing that the 
“responsibility of the international community is to alleviate suffering, not to add to it800. 
 
For many reasons it is in China’s national interest to promote stability in Sudan and Darfur. One 
of the most compelling arguments is the PRC’s reliance on Sudan’s continuous supply of oil. 
Sudan’s exports to China rose from US$1.8 billion in 2006 to US$4.1 billion in 2007, with 
Sudan ranking as China’s fifth-largest supplier, and second-largest in Africa, after Angola801. 
Another reason is that China is a majority shareholder in two of Sudan’s largest oil consortiums, 
with stakes in fields in Darfur among other investments802. Sudan has also accounted for seven 
per cent of the PRC’s overseas arms sales between 2003 and 2007803. China also has interests in 
exploring oil reserves in neighboring Chad804. Finally, China’s interest in maintaining the status 
quo is because conflict in Darfur threatens not only its economic interests, but also the safety of  
Chinese workers in the area805. As one Chinese diplomat commented, Beijing does not “want 
Sudan to turn into Somalia”806. Arguably it is more accurate to conclude that China is concerned 
about maintaining the status quo and not about the conflict in Darfur in general. Following this 
logic, it could be in their interest to support conflict if it is a means to protect the status quo. In 
order to understand China’s role in Sudan and its opposition to sanctions in the UN during 2007, 
one needs to understand the background to the conflict. 
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The dispute between black African farmers and Arab herdsman for land, water and other scarce 
resources erupted into large-sale violence in early 2003, pitting rebel groups, such as the Sudan 
Liberation Movement, against Arab militias collectively known as the Janjaweed. The Khartoum 
government supported the Janjaweed and provoked the situation by supplying arms and 
ammunition to them. By 2004, some 200,000 Darfurians had been killed, another 200,000 had 
fled to Chad, and 2.5 million had been internally displaced807. The violence in Darfur occupied 
mainstream Western media and it became a diplomatic issue. The USA and other partners in the 
UN sought to draft a resolution that would impose sanctions on Khartoum if it did not halt its 
attacks in Darfur and disarm the Janjaweed808. Supported by Pakistan, the Arab League and other 
representatives of the developing world, China opposed a punitive approach but agreed to enact a 
ban on arms sales to “all non-governmental entities and individuals” operating in Darfur809. 
During voting at the UN, China abstained with Wang Guangya arguing to a New York Times 
reporter that sanctions would be counterproductive “You cannot alienate the Sudan government. 
Without them, the U.N. [mediation] mission will fail”810. 
By 2004 the situation in Darfur continued to deteriorate further. In September, the Security 
Council passed another resolution, calling for a “rapid expansion” of the AU observer force in 
order to “protect the welfare of the people of Darfur”811. The US and other European countries 
warned Khartoum that sanctions would be imposed on its petroleum sector if it did not disarm 
the militias812. China again abstained in order to signal its ambivalence, as did Russia, Algeria 
and Pakistan. In his explanation, Wang said that he would not veto the draft resolution on 
account of its positive references to the AU effort, but would not cast an affirmative vote either, 
since threatening language would “send the wrong signal and make negotiations more 
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difficult”813.  The situation in Darfur continued to worsen in late 2004, with repeated breaches of 
the ceasefire.  
 
On 29 March 2005 a draft resolution was circulated which included an arms embargo, travel and 
financial restrictions on individuals and the creation of a Panel of Experts to monitor 
compliance814. However, sanctions on Sudan’s oil industry were omitted, reportedly to avert a 
Chinese veto815. Wang argued that, in order to achieve progress on the political front, “it is 
necessary to keep appropriate pressure on the parties”. Yet he also asserted that China had asked 
for “major amendments to the text” and, since these were not accepted, there was no choice but 
to abstain816. Despite Wang’s remarks, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
stated that: “We don’t support sanctions or constant pressure. It’s no good for a peaceful 
resolution to the issue”817. 
In January 2006 the Panel of Experts identified 17 potential targets, including senior officials of 
the Sudanese government, including the interior minister, head of national intelligence, defence 
minister and President Omar Bashir818. The USA had proposed only four individuals, a Sudanese 
Air Force officer, a Janjaweed leader, and two rebel commanders. They were accused of 
violating the ceasefire agreement819. China again abstained. According to some analysts the list 
was narrowed down at the behest of China, which was defending its oil interests in Sudan by 
protecting the Sudan’s government820.  
 
Below is a summary in a table of China’s positions in the Security Council regarding resolutions 
on Darfur and the Sudan. 
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Figure 21: KEY SECURITY COUNCIL DECISIONS, 2004-2007 821 
 
Date Res.# Purpose China’s vote 
30 July 2004 1556 Imposed an arms embargo against 
nongovernment actors, welcomed AU mission 
Abstention 
(13-0-2) 
18 September 
2005 
1564 Threatened oil sanctions, opened human 
rights inquiry, urged “rapid expansion” of 
AU mission. 
Abstention 
(11-0-4) 
24 March 
2005 
1590 Established UNMIS, requested UNSG to 
identify ways for UNMIS to liaise with 
AMIS. 
Yes 
(15-0-0) 
29 March 
2005 
1591 Established sanctions committee, widened 
arms embargo, authorized individual 
sanctions 
Abstention 
(12-0-3) 
31 March 
2005 
1593 Referred situation in Darfur to the ICC. Abstention 
25 April 
2006 
1672 Imposed travel ban and financial restrictions 
on four individuals 
Abstention 
16 May 2006 
 
1679 Endorsed AU decision on need for steps to 
transition AMIS to a UN operation 
Yes 
(15-0-0) 
31 August 
2006 
1706 Expanded mandate of UNMIS to include 
deployment to Darfur 
Abstention 
31 July 2007 1769 Authorized UNAMID to take over from 
AMIS. 
Yes (15-0-0) 
 
China has used its permanent member status at the UN Security Council to oppose concrete 
measures intended to address the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. This has increased the breach and 
tension between Sudan and the West but at the same time it has bolstered Beijing’s prominence 
to Khartoum. This use of soft power by China in respect of Sudan has convinced many African 
countries to avoid condemning at the UNHC China’s human rights practices. One of the 
objectives of the Chinese African policy is to ensure support for its domestic and foreign policies 
within specialized organizations such as the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR).  
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6.3.7  Area four: The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC): China’s soft power in the 
form of multilateralism 
 
 In support of the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,’ China established the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in October 2000 in Beijing. By providing a new 
institutional base and mechanism for communication between China and its economic partners in 
Africa, Beijing seeks to foster closer ties with African regimes. Since its creation the Forum has 
held four summits, where African and Chinese leaders, investors and business people meet to 
discuss trade, investment and development opportunities. As with China’s development model, 
the soft power Beijing exerts through the FOCAC is one of the central points in China-Africa 
relations.  
FOCAC was created to facilitate cooperation between China and Africa in a number of sectors, 
including trade, aid, investment, culture and international affairs. The Forum’s first Ministerial 
Meeting was held in Beijing in 2000 and its second meeting was convened in Addis Ababa in 
2003. In October 2004 the Forum established the China-Africa Business Council and during the 
third Forum in Beijing in November 2006, President Hu Jintao acknowledged that the history of 
China-Africa relations had crossed vast distances and defied the oceans. He stated that “China’s 
friendly contacts with Africa date back to the 15th century when Mr. Zheng He, a famous 
navigator in the Ming dynasty, reached the coast of Africa four times, writing an important 
chapter in the history of China-Africa relations” 822. 
 
At FOCAC’s first Ministerial Meeting two documents were produced: the “Beijing Declaration 
of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation”, which set out the foundations, principles, goals and 
objectives of the Forum; and the “Beijing Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic 
and Social Development” which outlined the principles, objectives and procedural framework for 
cooperation in various fields, including intergovernmental cooperation, trade, investment, 
infrastructure, debt relief, agriculture, tourism, natural resources, health, technology and 
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education. The Beijing Declaration stated that FOCAC is “a framework for collective dialogue 
between China and African Countries”. 823 
This cooperation was founded on equality and mutual benefit, with the main objective being 
peace and development. 
 
“The Declaration clearly stated that China-Africa cooperation is facilitated by South-South 
solidarity and a common identity affirmed by their shared status as developing countries and 
common fundamental interests. The Declaration also stressed the long history of Sino-African 
relations and their time honored traditional friendship. In addition, the Declaration emphasized 
the strategic and necessary relationship between China and Africa within an unjust and unequal 
international system, characterized by the developed North and developing South. The 
Declaration calls for the establishment of a just and equitable new international political and 
economic order that includes developing countries, particularly with regard to decision-making 
in the international system.  The Declaration stresses the importance of close cooperation and 
consultation between China and Africa on matters of decision-making within the global 
arena”.824 
 
The China-Africa Forum has had many successes in strengthening cooperation between the two 
regions. Between the first and second Ministerial Meetings China hosted more than thirty 
African leaders, and former Chinese President Jiang Zemin and the previous premier Zhu Rongji 
both visited Africa during that period. China furthermore eased the debt burden of 31 African 
countries, thereby facilitating greater economic and social development. In addition, trade 
between the regions increased notably since the inception of the Forum, and human resource 
cooperation has been significant. Greater cooperation has been forged through technical 
assistance in a number of fields, including medical research aimed at preventing the spread of 
infectious diseases and collaboration in the promotion, manufacture and marketing of traditional 
medicines825. 
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Despite these apparent successes, some commentators however believe that the FOCAC was 
created with a number of other strategic objectives in mind. It is regarded as a platform where 
China is able to expand its soft power in Africa826. As Muekalia argues: “by positioning itself at 
the helm of a coalition of African Council and improve its bargaining power in other 
international institutions”827. Another aim of the Forum is to extend China’s development model 
by highlighting its achievements during its modernization period, and in so doing persuading 
African countries to implement similar reforms, partly in order to lessen China’s foreign aid 
burden828. It can be argued that China has fostered self-development, and discouraged 
dependency on “hand-outs”. Consequently, through the framework of the FOCAC, China 
supports the goals of NEPAD. 
 
Another objective appears to challenge the leadership of the United States. In an indirect 
criticism of US condemnation of China’s human rights abuses, Beijing has called for the creation 
of a new international order and criticized the politicization of human rights and the attaching of  
conditionalities to aid and assistance829. Added to this is the objective to consolidate and exert 
China’s leadership role in the developing world830. The Forum’s documents repeatedly stress 
global inequality and injustice, the negative effects of globalization on poor nations and the 
merits of debt forgiveness. At the first Conference, Jiang Zemin referred to China’s leadership 
status, and emphasized the similarity between the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the 
OAU and UN charters. Liu argued: “by linking the diplomatic principles of the largest 
developing country with the OAU and the UN, Beijing strongly implied its hope to lead 
developing countries, including African states, in the UN”831. The Forum was also subtly used to 
curtail Taiwan’s influence in Africa.  
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Taiwan was never explicitly mentioned, but documents and speeches at the Forum continuously 
repeated support for the ‘One-China Policy’832. 
 
Figure 22: China’s FOCAC 2006 Promises 833 
 
 Assistance Double development to Africa by 2009 
 Provide $3 billion in preferential loans and $2 billion in Preferential buyer credits to Africa over the next 
three years 
 Set up a China- Africa Development Fund to reach $5billion to encourage Chinese companies to invest and 
support firms investing there: 
 Build a conference centre for the African Union 
 Increase from 190 to more than 400 number of export items exempt from entry tariffs in China for the least 
developed African countries with diplomatic relations with Africa. 
 Establish between three and five trade and economic co-operations zones in Africa over the next three 
years 
 Over the next three years, train 15,000 African professionals; send 100 senior agriculture experts to 
Africa: set up ten agriculture technology demonstration centers in  Africa: build 30 hospitals in Africa and 
provide 300 renminbi grants to cover the provision of anti-malaria drug artemisinin and construction of 30 
malaria prevention treatment centers in Africa: build 100 rural schools in Africa 
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6.3.8 Chinese peacekeeping and military operations in Africa as a means of political soft 
power 
 
Earlier it was mentioned that during most of the Cold War period China did not want to 
participate in any military or peace-keeping operations, including in Africa. Gradually it changed 
its stance and arguably it was motivated by the advantages it saw in terms of gaining soft power 
in the process. Peace-keeping operations are the UN and international community’s means of 
direct intervention in dealing with conflict or transition situations. In addition to establishing 
peace, most transitions are also directed towards laying the foundation for a democratization 
process. By being associated with these values the Chinese want to present themselves as 
responsible world citizens, promoting peace and democracy and therefore being seen as an 
attractive power. Chinese peace-keeping operations and security cooperation in Africa are 
therefore a part of China’s grand strategy of developing soft power and as a way of promoting its 
interests on the African continent. China continues to maximize its military and security 
relationship with African countries, especially with countries that have large quantities of oil and 
raw material. There is an obvious correlation between China’s military cooperation and 
important oil producing countries like Angola, Sudan, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Chad and 
Libya. It can be noted that China is not deterred from supporting a country in spite of 
international pressure to impose sanctions - Sudan is a good example where UN sanctions 
prevailed but China still continued with bilateral diplomatic and economic relations. For China, 
maintaining access to African oil, gas, minerals and timber is important as it fuels the Chinese 
economy and hence Beijing will make every effort “to expand military-security cooperation with 
resource-exporting countries”834. China’s support for the UN and AU peacekeeping in Africa 
provides China with military access to African countries and its military undertakes intelligence 
gathering, especially in conflict areas. This was illustrated by China’s peacekeeping 
contributions in Sudan that help deflect some negative criticism by the international community 
against its oil connections and the sale of arms to Khartoum. China’s military or grants assistance 
in Africa is directly related to military infrastructure projects. China is willing to give low-
interest funding to projects in Angola and Ghana in the areas of military and infrastructure 
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development835. According to David Shinn, “Chinese state-owned companies manufacture the 
products: the loans are transferred from one government account to another. The same concept 
applies to military aircraft and sales equipment”836. 
Chinese involvement in African peace-keeping has resulted in increasing cooperation between 
Chinese and African troops. Joint training is a relative low-cost manner to maintain a bilateral 
military relationship. The Chinese view it as a long-term benefit in developing more personal ties 
between African and Chinese military personnel837.While most analysts argue that Chinese 
interest in expanding security of the sea lanes are not significant, it is possible to argue otherwise 
based on the following considerations. 
A white paper entitled China’s National Defence in 2006 stated that “the navy aims at gradual 
extensions of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operation and must guard not only coastal 
areas but also nearby oceans”838. Willy Lam interprets this reference as an intention to develop a 
blue-water fleet with long-range, all weather capabilities839. In a memorandum the former 
American Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, argued that China is building military forces 
and setting up bases along sea lanes to the Middle East to ensure its global military power in the 
region but more importantly to protect its oil shipment840. 
According to David Shinn, “China is constructing a deep-water Indian Ocean port at Gwadar in 
Pakistan and building a container port facility at Chittagong, Bangladesh. Together with Chinese 
developed ports in Cambodia and Burma, these facilities will eventually permit the Chinese navy 
to extend its sea power into the Indian Ocean”841. According to Cortez Cooper, Director of East 
Asia Studies at Hicks, by the year 2020 Beijing hopes to have military capabilities in its ‘greater 
periphery’, more importantly in the Straits of Malacca, the Indian Oceans and the Persian 
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Gulf842. Cooper notes that “China will require the development of a blue-water fleet and strategic 
bomber force to protect trade in goods and natural resources”843. 
Most analysts link Chinese interests in expanding security of the sea lanes to oil coming from the 
Middle East, which contributes up to 50 per cent of China’s oil imports844. However, due to the 
political and economic unrest in the Middle East in 2011/12, China’s imports have decreased 
from this region. China will require more oil from the African continent, and will also import 
large quantities of minerals and timber from Africa that are essential to China’s booming 
economy. Hence the arguments for secure shipping routes in other regions will also become very 
important to China in the African region. 
Another reason for China to expand its sea lanes is the growing strength of India’s naval 
capabilities in east Africa and along the African islands in the Indian Ocean. Although China and 
India have been at relative peace for the past decade, China still sees India as a competitor. China 
still has an unresolved boarder dispute with India and China’s close relations with Pakistan could 
in the future pose a problem. Hence, it is in China’s interest to protect its maritime interests in 
the Indian Ocean by securing the transportation of its commodities. Hu Jintao’s visit to the 
Seychelles on his 2007 Africa tour was not a mere coincidence. China’s naval presence can 
therefore be interpreted from different perspectives: for Pakistan it is a form of soft power while 
for India, the Philippines and other states involved in territorial disputes with China it can be 
seen as a form of hard power. China’s naval presence around the African coast is still limited and 
not yet used in its bilateral relations. No cases of direct confrontation between the Chinese and 
American or European navies in African waters have been reported. It might therefore still be 
seen as a form of soft power.  
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6.3.9   Peacekeeping 
 
An important aspect of China’s foreign policy with strong soft power reverberations is its United 
Nations (UN) peacekeeping activities. Despite frequent and ongoing statements about non-
intervention in the internal affairs of other sovereign states, China now has more UN 
peacekeepers in operation in Africa than any of the other four UN Security Council permanent 
members845. The image of China now as a responsible member - or even a leader - of the 
international community, contributing its share to the “greater good” is a typical objective of soft 
power and is something Beijing is keen to portray. 
 
In 1971, when China became a member of the Security Council, it was opposed to peacekeeping 
operations. By the early 1990s China decided to play a more assertive role by sending a small 
number of observers to Mozambique, Liberia and Sierra Leone. By 2000 it contributed ten 
observers to the UN mission along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border and in 2001 China had sent 200 
troops to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In 2003 it contributed 600 troops and police to 
Liberia and in 2004 it sent a small number of observers to Cote d’Ivoire and Burundi846. 
China not only provides personnel but also medical expertise, transportation equipment, 
engineering, and logistical specialists for UN operations and more importantly it provides 
financial assistance to the AU for the peacekeeping mission in Darfur847. By April 2008, China 
was the twelfth largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations with 1,981 personnel 
participating in seven UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. These included 613 personnel in 
Sudan, 13 in Cote d’Ivoire, 581 in Liberia, 234 in Democratic Republic of the Congo, two in 
Ethiopia-Eritrea and 14 in Western Sahara848. 
It can be noted that China’s most prominent peacekeeping involvement in Africa is directly 
linked to countries that have strategic natural resources. For example, China has a strong 
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peacekeeping presence in Sudan where it also has oil interest in the region. In the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, China has important mining concessions, while in Liberia, China is a major 
importer of timber. With regard to Liberia, China has invested in the country as a “reward for 
terminating its recognition of Taiwan and restoring relations with Beijing in 2003. China sent 
nearly 600 engineers, medical personnel, and transportation specialist to the UN peacekeeping 
operations in Liberia”849. The President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, informed the media 
that “Liberia will never forget the friendship of Chinese peacekeeping soldiers”850. This 
comment is arguably the most direct evidence of acceptance of Chinese soft power by means of 
its involvement in peacekeeping operations. At the same time Western powers like the USA 
contribute vast amounts of financial assistance to UN peace operations but are not directly 
involved in the form of troops. One noticeable exception is France which is less involved in UN 
peacekeeping operations but more directly in security operations. China therefore does not have 
a monopoly in this field and is in competition with these other powers. 
 
6.4 China’s instrument of soft power in Africa: Political outreach 
 
6.4.1 Party to Party relations as form of soft power 
 
Over the past few decades the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has devised a strategic 
campaign to build lasting ties with African political parties and organizations. In this section we 
examine how China uses different instruments of political influence to ensure Africa’s 
commitment to Beijing. 
In the 1950s and 1960s Beijing’s primary motivation in Africa was to promote China’s own 
brand of Communism and to support revolutionary, anti-colonial liberation movements. This led 
the Communist Party of China (CPC) to developing political relations with a wide spectrum of 
governing and other parties in Africa.  In Angola, for example, the CPC supported the ruling 
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) as well as the rival National Liberation 
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Front of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA). In the case of South Africa, the CPC supported the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) 
and to a lesser extend the African National Congress (ANC) during this period. During the anti-
colonial struggle it also supported ZANU in Zimbabwe while the Soviet Union supported ZAPU, 
which was a close ally of the ANC.  However during this period party-to-party contacts were 
minimal and few African politicians visited China. Official documents indicate that no CPC 
officials travelled to Africa851. The occasional contacts China had with Africa were mainly with 
the military or other subordinate CPC groups. During this period China’s focus was on the on-
going Cold War tensions and exporting its revolutionary Maoist ideology. Although many 
African leaders were following Maoist revolutionary thinking, direct contacts with CPC were 
limited852.  
In 1969, under the leadership of Premier Zhou Enlai, there was a shift in China’s policy towards 
Africa. The CPC turned away from an aggressive ideological programme to following a path of 
pragmatism in placing geopolitical objectives before ideology, similar to the Soviet Union. This 
shift resulted in a policy change in the CPC’s outreach to African political parties. The CPC 
began to concede that African countries did not have to accept Chinese ideology in order to 
develop a relationship: “China was able to grant ideology autonomy”853 to its partners. In many 
ways the absence of overtly stated ideology in China’s foreign policy was the preamble for the 
CPC to build ties with African ruling parties across the political spectrum. By the 1970s, China 
began to send ambassadors to all the countries it had diplomatic relations with. 
During the past three decades the PRC has implemented an outreach program designed to build 
lasting ties to African political parties and organizations. This was done in order to enhance 
official bilateral state-to-state relations and in support of Chinese domestic economic 
developments854. Since the third plenary session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee held in 
1978, the Communist Party of China and the Party’s International Department (CPC-ID) have 
emerged as the departments that are primarily responsible for the party’s international exchange 
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and communication with foreign political parties and organizations855. Deng Xiaoping supported 
the new CPC-ID strategy to develop contacts with various parties and during his period, the 
CPC-ID began to receive its first African delegations856. This was a breakthrough in the CPC’s 
history of foreign affairs and it improved the relationship between China and Africa. It also 
meant that for the first time the CPC no longer limited its contacts to Communist parties only.   
The CPC’s Twelfth Assembly in 1982 defined the new principles of its party-to-party relations. 
These four principles were independence, complete equality, mutual respect and non-interference 
in each other’s internal affairs”857. 
The CPC-ID was given four responsibilities, namely: 
1) to research foreign developments and key global issues 
2) to provide briefings and policy proposal to the Central Committee 
3) to carry out exchanges with foreign political parties, and 
4) to carry out exchanges with organizations858. 
From these four principles and four responsibilities, the CPC-ID derived seven guidelines to 
govern its interactions with foreign political parties. These were laid out in a 2001 speech by the 
CPC-ID Vice-Minister Cai Wu. These were firstly to establish new types of relationship between 
parties, secondly no party should judge the achievements and mistakes of foreign parties on the 
basis of its own experience, thirdly every party should decide its own country’s affairs 
independently, fourthly all parties should be completely equal, and they should respect each 
other and not interfere in each other’s internal affairs, fifthly ideological differences should not 
be obstacles to establish a new type of party-to-party relations, sixthly the purpose of exchange 
and cooperation with foreign parties should be to promote the development of bilateral state-to-
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state relations, and finally all parties should look to the future and forget historical 
sensitivities859. 
These guidelines for establishing a new type of party-to-party relations served to operationalize 
the CPC strategy and stands as a useful guide to understand the CPC’s political outreach in the 
modern era860. 
These policies were instituted by the CPC to engage African ruling parties and establish stable 
relationships, regardless of ideology (in accordance with the guidelines listed above). These 
bilateral meetings provided a forum for exchange of views, coordination of policies, and 
provision of economic assistance.  The leaders of China’s state-controlled firms depend on the 
CPC-ID and other related organizations like the Chinese Association for International 
Understanding (CAFIU) to arrange appropriate meetings and social activities with African 
delegations, while African party leaders rely on the CPC-ID to introduce them to the relevant 
Chinese political and business leaders.  
This policy proved to be successful, because from 1978 to 1990 the CPC-ID conducted over 300 
exchanges with African political parties861. By the early 1990s the initiative, led by the CPC-ID, 
was coupled with economic incentives that began to woo many African countries who officially 
cut their diplomatic ties with Taiwan. In exchange for such political loyalty, China offered 
grants, loans and low-cost infrastructural projects to many African countries that pursued a ‘one 
China policy’. 
The so-called third generation of CPC leadership under Jiang Zemin followed the same political 
outreach and strategic methodology as his predecessor to foster economic growth and integrate 
the country into the global economy. This required the CPC to develop stronger political 
relationships to support such goals, where countries like Egypt, Ethiopia, South Africa, Sudan, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe provided some of the strongest partnerships in the early 1990s to cement 
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the Sino-Africa relations. Hu Jintao accelerated China’s growth by increasing the value of 
political capital with resource rich African states and in turn the CPC increased the importance of 
political outreach on the African continent. An example of China’s political influence was seen 
in Zambia’s 2006 presidential elections where the CPC supported the ruling Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy (MMD) party862. There were strong rumors that the CPC provided 
financial support for MMD863. According to media reports, the opposition party leader of the 
Patriotic Front, Michael Sata, a strong opponent of Chinese investments in Zambia, alleged that 
the Chinese had financed the MMD. Sata informed the media that Chinese Ambassador Li 
Baodong threatened that “Beijing would have nothing to do with Zambia if Sata wins the 
elections”864. This threat became a reality when Sata was indeed elected as Zambian President in 
2011 on an anti-Chinese campaign ticket.  
 
6.4.2 Hospitality and negotiations approach as form of soft power 
 
Another political instrument used for the development of soft power in Africa is diplomatic 
hospitality. Chinese hosting practices consist of a mixture of traditional Confucius teachings and 
modern hospitality which are very appealing to ruling elites. African political elites and NGOs 
are hosted in first class luxury and showered with gifts. Another factor that impresses these elites 
is that there are seemingly no conditionalties attached to China’s hospitality. The CPC’s mantra 
of equality, mutual respect, and non-interference has won over African government and 
nongovernment officials across the political spectrum. According to Joshua Eisenman, “visits 
from African political party delegations give the CPC-ID an opportunity to practice its 
intoxicating mix of contemporary and traditional hospitality”865. Between 1997 and 2006, the 
CPC-ID feted over sixty African party leaders during which time the leaders and their Chinese 
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counterparts transformed party ties into long term bilateral cooperation for mutual interest and 
concern. These meetings provide a forum for exchange of views and coordination of policies866. 
 According to Solomon, “the most distinctive characteristic of Chinese negotiating behavior is an 
effort to develop and manipulate strong interpersonal relationships with foreign officials (and) 
feelings of good will, obligations, guilt or dependence to achieve their negotiation objectives”867. 
Hosting these meetings allows the Chinese “to carry out negotiations on their own turf and by 
their own rules while maximizing (the visitor’s) sense of gratitude, awe and helplessness”868. 
This explains why China has been so successful in its political negotiations. 
 
6.4.3 High level visits as form of soft power 
 
China implements its international diplomacy by dispatching high-level delegates on official 
visits to various countries. It appears that these visits take place more frequently to developing 
countries. A possible reason could be its symbolic importance for leaders in developing countries 
because of China’s rising stature and importance in the international system. Chinese delegates 
also pay frequent official visits to countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa. These high-level 
contacts allow China to demonstrate the importance it attaches to its relations with those 
countries. Premier Wen Jiabao stressed on a visit to Fiji that “China maintains that all countries 
whether big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are equal members of the international 
community and should treat each other as such”869. Visitors from developing countries who are 
given little attention in Washington or London are given the full red carpet treatment by China. 
Senior Chinese state officials make a point of visiting small countries who otherwise receive 
little attention, with aid announcements and agreements usually part of the visit870. 
  
One former Ugandan ambassador to China explains: “When I was arriving at my post, I was 
scheduled for a brief meeting and photo with the President and CPC Chairman Jiang Zemin. 
                                                          
866Interview with Ma Xiaolin, (Third Secretary, African Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic 
of China), Beijing, 13 May 2010 
867Solomon, Richard H, Chinese Political Negotiating Behavior, A Brief Analysis, Santa Monica, 1985 
868Solomon, Richard H, Chinese Political Negotiating Behavior, A Brief Analysis, Santa Monica, 1985, page 237 
869Hongyi Lai and Yiyi Lu, China’s soft power and International Relations, Routledge, 2012, page 154 
870 Interview with Mahmoud Allam (Egypt’s Ambassador to China), Beijing, 15 January 2008  
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Instead, we spoke for nearly an hour. President Jiang not only had a broad continental view of 
Africa but I was impressed by his detailed knowledge of African issues”871. Another example 
was the president of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, who expressed his acknowledgement of this 
approach saying that “China’s approach to our needs is simply better adapted than the slow and 
sometimes patronizing post-colonial approach of European investors”872. 
 
The number of high-level visits from senior Chinese officials to Africa since the early 1990s 
reflects the importance of Africa for China’s foreign policy agenda. Chairman Mao, while 
meeting Asian and African visitors for the first time in 1964, declared them to be close 
friends873. Despite changes in leadership and a change in political strategy, President Hu Jintao, 
in reinforcing China’s position in 2006, stressed that “China and Africa are good friends, good 
partners and good brothers”874. China maintained the momentum of mutual visits and dialogue 
with African leaders, in order to facilitate communication, deepen friendships and promote 
mutual understanding and trust. China favours increased multi-level and multi-channel 
engagements based on mutual respect between the National People's Congress (NPC) and 
African parliaments and the Pan-African Parliament of the AU, so as to deepen understanding 
and cooperation875. 
 
Top level meetings or “summit diplomacy” between Chinese and African heads of state since the 
1960s, have been key in establishing direct communications and have set the tone for bilateral 
relations and policies. As early as 1963-64, Premier Zhou’s visit impacted on the structure of 
international relations as Beijing won the friendship of many African nations, thereby expanding 
its diplomatic reach. Brian Hotron, Chief Diplomatic correspondent of Reuters, believes that 
Zhou Enlai’s visit was “a big move for China to expand China’s presence and influence in 
Africa,” and “a significant development in Asian-African political relations and the relations 
between the East and the West”876. 
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During China’s policy shifts in Africa in the 1980s, the Chinese Premier initiated more visits to 
the continent to reassure its friendship, despite Beijing’s burgeoning growth and new business 
partnerships with previous ideological competitors. Beijing publicly stated: “We will not forget 
old friends when making new friends, or forget poor friends when making rich friends”877. 
Importantly, this diplomacy has sought to instill confidence by consistently applying these 
principles to Sino-African relations. Reinforcing this cooperation on the basis of equality has 
become a tradition of Chinese diplomacy. 
 
While the West largely neglected Africa after the Cold War, Chinese foreign ministers made 
African nations their first official stop when travelling abroad from 1991 to 2008. These visits 
were both symbolic and real gestures of China’s respect for Africa.  
 
Two-way visits between Africa and China have dramatically increased since the turn of the 
century878. China’s increased economic engagement with Africa since the early 1990s led to an 
increase in diplomatic visits: in 1992 former President Yang Shangkun visited Africa, followed 
by former President Jiang Zemin in 1995, 1996 and 2000. In 2006, dubbed the ‘year of Africa’ 
by Beijing, important Chinese delegations visited almost every country in Africa. 
 
In January 2006, the Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing visited Cape Verde, Senegal, Mali 
and Liberia, as well as Libya and Nigeria. In April President Hu Jintao visited Morocco, Nigeria 
and Kenya; and in June Premier Wen Jiabao toured Egypt, Ghana, the Republic of Congo, 
Angola, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda. Before the June visit, the Premier’s previous visit 
to Africa was in December 2003 when he participated in the China-Africa Forum in Addis 
Ababa879. 
 
The countries visited are also strategically important for China. Nigeria, Sudan and Angola are 
important oil-producing countries and are sources for China’s oil imports. South Africa, as a 
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strategic ally and the economic powerhouse in Africa, has received a number of high-ranking 
Chinese officials since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1998. The importance of 
South Africa to China is frequently stated, particularly in relation to China’s agenda regarding 
‘South-South cooperation’ and boosting China as the leader within this framework. Commenting 
on the Chinese Premier’s visit to South Africa in June 2006, the Chinese ambassador to South 
Africa, Liu Guijing, said: “We have realized that South Africa is one of the most important 
countries”. 880 
At the same time, the Chinese Embassy in Pretoria hailed the cooperation between China and 
South Africa in international affairs, as well as African affairs and matters of South-South 
cooperation, saying that this “cooperation constitutes a very important part of China-Africa and 
South-South cooperation”881. South Africa also regards China as an important ally, considering 
its own aspirations in the international system and increasing its own status amongst developing 
countries. This is attested in a statement released by the South African Department of Foreign 
Affairs (DFA) following a South African delegation’s visit to China (led by Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Aziz Pahad) in June 2006, which stated: “discussions affirmed that South Africa 
is a strategic partner for China and that both countries were allies in efforts to achieve the 
developmental agenda of the South. Both countries agreed to continue their cooperation in 
multilateral forum with a renewed focus on the implementation of the developmental agenda of 
the South”882. 
 
On a state visit to South Africa during April 2000, President Jiang Zemin and President Thabo 
Mbeki signed the ‘Pretoria Declaration on the Partnership between the People’s Republic of 
China and the Republic of South Africa’, which aimed to increase economic cooperation, as well 
as cooperation in international affairs. The most important outcome of the Pretoria Declaration 
was the setting up of a bi-national commission (BNC), which was aimed at facilitating bilateral 
relations and cooperation between China and South Africa as well as providing a platform for 
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discussions on all matters of mutual interest. Mbeki’s visit to Beijing in December 2001 saw the 
official launch of the BNC. 883 
 
The following five sectorial committees have been established under the BNC: diplomatic 
affairs, trade, education, science and technology, and defence. The second BNC was held during 
Vice President Zeng Quighong’s visit to South Africa in 2004, which focused mainly on 
strengthening cooperation between the two countries.  
 
6.4.4 Image building as a form of soft power 
 
The CPC is very aware that it has to constantly improve its image and influence public sentiment 
within the African countries. It does this through its embassies. In 2007/2008 the CPC’s 
international outreach organization tasked a number of African embassies to undertake a 
perception survey884. The main purpose of this exercise was to determine China’s image in 
Africa. China decided to conduct this survey in order to improve its image, especially after the 
negative reports it was receiving in the media. The media were reporting that China’s entry into 
Africa ‘was another form of colonialism’. CPC allocated “$3 billion for exerting more 
international influence through diplomacy and national image lifting885. The results of the survey 
are not known and therefore a substitute was looked for to include in this study. In 2007 the Pew 
Center conducted an attitude survey in African states to determine how citizens view the 
comparative influence of China and the USA in their countries. The figure below indicates the 
attitudes about their respective good and bad influences and the difference between the two 
powers’ good influence. 
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Figure 23: China’s influence compared to America’s influence in Africa886 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Senegal, Tanzania and Ethiopia stand out as states where there is the biggest difference in attitude in 
favour of China, while South Africa is the only state where the American influence is regarded as 
more than the Chinese influence.  
6.4.5 Role of the Ministry of State Security and other intelligence agencies in soft power 
 
Any discussion on China’s political and economic activities on the African continent must take 
into account the covert role played by the country’s intelligence organs which serve the 
economic and political interests of the state. Unlike Western corporations which operate 
independently of any state intelligence structures, Chinese companies are closely interwoven into 
state structures (which include intelligence). Furthermore, heads of management and CEOs are 
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appointed by the government. Chinese companies work in tandem with the state’s economic, 
political and developmental strategic plans, ensuring proper alignment of companies with the 
state’s economic and political objectives.  Hence all negotiations with foreign governments and 
business entities are subject of on-going assessments by a number of PRC intelligence 
structures887.  In the context of China’s growing energy and resources acquisition in African 
countries, the information provided by the embassies feed into the Chinese intelligence system.  
Some of these intelligence operations are conducted by the Ministry of State Security, known as 
Guoanbu, followed by the National Security Ministry (MSS), which is the country’s single most 
important strategic intelligence service, and operates both internally and externally. Under the 
MSS is the People’s Liberation Army, which falls under the Department of Military Intelligence 
(DMI) and the all-powerful Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)888. MOFCOM is the head of 
China’s economic and business intelligence and evaluation structure in the country which 
provides vital information on the country’s internal and external relations. It relies on industrial 
intelligence through the use of analysts and researchers, through its Second Bureau, Eighth 
Bureau Economic office, 10th Bureau of Science and Technology, and the infamous Technical 
Department (Jishubul), which spend considerable resources on spying and monitoring foreign 
businesspeople889.  
Unlike in other countries, the dividing line between state and private enterprises in China is 
deliberately blurred, with individuals acting in overlapping capacities.  A Chinese business 
leader may head a state-held Chinese company; at the same time he may also report to 
MOFCOM and be a member of the MSS or a high ranking CCP official working in one of the 
many research organizations or think-tanks890. Shambaugh argues that foreign attaches “do not 
openly identify themselves as such, usually identifying themselves simply as Foreign Ministry 
personnel”891. A South African diplomat observed that “the CPC-ID official posted to an African 
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embassy carried three different cards; one from the CPC-ID bureau, another as a PRC embassy 
staff member, and yet another as a research fellow at CAFIU”892. 
Adding to the confusion is that the MSS often sends delegates or ‘business delegates’ to attend 
international policy conferences or to attend complicated trade negotiations. These ‘delegates’ 
provide background intelligence, sum up opposition negotiating positions and provide relevant 
advice to business officials. 
MOFCOM also plays a vital role in economic intelligence gathering. Although MOFCOM’s 
main function is to interface with foreign commercial interest groups, it also has sub-intelligence 
units that deals with economic information gathering. According to the French publication, 
Intelligence Online, MOFCOM works closely with MSS. MOFCOM’s main objective is to keep 
an eye on China’s massive economic development on the global stage. This would involve 
monitoring developments within organizations like the WTO as well acquiring new technologies 
for the country893. 
MOFCOM also acquires information from a commerce ministry service within the Department 
of International Trade and Economic Affairs. Other organizations that MOFCOM acquires 
information from are research institutions and think tanks that have been established in the past 
two decades. Some of these are the Foreign Trade Research Institute, the National Economic 
Research Institute of Beijing and the Shanghai Economic Research Institute. MOFCOM’s 
economic, business and financial information is processed by the Chinese Communist Party894.  
MOFCOM supplies Chinese companies with information on trade and investment opportunities 
in Africa and is known in the host countries as the Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s 
Offices (ECCO)895. 
Another aspect of Chinese intelligence gathering is through social relationships and personal 
networking, known as the “United Front”. Chinese expatriates act as a reservoir for intelligence 
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gathering, local networking and influencing operations. Some of the examples of how MSS have 
assisted in Africa are for example in Angola where it was able to assist China’s entry into the 
country’s energy sector and open back channels to Sao Tome Principe.  
In Guinea Bissau the MSS was able to monitor Taiwan’s relations with Gambia. In Senegal it 
was able to monitor Taiwanese activities in Dakar before Senegal switched sides in October 
2005. In Niger it was able to monitor Taiwan’s relations with Burkina Faso and the movements 
of Islamic militants possibly linked to the Uyghur’s from Xinjiang Province896. 
In Nigeria, the MSS was able to expand China’s strategic interest in energy resources and new 
markets. In Sudan, (until the recent Peace accords) the MSS was used to monitor and provide 
tactical information of rebel movement across the country and in Darfur. In Egypt and Algeria, 
the MSS was able to monitor the movement of Chinese Islamists Turkestan and Uyghur’s across 
North Africa.  The MSS monitored South Africa because of its strategic locality and importance 
in the developing world and its gateway into Africa. In Mozambique, China interest was because 
of its strategic location in the Indian Ocean and its proximity to Taiwan’s support for 
Swaziland”.897 
MSS personnel are more concentrated in countries that are rich in raw minerals like Sudan, 
Nigeria, Angola and South Africa. The most successful MSS operations have been in Senegal 
and Chad, where it played an important role in opening back channels to get these countries to 
switch diplomatic ties from Taiwan to China898.    
Chinese intelligence officers are not only found in embassies but also in Chinese companies, and 
also under the guise of media organizations. Media outlets like New China (Xinhua) News 
Agency or journalists act as an important conduit in conveying information back to headquarters. 
Chinese business intelligence also plays a critical role in China’s energy resource acquisition 
agenda. Companies like CITIC, China Overseas Shipping Corporation (COSCO), Huawei, ZTE, 
and Semi-tech relay intelligence through the state body for Science and Technology (SSTC). 
Some employees in Chinese companies are also used as intelligent operatives in order to 
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understand the local environment and interface with local decision-makers to strengthen Chinese 
political institutions. An unofficial source claimed that “China targeted competitors in the energy 
and natural resource sector” to gather intelligence information on De Beers Diamond in 2005 in 
the Central African Republic (CAR)899. This highlights the symbiotic relationship that exists 
between Chinese companies, MOFCOM and China’s state intelligence apparatus. 
Intelligence is therefore used as a means of determining what is in the interest of soft power, in 
strategic terms how it should be coordinated and in which areas it should be applied.                                                                                                       
 
6.4.6 The role of an embassy as a vehicle for Soft Power diplomacy 
 
The wide-range of exchange and co-operation activities lay out under the FOCAC framework 
and in the China’s African Policy is implemented by an extensive network of PRC diplomats in 
Africa900. China maintains embassies and has diplomatic ties with 49 countries and has 
commercial offices in 40 of these countries and seven Consulates General in five of them. 
Chinese diplomats are extremely fluent in the local languages. The embassies are pivotal 
instruments in preparing for high level leadership exchange visits, including regular annual trips 
to Africa by top PRC authorities901. Regular leadership visits are encouraged to build personal 
ties and cement bilateral relationships. The local embassy staff members are very important in 
identifying opportunities for Chinese businesses, for bilateral cooperation and for Chinese 
interventions in the local conditions. Draft agreements are prepared and finalized by the visiting 
PRC leadership. 
These top PRC leadership visits are usually accompanied by large delegations including business 
representatives. They sign major agreements which are financed by PRC state agencies at 
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preferential rates. African heads of state accompanied by a large retinue of political, trade, and 
business leaders also make frequent reciprocal visits to China902. 
Low level exchanges include training by the Chinese for senior and mid-level African diplomats, 
economic officials, business professionals and other key decision-makers and policy 
implementers. These training programs began in the mid-1990s and are a pivotal part of China’s 
political soft power and charm offensive. Although one can argue that all countries engage in 
these charm offensives, China is very effective in delivering on its promises. Exchanges between 
legislative bodies, the PRC’s Communist Party and African political parties, local governments 
and think tanks take place and these trips are generously funded by the PRC.  
Embassy personnel play a critical role in providing information to the PRC. However, this is not 
unique to China as all embassies provide similar functions to their governments. However 
Chinese embassies operate slightly differently and in order to understand the Chinese political 
system we need to understand its structures. 
It is reported that MSS Officers are located in most African embassies and in many cases they 
hold senior positions. In the Chinese embassy in Pretoria, MSS members are active in collecting 
information on South Africa’s economy. The MSS also looks for business opportunities and they 
facilitate meetings with South African business leaders. According to an anonymous source, the 
PRC at one stage had approximately 30 specialist MSS agents inside Liberia. This was the 
runner up to the 2005 Presidential election. The MSS were positioned in Liberia to determine if 
any financial assistance would be given by Taiwan903. 
The local Chinese embassies are therefore essential elements in the Chinese network of 
instruments that galvanize its political soft power all over the world, but specifically in Africa. 
This study has identified the role played by embassies as a specific element of soft power; a fact 
not explicitly acknowledged in theoretical terms by Nye. 
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6.5.  Chapter Conclusion 
 
In an article “China and Africa,” Gerald Segal asserted that China, as a rising global power, 
would be more important to Africa than vice versa and surmised that Africa would be of least 
importance to China’s foreign policy904. An examination of current Sino-African relations 
clearly disproves Segal’s observations. In fact, Africa has become a key region for Beijing’s 
international political and economic agenda.  
 
In this chapter we examined how China uses political soft power in its engagement with African 
countries. From 1980 it was primarily driven by a Realist foreign policy. According to Realism 
theory, it is in the interest of the every state to seek power and influence in order to promote its 
own security against other states through economic and political maneuvering. Moreover, 
asserting influence on other states to enhance one’s own goals and policies can be achieved 
through forceful coercion (‘hard power’ like military intervention) or through appeal, known as 
soft power.  
 
The question that needs to be asked is why is China driven by a Realist foreign policy? One 
explanation is Chinese nationalism which might have been spurred by Western hostility towards 
China. In this context Chinese rulers promoted nationalism as a way to oppose external hostility 
and assert their independence905. Nationalism was a driving factor in Chinese foreign policy for 
most of the 20th century and since 1949, Beijing has actively promoted ‘state nationalism’ (i.e. 
building a Chinese nation as opposed to ethnic nationalisms). Nationalism still dominates 
China’s foreign policy orientation – “to seek and preserve China’s national independence”906. 
The key factors of Chinese nationalism are economic development, national unity and 
independence and international prestige. 
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Of the three, economic development is regarded as the most important priority and the one that 
encompasses all other national aims907. It is within this framework that China’s political soft 
power is regarded. 
 
In this chapter we analyzed elements of China’s political soft power. I argued that China’s ‘one 
China’ policy is a way of marginalizing Taiwan’s presence on the continent and preserving its 
national security. China’s other objective is to reinforce its political influence within the 
developing world so as to increase its global legitimacy among the international community. 
 
Secondly, as a rising power, China is keen on mustering political influence in Africa by 
aggressively pursuing new allies. It requires votes at the United Nations (UN) and other forums 
to support its foreign policy and to ease pressure from the Western democracies regarding issues 
like human rights, economic openness and political freedom. Africa represents more than one-
quarter of the UN General Assembly membership and China is attempting to divide conventional 
foreign policies of the West and the global South. In fact, Beijing uses several methods including 
traditional and commercial diplomacy and increasingly, public diplomacy and ‘soft power’. is 
one of the objectives of China’s Africa policy is to ensure support for its domestic and foreign 
policies within specialized organizations such as the UN Council on Human Rights (UNCHR). 
For this reason, China provides unconditional support to African countries, and subsequently, 
African nations have supported Beijing. With regard to Sudan, China, as a permanent member of 
the UN Security Council, has opposed any measures intended to address the humanitarian crisis 
in Darfur. By using its influence in the Security Council, China has managed to drive a wedge 
between Sudan and Western countries, a move that only increases Beijing's stature to the oil-rich 
Khartoum regime. On the other hand, African states have avoided condemning Chinese human 
rights practices at the UNCHR. As soon as China was assured of the support of more than half of 
African countries, it established its African multilateral partnership in the form of FOCAC.  
 
China’s pledge of “non-interference” in the political affairs of African countries and the absence 
of conditionalities in making investment deals and offering development assistance has appealed 
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to African leaders. Many of these countries are ruled by corrupt, autocratic leaders and elites 
who disregard human rights and the rule of law. China readily strikes deals that lack 
transparency, accountability, and other criteria established by the World Bank and IMF, Western 
governments and NGOs. As Lafargue notes, China provides such regimes with the opportunity 
to steer clear of these measures and to suppress opposition political movements and civil society 
who call for democracy, transparency, the rule of law and the end of corruption. China’s non-
interference policy has been rightly deemed “deeply disingenuous”908. 
 
Beijing is an attractive partner for Africa’s authoritarian leaders and regimes for whom “the 
distribution of patronage remains an exigency for political survival”909. These resource-rich 
African regimes have very little incentive to diversify their economies and to promote 
development outside of the resource sector. Indeed, they have no interest in developing a social 
order with a middle class that would demand the rule of law, democracy and an end to corruption 
and good governance, which would threaten their hold on power. 
 
Alden outlines this predicament in much of Africa: “For many elites in Africa, wealth generation 
and survival does not depend on productive development on a nationwide scale. Elite survival 
depends on access to rents to distribute to patronage networks.  Consequently, China’s economic 
and political support could offer African politicians increasing leeway in misusing public funds 
and manipulating institutions to preserve their own power”910.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN:  CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis set out to explore and analyses the concept of ‘power’ and soft power in particular in 
the context of China and Africa.  The purpose of the study was to firstly determine the salient 
features of soft power and its application in Chinese relations with African states. Secondly, it 
was to apply the theories of soft power in the context of Chinese relations with African states. 
The preparations for this study made it clear that China’s applications of soft power could be 
confined to two main areas, namely political and economic soft power.  
In this chapter the first part will summarise the concluding remarks and arguments of each 
chapter, and in the latter part the key findings of the study will be presented.   The chapter will 
end with some concluding thoughts on the topic. 
This study has made attempts to show that China’s foreign policy underwent a shift from 1978, 
following the implementation of Deng Xiaoping’s domestic modernization process. This shift 
was characterized by China’s increased engagement with the outside world, and the beginning of 
its integration into the global economy. 
The scope of this study is grounded in the fields of both International Relations (IR) and Global 
Political Economy (GPE). The theoretical underpinning for such a discussion was elaborated on 
in Chapter 2. This theoretical framework was constructed from three separate but interrelated 
concepts. It included Joseph Nye’s theory of soft power, the Realist perspective and the theories 
of Economic Nationalism. These theories provide us with instruments for analyzing and 
understanding China’s involvement in Africa and specifically its soft power relations with 
African states.  
Joseph Nye’s concept of ‘soft power’ was examined and elucidated further. This concept is 
closely associated with non-material forms of power and has become a powerful weapon for 
states in their international relations and diplomacy. This is especially evident in the manner in 
which China relates to Africa. It is clear that soft power attracts new relationships and legitimizes 
actions whilst building alliances and consensus. At the same time it is a peaceful alternative to 
the zero-sum strategy of the Realists, who predominately focus on excessive use of hard power 
capabilities.  
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The literature review presented different perspectives on China’s power perceptions and their 
possible implications. Though it referred to a rich tradition of publications on China’s use of soft 
power, Africa as a region is not particularly well represented in it. More specifically the literature 
review concluded that soft power in its existing theoretical form and in the way China utilizes it 
in relation to African states has not yet received sufficient research attention. This therefore 
provided a justification for the present study to be conducted. 
The research in Chapter 2 indicates that China’s behavior in Africa is amenable to the Realist 
descriptions and predictions of state behavior. The concepts of ‘power’, ‘national interest’ and 
‘self-interest’ are recurring themes in China’s relationship with Africa especially in its economic, 
and political engagements with the African continent. This study also assumed that China’s quest 
for resources in Africa is well suited for interpretation by the Economic Nationalist theory. The 
heavy influence of the state in China’s economic interaction with Africa also demonstrates how 
Economic Nationalist theory is suitable for interpreting China’s policies. 
Though in theoretical terms soft power is ‘attractive power’ or the ‘carrot’ in the ‘carrot and 
stick’ approach, it is still in essence a form of power and has therefore theoretical links to the 
Realism/Neo-realism schools. There is however doubt whether its form articulated by Joseph 
Nye is most appropriate for China’s purposes. An alternative in the form of the ‘soft use of 
power’ is therefore also included for use in this study. 
In Chapter 3 we introduced the main concepts used in the study and linked them to a theoretical 
framework. It is seldom that a study can depend on only one theoretical premise to provide an 
analytical or explanatory framework. This study is no exception. 
Given the fact that China’s relationship with African states is located within the domain of its 
emergence as a major world power (i.e. a rising power), power as a concept is central to this 
study. Traditionally power has been associated mainly with the schools of Realism and Neo-
realism, and for the purpose of this study it was understood that ‘soft power’ is used to promote a 
state’s national interest and therefore can be integrated into the traditions of Realism and Neo-
realism. This point has not been discussed in depth in theoretical terms but serves as a premise 
for this study.  
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This study’s topic refers to China as a ‘rising power’. Given the fact that the main objective of 
this study was to concentrate on China’s relationship with African states and the role the 
continent plays in China’s development as a world power, this study is not concerned with 
China’s domestic development processes but only with how its relationship with African states 
contributes towards its status as a “rising power”. The purpose of this study was therefore not to 
demonstrate how China’s power is developed – it is accepted as a given – but how one region 
contributes towards that power development. More specifically this study wanted to demonstrate 
how China’s ‘soft power’ specifically contributes towards that development.   
We have noted that the manner, in which Beijing deals with the outside world, including Africa, 
is very reflective of what is happening in China’s internal affairs. From the 1940s onwards, when 
China was isolated and it had prioritized securing diplomatic ties, it dealt with the outside world 
in this manner. However, we observed a shift in China’s foreign policy towards Africa as it 
began to place economic development at the center of its affairs. An important conclusion of 
Chapter 3 is that a proper understanding of the history of China-African relations depends on a 
thorough understanding of the history of development in China itself which undoubtedly mirrors 
changes in the policies and objectives of the Chinese and the way China interacts with the rest of 
the world. 
In Chapter 4 an historical overview of the reasons why most Chinese believe that China is 
destined to become a great nation with its rise to super power status in the international system is 
provided. They believe that this rise, as a great nation, has been predetermined and presently, 
China’s Africa policy reaffirms the presence of this mentality. The logic is that if other countries 
recognize or respect China as a great power, China will reciprocate with economic benefits for 
them.   
One of the most significant conclusions of this study is that China applies soft power in the 
African context not only to be attractive for the continent but also to address possible perceptions 
that its emergence as a global power may pose a direct threat to the status quo world powers. The 
study demonstrated how the PRC’s use of terms like “peaceful rise”, “peaceful development” 
and “harmonious world” are carefully calibrated to emphasise that China’s intentions are 
peaceful. It is very careful and guarded about using of language that does not present a negative 
image.  The concept “peaceful rise” has been replaced with “peaceful development” and more 
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recently China decided to project an image of a “responsible power”. Therefore the phrase 
“harmonious world” is intended to reduce potential international friction between China and 
other major powers and to prevent possible counter measures on China’s rise. 
In examining China’s economic relationship with Africa in Chapter 5, the study concluded that 
Beijing selects African countries according to their potential source of raw materials or 
alternatively as potential market for China’s manufactured goods. China’s increasing demand for 
commodities has had a positive impact on Africa’s growth. Furthermore the influx of cheap 
Chinese manufacturing goods and consumables has had a positive impact on the purchasing 
power of the poor in some African states. The research clearly indicates that China has made its 
largest investment in Africa’s energy sector, in order to secure its own oil flow. China has 
become a major player in almost every oil-producing African country and Beijing’s strategy has 
been to negotiate lucrative oil prices in exchange for attractive investment packages, trade and 
aid. Although China’s aid to Africa is by no means unusual, as many Western countries provide 
similar forms of aid, it is clear that China uses aid in a sophisticated, soft power manner that 
other Western countries don’t. 
The research concluded that China’s aid to Africa is by no means altruistic but is motivated by 
economic self-interest – providing access to Africa’s natural resources, penetrating African 
markets, creating new business opportunities for Chinese companies and creating employment 
opportunities for Chinese labour. However, the one positive aspect of China’s foreign direct 
investment in Africa has been the boom in Africa’s infrastructural development.  
There is almost no evidence that can challenge China’s rise as a global power and therefore its 
status as a “rising power” is regarded as a given also in this chapter. It already surpassed Japan as 
the second biggest economy in GDP terms. This Chapter also examined ‘soft power’ and how it 
influences China’s self-perception of its emergence as a major power. These perceptions were 
articulated in a series of terms (i.e. rising power, peaceful rise, peaceful development and others) 
mentioned already earlier to make China attractive and non-threatening to the international 
community. In that sense, we can conclude that soft power considerations were paramount in 
determining China’s public diplomacy language. 
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Economic soft power focuses specifically on trade and investment as elements of China’s power 
projection into Africa.  The study demonstrated that general trade between China and Africa 
grew exponentially over the last decade and that this increase has seen China importing mostly 
raw materials, commodities and primary products, while African states importing mostly 
manufactured and value-added goods from China.  
While China’s increasing demand for commodities has the potential to have a positive impact on 
Africa’s growth, as this is linked to the growth in their foreign exchange and capital for more 
investments, these benefits could be outweighed by the high volatility of demand for Africa’s 
commodities depending on tendencies in the Chinese domestic market.  
A further problem is that China’s presence in Africa has the potential to encourage rent-seeking 
behavior, where the local elites are enriched with little or no benefits for the masses. For 
example, China has carefully developed relationships with Sudan and Zimbabwe, which allows it 
to extract oil (in Sudan) and commodities like tobacco, diamonds, gold and agricultural products 
(in Zimbabwe) in exchange for weapons and military equipment.  
As we have indicated, the influx of cheap Chinese manufactured goods and consumables has a 
potentially positive impact on the purchasing power of the poor, such as in Uganda where the 
general population has benefited from access to affordable consumables at no expense to the 
local industry. However, in economies such as South Africa, where there is a mature 
manufacturing sector, Chinese imports have been detrimental to the textile and footwear 
industries, which have seen numerous factory closures and job losses.  
In the most part the research has shown that Chinese investments are welcomed by African 
governments, especially in the light of decreased European and North American investments. It 
is important to note that it is the state rather than the market, that determines Chinese investment 
projects and that many of these companies are State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), which are 
accountable to party officials rather than commercial managers.  
China’s economic involvement in Africa conforms to the Economic Nationalist explanatory 
framework. The nature of China’s business in Africa is premised on the notion of promoting its 
national interest as its key priority and as such bolstering China’s domestic economy irrespective 
of its impact on the African economies. In particular, China’s interests in African minerals and 
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oil are aimed at bolstering its domestic manufacturing base and energy security and therefore 
these relations with African states are aimed at furthering its own economic development, and, 
within Realist terms, its national interest and power. 
China decided to make its largest investments in Africa’s energy sector in order to secure its own 
oil flow. In terms of soft power most African companies see China as a reliable partner and one 
that allows them to offset the influence of the private multinational oil companies.  China’s 
strategy of aggressively offering economic investment packages and trade opportunities is 
working to promote its soft power, while at the same time improving its ability to gain 
opportunities either to purchase additional oil supplies or to develop partnerships with state oil 
companies. 
Following the soft power approach China publicly states that it does not seek to use aid to 
influence the domestic politics of African countries or to dictate their policies. Instead, its stated 
motive is to assist African countries’ development. However, China’s assistance is not one way 
only.  Chinese projects create access to Africa’s natural resources and local markets, business 
opportunities for Chinese companies and employment for Chinese laborers. Chinese officials 
often refute this fact by claiming that China also provides aid to countries that are not rich in 
natural resources, but they neglect to mention that China may have other intentions like gaining 
support for Beijing’s “one China policy”, or for China’s agenda for its multilateral forum. 
China’s aid policy to Africa is complex, comprehensive and multi-dimensional and defies any 
simplistic view. 
China’s success lies in that its bankers do not impose governance preconditions on lending to 
African governments. The one positive aspect of China’s foreign aid, as indicated by the 
research, has been the boom in Africa’s infrastructural projects, creating much needed electrical, 
transportation and telecommunications capacity.  
Finally, inclusion of economic elements in the discussion of China’s soft power does not strictly 
follows Nye’s original approach to soft power. This suggests that China uses its economic means 
and trade relations with African states in a manner different from the USA and most European 
countries. Hence the conclusion is that the Chinese economic elements assume much more the 
role of ‘soft power’ than in the case of the American approach – hence the deviation from Nye’s 
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approach. This however is not an unqualified success, as explained earlier, and therefore the 
inclusion of economic elements as part of soft power should not be regarded as an unqualified 
new theoretical contribution. It is my contention that these theoretical implications should be 
more closely examined in the future. 
In Chapter Six, in respect of political soft power, we analyzed why China is driven by a Realist 
foreign policy in Africa. This Chapter concluded that indeed nationalism is the driving factor in 
China’s foreign policy towards Africa in the 21st century and that it may have been spurred by 
Western hostility towards China.  
In addition to its economic soft power China uses political soft power in its engagement with 
African countries. One of its policy elements is the ‘one-China policy’ as a way to marginalize 
Taiwan’s influence in the continent. This has been one of China’s most successful achievements. 
From 1980 onwards its approach was primarily driven by a Realist foreign policy towards 
Africa, which means that it is in the interest of the state to seek power and influence in order to 
promote its own security against other states through economic and political maneuvering. 
Moreover, asserting influence on other states to enhance one’s own goals and policies can be 
achieved through forceful coercion (‘hard power’ like military intervention) or through appeal, 
known as soft power.  
The question that continually underpinned the research is: why is China driven by a soft power 
foreign policy? It is clear that Chinese rulers promoted nationalism as a way to oppose external 
hostility and assert their independence. Nationalism was a driving factor in Chinese foreign 
policy for most of the 20th century and since 1949, Beijing has actively promoted ‘state 
nationalism’ (i.e. building a Chinese nation as opposed to ethnic nationalisms). Nationalism still 
dominates China’s foreign policy orientation – “to seek and preserve China’s national 
independence”. The key factors driving this nationalism are economic development, national 
unity and independence and international prestige. 
Of the three, economic development is regarded as the most important priority and the one that 
encompasses all other national aims. It is within this framework that China’s political soft power 
was considered. 
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It is evident that, as a rising power, China is keen on mustering political influence in Africa by 
assertively pursuing new allies. China requires votes at the United Nations (UN) and other 
forums to support its foreign policy and to ease pressure from the Western democracies 
regarding issues like human rights, economic openness and political freedom. African states 
represent more than one-quarter of the UN General Assembly membership and China is 
attempting to establish a divide between the conventional foreign policies of the West and those 
of the global South. In fact, Beijing uses several methods to achieve it, including traditional and 
commercial diplomacy and increasingly also public diplomacy and ‘soft power’. One of the 
objectives of China’s Africa policy is to ensure support for its domestic and foreign policies 
within specialized organizations such as the UN Council on Human Rights (UNCHR).  
China’s pledge of “non-interference” in the political domestic affairs of African countries and 
the absence of Chinese conditionalities in making investment deals and offering development 
assistance has appealed to African leaders – in other words, they are used in the form of soft 
power. Many of these countries are ruled by corrupt, autocratic leaders and elites who disregard 
human rights and the rule of law. China readily strikes deals that lack transparency, 
accountability, and other criteria established by the World Bank and IMF, Western governments 
and NGOs. From empirical evidence, it is clear that China provides such regimes with the 
opportunity to steer clear of these requirements and to enable them to suppress opposition 
political movements and civil society who call for democracy, transparency, the rule of law and 
the end of corruption.  
It is equally evident that Beijing is an attractive partner for Africa’s authoritarian leaders and 
regimes for whom patronage is essential for political survival. These resource-rich African 
regimes (as well as China) have very little incentive to diversify their economies and to promote 
development outside of the resource sector. Indeed, they have no interest in developing a social 
order with a middle class that would demand the rule of law, democracy and an end to corruption 
and good governance. 
In the final analysis, the use of political soft power is not premised on any moral judgments or 
that it serves as a means towards the end. The research concluded that Beijing uses soft power to 
achieve certain political goals that promote its national interest in terms of relations with other 
states or enhancing its international power and prestige. Its objective is not to promote good 
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governance, human rights, democracy ore even economic development through its use of soft 
power. It is concluded that in China’s view such an insistence on political moral aspects is not 
generally popular in the international community.  
China’s approach to soft power is diametric opposed to Western and North American uses of soft 
power, which often includes a political-moral or value dimension, for example human rights or 
democracy. This study showed that China deliberately intends to distance itself from this 
approach and anticipating it will make itself more attractive to African states with uncertain 
democratic dispensations.  
While the research has attempted to analyses and answer some of the fundamental propositions 
raised, it has also raised some fundamental questions regarding China’s future. While the use of 
the ‘one China policy’ as a soft power pillar has been highly successful, the question remains: 
what is the purpose of this policy? Can it still be used for or to promote soft power policy in 
Africa? As China enhances its status on the international stage, the question is: does Beijing need 
a new theoretical framework for its foreign policy issues?  
In the chapter’s final section the focus returns to the research questions posed in the Introduction, 
section 1.4. The question was the following:  
In its relationship with African states, how does China use soft power to promote its national 
interest? What is the nature of that soft power and does it also affect our theoretical 
understanding of soft power? 
In order to address this question, the following two objectives were identified for the study: 
1. To determine the salient features of ‘soft power’ and their application in Chinese 
relations with African states. Moreover, to determine China’s perception of what “soft 
power” is and how it can be used in Africa.  
2. To test the theories of ‘soft power’ in the process of their application to Chinese relations 
in Africa. Based on the preparatory research for this study it is assumed that the Chinese 
application of soft power can be divided into two main areas: the political and economic 
aspects of soft power. 
~ 262 ~ 
 
In all the discussions the premise was used that Chinese use of soft power in Africa can be 
reduced to two elements, namely political and economic components. Chapters 5 and 6 
demonstrated the multitude of ways in which the Chinese apply them in Africa, which therefore 
serve as a validation of the premise that Chinese policies indeed rely on economic and political 
soft power. To avoid a tautological argument, it is also evident from the discussions in the two 
chapters that no evidence exists to refute the argument that China relies on those two elements to 
constitute the core of its soft power in Africa. It does not suggest that these are the only forms of 
power used by the Chinese in Africa but the focus of this study was to determine how the 
Chinese use specifically soft power in Africa. 
The discussion found little evidence of any other major elements of soft power used by the 
Chinese in Africa. The most direct question in this regard is: what about cultural soft power? 
Nye attaches much weight to it in his conceptualization of soft power, especially in the form of 
American popular culture (i.e. music, Hollywood, fast foods, literature, etc.) as a factor in 
American appeal to others. Though China has embarked on establishing Confucius Centres in 
many parts of the world, it is unable to compete with the Anglo-Americans on this level. 
Mandarin cannot compete with English as a global language and therefore cultural goods like 
music or films are equally affected by it. Indirect mediums of culture, especially electronic 
platforms like Google, Facebook or Twitter, are challenged by the Chinese, not so much to 
establish competing cultural mediums but to limit the democratizing challenge they pose for the 
autocratic Chinese political milieu.  
Attractive foreign policies are also included in Nye’s soft power concept. China is certainly 
aware of its potential and therefore includes it in both their economic and political uses of soft 
power. China’s promotion of its Beijing Consensus as a paradigm for national development and 
as a basis for bilateral economic relations is one of the best examples. China’s need for natural 
commodities in exchange for providing attractive loans or becoming involved in African 
infrastructural development projects is a policy designed to present an alternative for the 
Washington Consensus approach of interest-based loans with political and economic 
conditionalities. Another example of its policy approach is China’s insistence on respecting 
countries’ national sovereignty and therefore no intervention in domestic affairs. Western 
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interventions are often associated with promotion of specific values like human rights, multiparty 
politics, limited presidential terms or good governance.  
From the discussion so far it should become evident that the Chinese use of soft power has some 
theoretical implications for the original Nye version of it. While in the original articulation of the 
concept culture has played a key role, in the Chinese version as articulated in Africa it is much 
less prominent. In its place the emphasis is almost exclusively on economic and political 
considerations. This study gave different content to economic and political soft power, such as 
participation in peacekeeping forces in Africa, the use of embassies and intelligence, and the use 
of multilateral bodies like FOCAC in the form of political outreach to African countries.  
Finally, the impact of soft power in China’s relations with African states has been positive for 
China in many respects but it also produced negative results in other instances. On the one hand 
it provided access to manufactured goods in underdeveloped African economies while in 
developing economies it became a competitor with local industries and therefore not popular (i.e. 
negative soft power). Its intention to remain a-political and not to become involved in the 
internal politics is also increasingly being more difficult to uphold. Darfur, South Sudan and 
Zimbabwe are a few examples of this dilemma for the Chinese. Other major powers have also 
realized that Africa is a new and emerging market worth competing for. Therefore Japan 
(TICAD), Turkey, Brazil, India together with the historical presence of France (Francafrique) 
and the European Union, and since 2014 also the USA (US-Africa summit) pose a direct 
challenge to China in Africa, which implies that it will have to revise its soft power approach 
more regularly. However, this study has demonstrated that Africa served so far a very important 
purpose for China’s emergence as a global power. Other regions (like Asia or Latin America) 
have played a similar role in their own right but study’s conclusion is that China’s success in its 
relations with Africa was primarily based on its application of a soft power approach to the 
continent. 
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APPENDIX  I  
List of Chinese Dynasties 
Chinese Dynasties Period 
Prehistoric Times 1.7 million years-the 21st century BC 
Xia Dynasty 21st- 16th Century BC 
Shang Dynasty 16th-11th Century BC 
Zhou Dynasty Western Zhou (11th Century BC) 
Eastern Zhou 
Spring and Autumn Period( 770BC-476BC) 
-Warring States Period (476BC-221BC) 
 
Qin Dynasty 221 BC-206 BC 
Hans Dynasty Western Han (206 BC-24 AD) 
Eastern Hans (25-220) 
Three Kingdoms Period 220-280 
Jin Dynasty Western Jin (265-316) 
Eastern Jin (317-420) 
Northern and Southern 
Dynasties 
Northern Dynasties (386-581) 
Southern Dynasties (420-589) 
Sui Dynasty 581-618 
Tang Dynasty 681-907 
Five Dynasties and Ten States Five Dynasties 
-Later Liang (907-923) 
-Later Tang (923-936) 
-Later Jin (936-946) 
Later Han (947-951) 
Later Zhou (951-960) 
Ten states (902-979) 
Song Dynasty Northern Song (960-1127) 
Southern Song (1127-1279) 
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Liao Dynasty 916-1125 
Jin Dynasty 1115-1234 
Yuan Dynasty 1271-1368 
Ming Dynasty 1368-1644 
Qing Dynasty 1644-1911 
Republic of China 1911-1949 
People’s Republic of China 1949-present 
 
 
 
 
